6 ms·

If you are going to demand a precise, non-handwavey answer to the hard problem, then you must first give the hard problem in a precise, non-handwavey way, or at

If you are going to demand a precise, non-handwavey answer to the hard problem, then you must first give the hard problem in a precise, non-handwavey way, or at the very least prove in a precise, non-handwavey way that there even is such a thing as the hard problem. As far as I've seen nobody has really done this, it's always just "what breathes fire into the equations?" "what is it like to be a bat?" "I just feel it in my bones that there's something missing"... P-zombies are an attempt, except that "p-zombies are conceivable" is to be taken as axiomatic without any further explanation.

joeberon 5y ago
That's the problem and exactly why I say I don't think it can't be explained via a vague feeling. I've never seen someone who says there is a hard problem of consciousness adequately explain to someone why there isn't. The poster is now making what seem more like appeals to emotion throughout the thread now: "are you saying that sufficiently complicated blocks of matter are conscious?" and the like. This is what always happens. While I personally believe there is a problem, I cannot explain why, and for a long time I didn't think there was a problem
- mach1ne 5y ago
  The so-called "hard problem of consciousness" may be a problem through which one may find a suitable definition for their own humanity, but it absolutely is not a scientific problem. If one wishes to gain concrete data, one needs to define the problem before defining the answer. Any current "problems" relating to consciousness are explainable without needing a consciousness component. I have not encountered a single problem which couldn't be explained by pure cognitive computation. Consciousness becomes a problem suitable for scientific endeavor the moment someone can actually define the problem.
  - nickelpro 5y ago
    Yes, just like the various interpretations of quantum mechanics, it's not a scientific question because it doesn't allow for any testable hypothesis. Science is bound by the scientific method, questions of philosophy exist outside these bounds. Is math invented or discovered? Does the wave function collapse upon observation, or do observers exist in superposition? Is my "red" the same as your "red"? Even if we could have exact answers to these questions, they wouldn't allow use to make predictions, and so they are not science. I think it's reasonable to say that means they aren't "useful", we can't go to space or build skyscrapers with these answers, but I think it equally makes them the more interesting questions. Our usual tools at rational inquiry fail to penetrate these sorts of questions.
    - mach1ne 5y ago
      Actually most of the problems you described are relevant and do exist in the objective world. The problem of the problem of consciousness is that there is no aspect in the definition of consciousness which couldn't be explained by objective mechanisms. Currently, asking whether there is a consciousness is like asking if there is glaxtimbo. What is glaxtimbo, you may ask? I can't explain it, but I feel like it is there. That's the extent to which the definition of consciousness in its unexplainable attributes currently reaches.
    - joeberon 5y ago
      As a doctor in quantum physics, we probably will be able to test between interpretations in the future, so you should not use this as an argument.
nickelpro 5y ago
Agreed, I somewhat address this in my follow on comment. In my mind rejecting the hard problem is the same as accepting the "consciousness is an illusion" answer to the problem. But I can see the point of view that views the entire conversation as a category error.
Al-Khwarizmi 5y ago
I find the classical argument with color qualia very convincing (in fact, I thought about it before even knowing what qualia were...). Nothing you can find out about wavelengths, cones, rods, neurons and so on will tell you why you see red the specific way you do, and whether my perception of red corresponds to yours or my "red" is actually your "green". So there is a gap there, something that doesn't follow from the mechanical state of the system. Of course, I won't claim to be able to define that gap in a precise way (I'm not even a philosopher), but I think it's clear that it exists, and in my view the burden on proof is on those that claim the problem doesn't exist because no one can come up with a believable methodology (even supposing infinite time, infinitely precise measuring instruments, etc.) that would tell us the answer to questions like why my "red" feels like it does or whether my experience of red is different from yours.
- bondarchuk 5y ago
  >Nothing you can find out about wavelengths, cones, rods, neurons and so on will tell you why you see red the specific way you do Or maybe it will, but we just don't have the neurological and information-theoretical tools at this moment in time. >and whether my perception of red corresponds to yours or my "red" is actually your "green". And maybe (at least this is my personal guess right now) it will show that this question is incoherent.
- FactolSarin 5y ago
  I don't see why two people experiencing red differently causes a problem for consciousness. Can't we both be conscious even with very different qualia?
  - Al-Khwarizmi 5y ago
    Of course we can be all conscious but with different qualia. But the thing is that if consciousness was merely a physical phenomenon, we should be able to determine qualia purely by looking at the physical system, just as we determine any other property. However, we could be in a situation where we have understood our behaviors down to particle level, and I would still have no idea how you perceive colors.
unyttigfjelltol 5y ago
My question is simply "why am I me?" Why and how is my personal point of view fixed to this particular lump of meat and I never wake up one day as you?
- eli_gottlieb 5y ago
  Because if you woke up as me, you'd be me. Let's assume that consciousness works in roughly the way implied by your question: it exists, but it exists entirely separately from both the body and from mental contents. Now, let's further assume that the scenario you're proposing actually happened. Last night, in our sleep, you and I switched souls. Yesterday's me is actually you now, and yesterday's you is actually me now. How can either of us tell the difference? Clearly the contents of our consciousness - our memories, knowledge, skills, perceptions, emotions, etc. - are attached to the body, particularly the brain. This is just the assumption we started with. What, then, makes you you and me me? Clearly our souls aren't doing a very good job at telling the difference!

joeberon 5y ago

That's the problem and exactly why I say I don't think it can't be explained via a vague feeling. I've never seen someone who says there is a hard problem of consciousness adequately explain to someone why there isn't. The poster is now making what seem more like appeals to emotion throughout the thread now: "are you saying that sufficiently complicated blocks of matter are conscious?" and the like. This is what always happens. While I personally believe there is a problem, I cannot explain why, and for a long time I didn't think there was a problem

mach1ne 5y ago
The so-called "hard problem of consciousness" may be a problem through which one may find a suitable definition for their own humanity, but it absolutely is not a scientific problem. If one wishes to gain concrete data, one needs to define the problem before defining the answer. Any current "problems" relating to consciousness are explainable without needing a consciousness component. I have not encountered a single problem which couldn't be explained by pure cognitive computation. Consciousness becomes a problem suitable for scientific endeavor the moment someone can actually define the problem.
- nickelpro 5y ago
  Yes, just like the various interpretations of quantum mechanics, it's not a scientific question because it doesn't allow for any testable hypothesis. Science is bound by the scientific method, questions of philosophy exist outside these bounds. Is math invented or discovered? Does the wave function collapse upon observation, or do observers exist in superposition? Is my "red" the same as your "red"? Even if we could have exact answers to these questions, they wouldn't allow use to make predictions, and so they are not science. I think it's reasonable to say that means they aren't "useful", we can't go to space or build skyscrapers with these answers, but I think it equally makes them the more interesting questions. Our usual tools at rational inquiry fail to penetrate these sorts of questions.
  - mach1ne 5y ago
    Actually most of the problems you described are relevant and do exist in the objective world. The problem of the problem of consciousness is that there is no aspect in the definition of consciousness which couldn't be explained by objective mechanisms. Currently, asking whether there is a consciousness is like asking if there is glaxtimbo. What is glaxtimbo, you may ask? I can't explain it, but I feel like it is there. That's the extent to which the definition of consciousness in its unexplainable attributes currently reaches.
  - joeberon 5y ago
    As a doctor in quantum physics, we probably will be able to test between interpretations in the future, so you should not use this as an argument.

nickelpro 5y ago

Agreed, I somewhat address this in my follow on comment. In my mind rejecting the hard problem is the same as accepting the "consciousness is an illusion" answer to the problem. But I can see the point of view that views the entire conversation as a category error.

Al-Khwarizmi 5y ago

I find the classical argument with color qualia very convincing (in fact, I thought about it before even knowing what qualia were...). Nothing you can find out about wavelengths, cones, rods, neurons and so on will tell you why you see red the specific way you do, and whether my perception of red corresponds to yours or my "red" is actually your "green". So there is a gap there, something that doesn't follow from the mechanical state of the system. Of course, I won't claim to be able to define that gap in a precise way (I'm not even a philosopher), but I think it's clear that it exists, and in my view the burden on proof is on those that claim the problem doesn't exist because no one can come up with a believable methodology (even supposing infinite time, infinitely precise measuring instruments, etc.) that would tell us the answer to questions like why my "red" feels like it does or whether my experience of red is different from yours.

bondarchuk 5y ago
>Nothing you can find out about wavelengths, cones, rods, neurons and so on will tell you why you see red the specific way you do Or maybe it will, but we just don't have the neurological and information-theoretical tools at this moment in time. >and whether my perception of red corresponds to yours or my "red" is actually your "green". And maybe (at least this is my personal guess right now) it will show that this question is incoherent.
FactolSarin 5y ago
I don't see why two people experiencing red differently causes a problem for consciousness. Can't we both be conscious even with very different qualia?
- Al-Khwarizmi 5y ago
  Of course we can be all conscious but with different qualia. But the thing is that if consciousness was merely a physical phenomenon, we should be able to determine qualia purely by looking at the physical system, just as we determine any other property. However, we could be in a situation where we have understood our behaviors down to particle level, and I would still have no idea how you perceive colors.

unyttigfjelltol 5y ago

My question is simply "why am I me?" Why and how is my personal point of view fixed to this particular lump of meat and I never wake up one day as you?

eli_gottlieb 5y ago
Because if you woke up as me, you'd be me. Let's assume that consciousness works in roughly the way implied by your question: it exists, but it exists entirely separately from both the body and from mental contents. Now, let's further assume that the scenario you're proposing actually happened. Last night, in our sleep, you and I switched souls. Yesterday's me is actually you now, and yesterday's you is actually me now. How can either of us tell the difference? Clearly the contents of our consciousness - our memories, knowledge, skills, perceptions, emotions, etc. - are attached to the body, particularly the brain. This is just the assumption we started with. What, then, makes you you and me me? Clearly our souls aren't doing a very good job at telling the difference!