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If your attacker is both sophisticated and able to access your hardware directly, the game is over; nothing we can do can currently avoid this. What we can do
by teddyh 5y ago
If your attacker is both sophisticated and able to access your hardware directly, the game is over; nothing we can do can currently avoid this.
What we can do is address the scenarios in which an attacker is either unsophisticated or remote. Normal network security takes care of the latter case, and for unsophisticated attackers, a good FDE (Full Disk Encryption) system covers it nicely. For laptops you can either live with typing in a password at every boot, or get a USB key of some kind. For servers with FDE you might want to use something to enable remote and unattended reboots, like (shameless plug) Mandos¹.
1. https://www.recompile.se/mandos https://www.recompile.se/mandos
- jonathanstrange 5y agoWell, you can probably annoy at least some attackers by using tamper-proof seals on your PC case and act accordingly if they are broken, because that would likely prevent them from conducting the first physical attack. But that won't help in the long run. Outstanding locks on a reinforced door and a combination of visible and hidden cameras in the hallway are probably more effective.
- panarky 5y agoAll tamper-evident devices can be defeated by a sophisticated attacker with physical access. https://www.slideshare.net/MichaudEric/how-to-steal-a-nuclear-warhead-without-voiding-your-xbox-warranty https://www.slideshare.net/MichaudEric/how-to-steal-a-nuclea...
- imwillofficial 5y agoThis is incorrect
- panarky 5y agoPerhaps you'd like to cite a source.
- gear54rus 5y agoHow does one go about breaking FDE tho? If it's secured by a password that's only in your mind.
- xvedejas 5y agoKeylogging? Depending on the bar for sophistication, I'm told this could be done by a microphone at the other end of town, or by measuring the power consumption of your building from the grid... but there's probably something at the middle point between these paranoid risks and something simple anyone could place in your computer case / keyboard.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- HanaShiratori 5y agoWait, did I miss something or how does a sophisticated attacker break encryption with ~100+ bit password entropy?
- droopyEyelids 5y agoif they have access to your device, they don't have to. They'll just snoop on whatever you use to enter your key.
- Matt3o12_ 5y agoI believe OP is referring to the fact that a sophisticated attack has access to the hardware and you continue using it afterwards. They could, for example, change the unencrypted /boot partition to log the password you use to decrypt your partition. Or, if you sign the boot partition, they could install a hardware key logger, or do any other kind of hardware modification that defeats the security. Preventing this kind of attack is incredible difficult. They are many means to prevent those kind of attacks but, for the most part, it just making it harder for the attacker so that the attacker needs to become even more sophisticated. Full disk encryption only helps if you are worried that your hardware gets stolen
- GekkePrutser 5y agoJust wanted to add that this is generally referred to as the "Evil Maid" scenario in case someone wants to Google it. It can be mitigated somewhat with secure boot, tpm technologies etc but due to the breadth of possible attacks it's really hard to do against a serious attacker. Even the sound of the keyboard is often enough to give your password away.
- markenqualitaet 5y agoAnd glitter nail polish :)
- jkepler 5y agoOr encrypt the boot partition. Libreboot supports this. (Though to be fair, Libreboot only runs on a very limited number of old devices).
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- colek42 5y agoThe issue isn't compromise of the remote system, but trust of that remote system. TPM 2.0 gives us the ability to make measurements before establishing trust.
- kobalsky 5y ago> If your attacker is both sophisticated and able to access your hardware directly, the game is over; nothing we can do can currently avoid this. I think with blanket statements like this it's important to define sophisticated. For example, what kind of resources are required to break the disk encryption of a computer protected with tpm 2.0 + secureboot + luks w/tresor* ? I'm of course not talking about social engineering or fooling the user into typing their password on a fake system, since this is preventable. * https://www.cs1.tf.fau.de/research/system-security-group/tresor-trevisor-armored/ https://www.cs1.tf.fau.de/research/system-security-group/tre...
- hulitu 5y ago> For example, what kind of resources are required to break the disk encryption of a computer protected with tpm 2.0 + secureboot + luks w/tresor* ? Intel ME and the equivalent AMD PSP. > I'm of course not talking about social engineering or fooling the user into typing their password on a fake system, since this is preventable. As other pointed out when the atacker has physical access it is game over. Also network access is insecure due to management engines.
- imwillofficial 5y agoAgain, Blanket statements. What ME flaws?
- eightails 5y agoThere are dozens of known CSME vulns -- there's a list on cvedetails [0] which itself seems to be missing some (e.g. 2019-0090/2019-0091). Plenty of these could be used by a sophisticated attacker with physical access, and some can even be executed remotely. Here's an Intel Whitepaper detailing one such vulnerability of moderate severity (CVE-2019-0090, CVSS 4.4) [1]. From the 'Potential Consequences' table: > Unauthorized BIOS compromises OS loader and OS integrity... All use cases / user secrets protected by Intel TPM are compromised. Other bits and pieces of firmware including AMT have been similarly plagued with vulns [2], such as CVE-2017-5689, with a CVSS score of 10! These are often difficult to patch, and even more difficult to convince manufacturers to spend the effort testing and distributing updates for their products. My own laptop is still running a version of CSME vulnerable to many of these attacks. [0] https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-238/product_id-50730/Intel-Converged-Security-Management-Engine-Firmware.html https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-238/... [1] https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/security-advisory/documents/cve-2019-0090-whitepaper.pdf https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/security-... [2] https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-238/product_id-37542/Intel-Active-Management-Technology-Firmware.html https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-238/...
- smoldesu 5y ago> If your attacker is both sophisticated and able to access your hardware directly, the game is over; nothing we can do can currently avoid this. This, particularly if your hardware has Thunderbolt capabilities. It's been proven that Thunderbolt can be exploited to give an attacker direct memory access[0], and there's really no recourse for it in the spec. Physical access is going to be game-over for a very long time, unfortunately. [0] https://thunderspy.io/#affected-apple-systems https://thunderspy.io/#affected-apple-systems
- mjg59 5y ago> there's really no recourse for it in the spec There's not only a recourse for it, modern firmware implements it. You just use the IOMMU to restrict Thunderbolt devices to being able to access their own buffers.
- mjg59 5y ago> nothing we can do can currently avoid this. Unless you scope "sophisticated" as "can compromise hardware we currently believe is secure", we can get to the point where the only mechanism is a hardware keylogger (which is something made far more complicated by, eg, using a Bluetooth keyboard). This has a few problems: 1) It's relatively easy to detect - you're adding a new physical object 2) You're only seeing a small amount of what you want to see - you have no ability to inspect the data on the disk, and if the user is using MFA then getting their passwords doesn't get you much 3) Exfiltrating the data isn't easy. Either you need further physical access to extract the object, or you need it to broadcast data occasionally and that's another thing that's going to make it easier to be detected If you're able to move from "A physically present adversary can compromise the system in a way that gives them complete access" to "A physically present adversary can log your keystrokes", that's a win.
- fidesomnes 5y agoapparently nobody has introduced you to Intel vPro.