> Because the modern Enterprise-y best-practice is to not allow multiple security contexts to exist within a single monolithic OS process where the OS kernel's

> Because the modern Enterprise-y best-practice is to not allow multiple security contexts to exist within a single monolithic OS process where the OS kernel's own "security manager" can't get to them to enforce its own policy; but rather to cleave apart your process along security-context lines into multiple processes; containerize those to isolate them from each-other; poke precise holes in those containers for well-defined RPC channels to flow; and connect those channels using a service mesh with secure application-layer firewalling. It always was? None of that solves the problem of blacklisting certain actions or logging for audit based on the content and/or origin of the data being processed. Ignoring such things does explain why and how modern enterprise-y solutions are leaking like sieves tho I guess, e.g. solarwinds would likely never have happened if they implemented proper application component level permissions.