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In my opinion, Apple will break its brand if they actually go ahead and release "self-reporting to the authorities" device features. Even if they somehow manag

by mrtksn 5y ago

In my opinion, Apple will break its brand if they actually go ahead and release "self-reporting to the authorities" device features. Even if they somehow manage to make it do exactly the thing it is supposed to do and not slide into a feature for mass governmental control, I think a lot of people will loose trust into the devices they own. Automatically scanning your stuff and reporting the bad things to the police is like the concept of God always watching. Even if you don't do anything wrong and you agree that the stuff they are watching for is bad and should be prevented, there is something eerie about always being watched and controlled. The iPhones should mind their own business and leave the police work to the police. That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. You caught someone, You have enough evidence to investigate the person, you are allowed to search his/her home then maybe it can be O.K. to run a fingerprint scan on the phone to look for evidence.

dylan604 5y ago
>That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. Why? You have physical access to the device. Just look at the data. The CSAM scan will only ID known imagery. What if this person has new content that is unknown to the database? This is a non-sensical justification.
- mrtksn 5y ago
  I want my data to stay encrypted no matter what however I accept that there are people who can do bad things and access to their data could be valuable. So it is a compromise, the data stays encrypted but the authorities can get an idea about the nature of the data. Then it is up to the person to reveal their data as a part of a cooperation agreement. If there's a CSAM material match, the person can prove innocence by revealing the data(false positives) or the judges can increase the severity of the penalty for not cooperating. Milage may vary depending on your jurisdiction however I think it is a good way to look at someones stuff for offensive material without actually looking at unrelated stuff. So no match, no reason to try to get into the device.
  - dylan604 5y ago
    What are you on about? The comment stated that the authorities have physical access to the device. That means that they can see whatever data you have because it's your device showing it to them. Also, this idea is even more dystopian than the original concept. The original idea was only going to scan content the user chose to push to Apple servers. This current suggests scanning the entire device just because johnny law has the device. That is soooo much worse of an idea.
    - mrtksn 5y ago
      Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted. I didn't say anything about Apple servers. They can implement a protocol that works over a wired connection only, gives the device the instruction to match all the files on the device against the given list of fingerprints and returns the results. No match, no results. If there's a match, return just enough to tell what fingerprints matched and nothing more.
      - dylan604 5y ago
        >Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted And what is properly encrypted if you can take advantage of 0-day vulns to unlock the phone so you have access to the data in an unencrypted state. You're not playing this through to the end of what physical access to the device means.
        mrtksn 5y ago
        These risks are valid for any device, it has nothing to do with Apple or the feature in question. The police can have a physical access to your devices with or without implementation of this feature. I don't understand what are you arguing for, physical access is not a software thing and it is guarded by exactly the same mechanism that guard the access to you apple(the fruit) in your fridge.
      - skoskie 5y ago
        This is almost how the new scanning system works.
Lamad123 5y ago
this whole thing just made me wake up to how much control that company has over something that's supposed to belong to those who buy it!!
- slg 5y ago
  I don't know why more people didn't come to this conclusion. The choice between scanning the files before upload to the cloud or after upload to the cloud is largely a policy decision and not a technical one since Apple already controls both ends of that process. If you don't trust them to scan things on your device why are you trusting them to scan things in the cloud and why are you trusting them with both the hardware and software you run?
  - wizee 5y ago
    1. They own their cloud, you own your device. Having your own device work against you is more problematic in principle than having another party you give your data to working against you. I don’t like the concept of devices that I own betraying me. 2. When scanning is done locally, it’s easier for them to secretly or openly modify the software to scan everything on your device, rather than just what’s just uploaded to iCloud. If they tried scanning everything (including non-iCloud images) in the cloud, the network traffic of uploading every image on your device to the cloud would be observable.
    - slg 5y ago
      You seemed to have missed my point. They control the entire ecosystem. If you are worried about them doing something secretly to violate your trust, you should assume they are already compromised because the only thing stopping them is a policy decision and not a technical limitation.
      - fsflover 5y ago
        The difference is, they promised not to look at personal files. If you are using their devices you trust their promises. Now, they broke their promise and a lot of people are loosing the trust.
robertoandred 5y ago
It of course does not self-report to any authorities.
- yjftsjthsd-h 5y ago
  So how would you describe the actions of this system when it think it's detected illicit pictures?
  - robertoandred 5y ago
    If the phone and the server agree that enough CSAM matches have been detected, the matches get reviewed by Apple. If Apple agrees with the phone and the server, the matches get reviewed by the NCMEC. If the NCMEC agrees with Apple and the phone and the server, the NCMEC may get law enforcement involved. Bad-faith actors want people to think that taking a picture of your baby in the tub will bring a SWAT team to your door the next day.
    - Gareth321 5y ago
      You just described reporting to authorities.
      - turdnagel 5y ago
        I guess we're splitting hairs over "reporting" and "self-reporting." I think the idea is that there is a layer - yes, a fallible, human one - between detection and reporting.
    - genewitch 5y ago
      That's just self-reporting to the authorities with a bunch of extra fallible human steps
      - robertoandred 5y ago
        No, it's self-reporting to Apple.
oreilles 5y ago
> "self-reporting to the authorities" That's 100% not what the feature is about. People need to stop spreading this nonsense. Apple only get the result of the scans when the files are send to them via iCloud, then they, Apple, not your device, would report to the authorities. Also, they already were looking for CP in your iCloud content and report to the authorities anyway, as was shown recently with the doctor that was caught with 2k images. So whether you were or weren't using iCloud, privacy-wise on-device scanning makes literally 0 difference.
- vorpalhex 5y ago
  It makes all the difference in the world on whether Apple scans their own servers for content they don't want versus your phone snitching on you. I can choose to not upload things to Apple. If my iPhone decides to scan my photos just because, I can do nothing. I won't accept my device being a snitch under someone elses control. Companies change values and Apple already brazenly allows the CCP to snoop on Chinese iCloud data.
  - oreilles 5y ago
    Except your phone is not a snitch. Snitching is sending informations to a third party, which your phone doesn't do, unless you explicitly accept it by using iCloud syncing. You're basically upset that your operating system can read your files. Well good luck finding an operating system that cannot read your files.
    - vorpalhex 5y ago
      Apple is a third party. Right now Apple says they only scan iCloud uploads. We can't verify that, but let's assume they aren't lying. Why not scan your whole library? They can, they could make the argument it's to fight CSAM. I mean if you aren't uploading to iCloud because you're a pedophile, obviously we should scan your whole phone just in case. Think of the children!
      - skoskie 5y ago
torstenvl 5y ago
> That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. In the U.S., due to how the rules of evidence work, this would be of limited utility. You want the results of the scan to come from a trustworthy expert who can testify, who uses equipment and software that is tested and calibrated frequently. Because the suspect's own device won't have those calibration records, trying to use the results from such a scan would raise issues of foundation and authenticity. If I were a prosecutor and I had a case like that come in, I would still send the device in to the lab for an expert forensic extraction. (Edit to reply to a response below: Yes, theoretically, such an on-device scan could be used to establish probable cause, but that seems circular, since the authorities wouldn't be able to seize the phone in the first place unless they already had probable cause or consent from the owner, either of which would obviate the need to establish probable cause via the on-device scan.)
- stjohnswarts 5y ago
  It would be used to get a warrant to trace the persons online activities and get his/her phone as evidence. This isn't going to be used to send out a SWAT team upon notice from apple.
  - Piskvorrr 5y ago
    [citation-needed], and Apple's pinky swear doesn't count.
    - skoskie 5y ago
      The argument made in several comments that this will result in SWATing isn't cited because it's an opinion on potential future events. A counter opinion, therefore, also would not need citation.
- mrtksn 5y ago
  Thanks, interesting details. I guess the legislators and the tech companies can work something out on the practical issues instead of turning people's devices into always watching policemen.
encryptluks2 5y ago
They already collect as much information about you as possible. Whenever you turn on a Mac, you're essentially agreeing to a ton of data collection. It is naive to think that they will never share it with anyone.
- sneak 5y ago
  They share data on 30,000 users per year with the US govt without a search warrant. There are even more when it comes to actual search warrants.
  - dragonwriter 5y ago
    > There are even more when it comes to actual search warrants. Probably not much, since there is very little that would be within third-party custody that they would need a search warrant rather than one of various forms of subpoena (including administrative ones like NSLs) for, and the latter would already be counted in the “without a search warrant” count.
    - sneak 5y ago
      NSLs and FISA orders are a small fraction of the data that US cloud providers turn over. The majority is in response to actual search warrants.
Exuma 5y ago
LOSE. The word is LOSE. LOOSE and LOSE do not even look remotely similar phonetically. LOOSE. GOOSE. MOOSE. NOOSE. CABOOSE. ... lose... which of these do not belong? I see this mistake once a day and it literally makes no sense to me, for the love of god stop plleeeasseeeeee Can you imagine watching a movie called FootLose?
- count 5y ago
  Don't loose your mind over a grammatical error.
  - Exuma 5y ago
    Yes I get it, grammar nazi blah blah blah. I don't normally ever correct people's grammar (because who cares), but this one error is just so mindblowing to me, and the SHEER amount of times I see it makes me go absolutely nuts, because if you've spoken english for any length of time, you know about 1000 words with long-o soft-s that end in "oose", yet I see people saying "lose" as "loose" about.... 2 times a day, 1 if I'm lucky, and it makes no sense whatsoever.
    - deleted 5y ago
      [deleted]
    - oehpr 5y ago
      It's just a typo that doesn't get corrected. People just arn't super duper proof reading, they're just watching for the red squiggles that indicates a typo. You wouldn't be really mad if you spotted an "an" instead of an "and" in the wrong place, right? Because it's the same accident. If you think about it in these terms, you wouldn't of had as much of a reaction ;)
      - Exuma 5y ago
        No it's definitely not a typo lol, it's people who are reading it wrong in their head. The sheer amount of time that specific mistake is made very strongly leads me to believe it's most definitely not a typo. Watch, now that I pointed it out you will see it everywhere. https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&query=%22loose%20my%22&sort=byPopularity&type=story https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que... https://www.google.com/search?q=site%3Areddit.com+%22loose+my%22&rlz=1C5CHFA_enUS905US905&oq=site%3Areddit.com+%22loose+my%22&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i58.4104j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 https://www.google.com/search?q=site%3Areddit.com+%22loose+m... This is only one combination of words for example, but you get the idea While super rough/anecdotal... "loose my" has 38,000 results and "lose my" has 900,000 results. Literally 1 out of 25 times the word is used it's used wrong (if google is including roughly the same amount of items in its index)
godelski 5y ago
> Automatically scanning your stuff and reporting the bad things to the police is like the concept of God always watching. What I find interesting is how our perspectives shifted over time. 1984 was considered a dystopian nightmare and within that world Big Brother wasn't always watching but rather _could_ watch at any time. The simple ability to be able to tune in was enough to create the fear and have people report others. We're well past that to be honest and interestingly our interpretations have shifted as well to Big Brother _is_ always watching and that being the dystopian nightmare. In this sense we're there in some areas of our lives and it has shifted to "I have nothing to hide" or "what can I do?" So it is interesting to see that essentially the window shifts further and further in that direction and as long as the shift is sufficiently slow the general public seems not to care. I wonder if there is a turning point.
- skoskie 5y ago
  I think it's critical to understand that a single law can shift that window drastically. If Apple can allow for a small shift in that direction – however distasteful – it may prevent the larger shift caused by anti-privacy legislation. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/senate-judiciary-committee-wants-everyone-know-its-concerned-about-encryption https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/senate-judiciary-commi...
polote 5y ago
> In my opinion, Apple will break its brand if they actually go ahead and release "self-reporting to the authorities" device features. I'm always astonished that some (random) people feel more confident on their brand analysis than the best people at this specific topic paid thousands of dollars at Apple to do just that. Or maybe I'm the one who is wrong
- RicoElectrico 5y ago
  The brand is ultimately in the minds of consumers, and if you followed discussions, many of them (and press) had the same impression that it is inconsistent with Apple positioning wrt. privacy. While household analysts get things wrong all the time, companies are not infallible, including Apple.
  - polote 5y ago
    You can make a mistake once or two, but if a company like Apple keep pushing for something ( that can hypothetically kill its brand) it is unlikely that it will actually kill the brand.
    - philosopher1234 5y ago
      Unlikely, sure, but its happened countless times. Its not useful or interesting to say "you're probably wrong because you're not head of apple".
    - pope_meat 5y ago
      How could a big bank like Lehman Brothers with their highly paid risk analysis people fail? How could Rome fall? The sun never set on the British Empire. Both me and my partner were very close to joining the apple eco system because we felt completely betrayed by G, now I'm researching alternative OS to flash my phone. We both abandoned Google search and browsers. The only FAANG I'm not actively avoiding is Netflix.
- mrtksn 5y ago
  What makes you think that I am random, I did brand analysis, that I am confident , that confidence is over the confidence of the people Apple paid, and those highly paid people concluded differently? That comment looks like partly uneducated guess, partly a fallacy to refer to the “authorities of branding”. I’m always amazed to see people who assume that employees of large companies cannot make mistakes or that they have unlimited power over the decision making.
YLYvYkHeB2NRNT 5y ago
> loose trust into the devices they own. I already did and have moved on. And I was with them for a long time. Thousands of dollars, also. Thousands.
skoskie 5y ago
I really wish the people – especially those on HN – would take a broader look at what Apple is proposing and better understand the forces at play before being so critical of the tech. I understand the initial knee-jerk anti-privacy response, but since there has been some time for people to learn all the facts, I remain amazed that they never come up in these threads. First, you hear a lot of people, including Snowden (while contradicting himself), say this isn't really about CSAM. That point is absolutely correct. This is ALL two things, each addressed here: 1. Legal liability, and the cost of processing as many subpoenas as they do. Ultimately, Apple has the keys to the data they store on their servers. They could easily encrypt all the data using on-device keys, before uploading to ensure they can't actually see anything. But this would cause a huge backlash from law enforcement that would cause congress to pass legislation mandating backdoors. In fact, Apple (big tech) has been trying to hold off that legislation since at least 2019, when they met with the Senate Judiciary committee [1]. Quote from EFF article: > Many of the committee members seemed to arrive at the hearing convinced that they could legislate secure backdoors. Among others, Senators Graham and Feinstein told representatives from Apple and Facebook that they had a responsibility to find a solution to enable government access to encrypted data. Senator Graham commented, “My advice to you is to get on with it, because this time next year, if we haven't found a way that you can live with, we will impose our will on you.” Apple is doing exactly what Graham told them to do. They have come up with a system that manages to increase security for most users by ensuring that nobody - not even Apple - has the decryption keys for your data, while also satisfying law enforcement to the degree necessary to prevent really harmful anti-privacy legislation. They managed to do it in a really creative way. It's not perfect of course. There are plenty of people with valid concerns, such as the potential for hash collisions and how a country like China might try to abuse the system and whether Apple would give into that pressure (as they did in the past). All of that is valid, and I'm glad to see Apple stop and examine all the complaints before pushing the release. But strictly on the topic of privacy, the new system will be a massive improvement. 2. User privacy. Yes, everyone thinks this is an invasion of privacy, but I just don't see how. The proposed on-device scanning solution provides MORE privacy than either the current iCloud system (in which Apple can be compelled to decrypt nearly all of your data) or the proposed [2] legislation – MORE privacy even for people found to meet the CSAM threshold! It seems to me there must be a lot of misunderstanding surrounding the encryption mechanisms Apple has proposed. But having read the technical documents, my view (again, strictly from a privacy standpoint) is that it appears to be extremely sound. Essentially, there are currently two parties that can decrypt your iCloud data with master keys – you and Apple. In VERY greatly simplified terms the new system will set one master decryption key on your device. But Apple will now instead use shared key encryption, which requires ALL of the ~31 keys to be present to decrypt the photos. Apple will have one of those keys. The other 30 (the "threshold") keys will be generated by a hash (of a hash of a hash) of the match found in the CSAM database. If no match is found, then the shared key needed to decrypt that image is never generated. It doesn't exist. One way to look at this is that it's the CSAM images that are the keys to unlocking the CSAM images. Without them, Apple cannot comply with a subpoena (for photos ... for now). Even people who meet the CSAM threshold, can only have the CSAM images decrypted. All other photos that have no match in the CSAM database cannot be decrypted without access to the suspect's phone. On the flip side, Apple is bending to congress's demands by voluntarily sharing information with law enforcement. I can absolutely understand how this behavior could make even perfectly innocent people feel uncomfortable. But in the context of the understanding that you have more privacy for yourself, while exposing those who deal in CSAM (and are dumb enough to store it in their iCloud account), I have to push my logical understanding to overcome my natural but unwarranted discomfort. Anything that prevents the government from getting universal backdoor into everyone's phone is a win, in my opinion. [1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/senate-judiciary-committee-wants-everyone-know-its-concerned-about-encryption https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/senate-judiciary-commi... [2] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/senates-new-anti-encryption-bill-even-worse-earn-it-and-thats-saying-something https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/senates-new-anti-encry...
mulmen 5y ago
> That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. You caught someone, You have enough evidence to investigate the person, you are allowed to search his/her home then maybe it can be O.K. to run a fingerprint scan on the phone to look for evidence. This was an unreasonable and unnecessary capability, no amount of comprise makes it a good idea. I don't want my devices to tattle on me. They exist to serve me, not the state. Don't negotiate with terrorists.
FabHK 5y ago
> Automatically scanning your stuff and reporting the bad things to the police is like the concept of God always watching. ... like all cloud providers scan your stuff and report the bad things (and Apple has not been doing it, but now proposed doing it in a more privacy preserving manner).
- CydeWeys 5y ago
  There's a big difference though between cloud providers scanning files stored on their hardware that they own and Apple scanning files on your hardware that you own.
  - FabHK 5y ago
    Is there? It's just running a blinded hashing and private set intersection locally, doesn't even know on device whether something has matched or what.
    - mrtksn 5y ago
      It is your own device actively checking on you for misbehaving. Completely different from cloud providers checking on renters for misbehaving in their infrastructure. Your phone will listen to instructions from 3.rd parties to check on you and report you to the police(with Apple as a dispatcher).
      - FabHK 5y ago
        Well, no... the cloud provider (Apple in the case of iCloud) will check on you and potentially report you (just like all the other cloud providers do), but without scanning all your files in the cloud (unlike all the other cloud providers). As I said, your phone doesn't even know if anything matched.
        mrtksn 5y ago
        The point is, your phone follows instructions from 3rd parties on scanning your data and reporting back the results. It’s processing your files accordingly, with the intent to to make sure you are not doing anything wrong according to those 3rd parties. Your own device is policing you according to the requirements of those 3rd parties.
joe_the_user 5y ago
That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. Let me call Yet Another Insideous Concession (YAIC). It seems like this has the sell that "this has safe search built in so in the event of seizure, authorities won't have to do a full search". But actual situation is authorities would never be satisfied with things limiting their search on seizure but would be happy for this to be added where they'd wind-up using it primarily through some automatic mechanism.
- qualudeheart 5y ago
  Yet Another Insidious Combinator sounds like a cool name for a startup incubator.
alatkins 5y ago
Not to mention the potential severe consequences of the inevitable false positives, given the target subject matter.

by mrtksn 5y ago

dylan604 5y ago

>That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. Why? You have physical access to the device. Just look at the data. The CSAM scan will only ID known imagery. What if this person has new content that is unknown to the database? This is a non-sensical justification.

mrtksn 5y ago
I want my data to stay encrypted no matter what however I accept that there are people who can do bad things and access to their data could be valuable. So it is a compromise, the data stays encrypted but the authorities can get an idea about the nature of the data. Then it is up to the person to reveal their data as a part of a cooperation agreement. If there's a CSAM material match, the person can prove innocence by revealing the data(false positives) or the judges can increase the severity of the penalty for not cooperating. Milage may vary depending on your jurisdiction however I think it is a good way to look at someones stuff for offensive material without actually looking at unrelated stuff. So no match, no reason to try to get into the device.
- dylan604 5y ago
  What are you on about? The comment stated that the authorities have physical access to the device. That means that they can see whatever data you have because it's your device showing it to them. Also, this idea is even more dystopian than the original concept. The original idea was only going to scan content the user chose to push to Apple servers. This current suggests scanning the entire device just because johnny law has the device. That is soooo much worse of an idea.
  - mrtksn 5y ago
    Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted. I didn't say anything about Apple servers. They can implement a protocol that works over a wired connection only, gives the device the instruction to match all the files on the device against the given list of fingerprints and returns the results. No match, no results. If there's a match, return just enough to tell what fingerprints matched and nothing more.
    - dylan604 5y ago
      >Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted And what is properly encrypted if you can take advantage of 0-day vulns to unlock the phone so you have access to the data in an unencrypted state. You're not playing this through to the end of what physical access to the device means.
      - mrtksn 5y ago
        These risks are valid for any device, it has nothing to do with Apple or the feature in question. The police can have a physical access to your devices with or without implementation of this feature. I don't understand what are you arguing for, physical access is not a software thing and it is guarded by exactly the same mechanism that guard the access to you apple(the fruit) in your fridge.
    - skoskie 5y ago
      This is almost how the new scanning system works.

Lamad123 5y ago

this whole thing just made me wake up to how much control that company has over something that's supposed to belong to those who buy it!!

slg 5y ago
I don't know why more people didn't come to this conclusion. The choice between scanning the files before upload to the cloud or after upload to the cloud is largely a policy decision and not a technical one since Apple already controls both ends of that process. If you don't trust them to scan things on your device why are you trusting them to scan things in the cloud and why are you trusting them with both the hardware and software you run?
- wizee 5y ago
  1. They own their cloud, you own your device. Having your own device work against you is more problematic in principle than having another party you give your data to working against you. I don’t like the concept of devices that I own betraying me. 2. When scanning is done locally, it’s easier for them to secretly or openly modify the software to scan everything on your device, rather than just what’s just uploaded to iCloud. If they tried scanning everything (including non-iCloud images) in the cloud, the network traffic of uploading every image on your device to the cloud would be observable.
  - slg 5y ago
    You seemed to have missed my point. They control the entire ecosystem. If you are worried about them doing something secretly to violate your trust, you should assume they are already compromised because the only thing stopping them is a policy decision and not a technical limitation.
    - fsflover 5y ago
      The difference is, they promised not to look at personal files. If you are using their devices you trust their promises. Now, they broke their promise and a lot of people are loosing the trust.

robertoandred 5y ago

It of course does not self-report to any authorities.

yjftsjthsd-h 5y ago
So how would you describe the actions of this system when it think it's detected illicit pictures?
- robertoandred 5y ago
  If the phone and the server agree that enough CSAM matches have been detected, the matches get reviewed by Apple. If Apple agrees with the phone and the server, the matches get reviewed by the NCMEC. If the NCMEC agrees with Apple and the phone and the server, the NCMEC may get law enforcement involved. Bad-faith actors want people to think that taking a picture of your baby in the tub will bring a SWAT team to your door the next day.
  - Gareth321 5y ago
    You just described reporting to authorities.
    - turdnagel 5y ago
      I guess we're splitting hairs over "reporting" and "self-reporting." I think the idea is that there is a layer - yes, a fallible, human one - between detection and reporting.
  - genewitch 5y ago
    That's just self-reporting to the authorities with a bunch of extra fallible human steps
    - robertoandred 5y ago
      No, it's self-reporting to Apple.

oreilles 5y ago

> "self-reporting to the authorities" That's 100% not what the feature is about. People need to stop spreading this nonsense. Apple only get the result of the scans when the files are send to them via iCloud, then they, Apple, not your device, would report to the authorities. Also, they already were looking for CP in your iCloud content and report to the authorities anyway, as was shown recently with the doctor that was caught with 2k images. So whether you were or weren't using iCloud, privacy-wise on-device scanning makes literally 0 difference.

vorpalhex 5y ago
It makes all the difference in the world on whether Apple scans their own servers for content they don't want versus your phone snitching on you. I can choose to not upload things to Apple. If my iPhone decides to scan my photos just because, I can do nothing. I won't accept my device being a snitch under someone elses control. Companies change values and Apple already brazenly allows the CCP to snoop on Chinese iCloud data.
- oreilles 5y ago
  Except your phone is not a snitch. Snitching is sending informations to a third party, which your phone doesn't do, unless you explicitly accept it by using iCloud syncing. You're basically upset that your operating system can read your files. Well good luck finding an operating system that cannot read your files.
  - vorpalhex 5y ago
    Apple is a third party. Right now Apple says they only scan iCloud uploads. We can't verify that, but let's assume they aren't lying. Why not scan your whole library? They can, they could make the argument it's to fight CSAM. I mean if you aren't uploading to iCloud because you're a pedophile, obviously we should scan your whole phone just in case. Think of the children!
    - skoskie 5y ago

torstenvl 5y ago

> That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. In the U.S., due to how the rules of evidence work, this would be of limited utility. You want the results of the scan to come from a trustworthy expert who can testify, who uses equipment and software that is tested and calibrated frequently. Because the suspect's own device won't have those calibration records, trying to use the results from such a scan would raise issues of foundation and authenticity. If I were a prosecutor and I had a case like that come in, I would still send the device in to the lab for an expert forensic extraction. (Edit to reply to a response below: Yes, theoretically, such an on-device scan could be used to establish probable cause, but that seems circular, since the authorities wouldn't be able to seize the phone in the first place unless they already had probable cause or consent from the owner, either of which would obviate the need to establish probable cause via the on-device scan.)

stjohnswarts 5y ago
It would be used to get a warrant to trace the persons online activities and get his/her phone as evidence. This isn't going to be used to send out a SWAT team upon notice from apple.
- Piskvorrr 5y ago
  [citation-needed], and Apple's pinky swear doesn't count.
  - skoskie 5y ago
    The argument made in several comments that this will result in SWATing isn't cited because it's an opinion on potential future events. A counter opinion, therefore, also would not need citation.
mrtksn 5y ago
Thanks, interesting details. I guess the legislators and the tech companies can work something out on the practical issues instead of turning people's devices into always watching policemen.

encryptluks2 5y ago

They already collect as much information about you as possible. Whenever you turn on a Mac, you're essentially agreeing to a ton of data collection. It is naive to think that they will never share it with anyone.

sneak 5y ago
They share data on 30,000 users per year with the US govt without a search warrant. There are even more when it comes to actual search warrants.
- dragonwriter 5y ago
  > There are even more when it comes to actual search warrants. Probably not much, since there is very little that would be within third-party custody that they would need a search warrant rather than one of various forms of subpoena (including administrative ones like NSLs) for, and the latter would already be counted in the “without a search warrant” count.
  - sneak 5y ago
    NSLs and FISA orders are a small fraction of the data that US cloud providers turn over. The majority is in response to actual search warrants.

Exuma 5y ago

LOSE. The word is LOSE. LOOSE and LOSE do not even look remotely similar phonetically. LOOSE. GOOSE. MOOSE. NOOSE. CABOOSE. ... lose... which of these do not belong? I see this mistake once a day and it literally makes no sense to me, for the love of god stop plleeeasseeeeee Can you imagine watching a movie called FootLose?

count 5y ago
Don't loose your mind over a grammatical error.
- Exuma 5y ago
  Yes I get it, grammar nazi blah blah blah. I don't normally ever correct people's grammar (because who cares), but this one error is just so mindblowing to me, and the SHEER amount of times I see it makes me go absolutely nuts, because if you've spoken english for any length of time, you know about 1000 words with long-o soft-s that end in "oose", yet I see people saying "lose" as "loose" about.... 2 times a day, 1 if I'm lucky, and it makes no sense whatsoever.
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
  - oehpr 5y ago
    It's just a typo that doesn't get corrected. People just arn't super duper proof reading, they're just watching for the red squiggles that indicates a typo. You wouldn't be really mad if you spotted an "an" instead of an "and" in the wrong place, right? Because it's the same accident. If you think about it in these terms, you wouldn't of had as much of a reaction ;)
    - Exuma 5y ago
      No it's definitely not a typo lol, it's people who are reading it wrong in their head. The sheer amount of time that specific mistake is made very strongly leads me to believe it's most definitely not a typo. Watch, now that I pointed it out you will see it everywhere. https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&query=%22loose%20my%22&sort=byPopularity&type=story https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que... https://www.google.com/search?q=site%3Areddit.com+%22loose+my%22&rlz=1C5CHFA_enUS905US905&oq=site%3Areddit.com+%22loose+my%22&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i58.4104j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 https://www.google.com/search?q=site%3Areddit.com+%22loose+m... This is only one combination of words for example, but you get the idea While super rough/anecdotal... "loose my" has 38,000 results and "lose my" has 900,000 results. Literally 1 out of 25 times the word is used it's used wrong (if google is including roughly the same amount of items in its index)

godelski 5y ago

> Automatically scanning your stuff and reporting the bad things to the police is like the concept of God always watching. What I find interesting is how our perspectives shifted over time. 1984 was considered a dystopian nightmare and within that world Big Brother wasn't always watching but rather _could_ watch at any time. The simple ability to be able to tune in was enough to create the fear and have people report others. We're well past that to be honest and interestingly our interpretations have shifted as well to Big Brother _is_ always watching and that being the dystopian nightmare. In this sense we're there in some areas of our lives and it has shifted to "I have nothing to hide" or "what can I do?" So it is interesting to see that essentially the window shifts further and further in that direction and as long as the shift is sufficiently slow the general public seems not to care. I wonder if there is a turning point.

skoskie 5y ago
I think it's critical to understand that a single law can shift that window drastically. If Apple can allow for a small shift in that direction – however distasteful – it may prevent the larger shift caused by anti-privacy legislation. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/senate-judiciary-committee-wants-everyone-know-its-concerned-about-encryption https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/senate-judiciary-commi...

polote 5y ago

> In my opinion, Apple will break its brand if they actually go ahead and release "self-reporting to the authorities" device features. I'm always astonished that some (random) people feel more confident on their brand analysis than the best people at this specific topic paid thousands of dollars at Apple to do just that. Or maybe I'm the one who is wrong

RicoElectrico 5y ago
The brand is ultimately in the minds of consumers, and if you followed discussions, many of them (and press) had the same impression that it is inconsistent with Apple positioning wrt. privacy. While household analysts get things wrong all the time, companies are not infallible, including Apple.
- polote 5y ago
  You can make a mistake once or two, but if a company like Apple keep pushing for something ( that can hypothetically kill its brand) it is unlikely that it will actually kill the brand.
  - philosopher1234 5y ago
    Unlikely, sure, but its happened countless times. Its not useful or interesting to say "you're probably wrong because you're not head of apple".
  - pope_meat 5y ago
    How could a big bank like Lehman Brothers with their highly paid risk analysis people fail? How could Rome fall? The sun never set on the British Empire. Both me and my partner were very close to joining the apple eco system because we felt completely betrayed by G, now I'm researching alternative OS to flash my phone. We both abandoned Google search and browsers. The only FAANG I'm not actively avoiding is Netflix.
mrtksn 5y ago
What makes you think that I am random, I did brand analysis, that I am confident , that confidence is over the confidence of the people Apple paid, and those highly paid people concluded differently? That comment looks like partly uneducated guess, partly a fallacy to refer to the “authorities of branding”. I’m always amazed to see people who assume that employees of large companies cannot make mistakes or that they have unlimited power over the decision making.

YLYvYkHeB2NRNT 5y ago

> loose trust into the devices they own. I already did and have moved on. And I was with them for a long time. Thousands of dollars, also. Thousands.

skoskie 5y ago

I really wish the people – especially those on HN – would take a broader look at what Apple is proposing and better understand the forces at play before being so critical of the tech. I understand the initial knee-jerk anti-privacy response, but since there has been some time for people to learn all the facts, I remain amazed that they never come up in these threads. First, you hear a lot of people, including Snowden (while contradicting himself), say this isn't really about CSAM. That point is absolutely correct. This is ALL two things, each addressed here: 1. Legal liability, and the cost of processing as many subpoenas as they do. Ultimately, Apple has the keys to the data they store on their servers. They could easily encrypt all the data using on-device keys, before uploading to ensure they can't actually see anything. But this would cause a huge backlash from law enforcement that would cause congress to pass legislation mandating backdoors. In fact, Apple (big tech) has been trying to hold off that legislation since at least 2019, when they met with the Senate Judiciary committee [1]. Quote from EFF article: > Many of the committee members seemed to arrive at the hearing convinced that they could legislate secure backdoors. Among others, Senators Graham and Feinstein told representatives from Apple and Facebook that they had a responsibility to find a solution to enable government access to encrypted data. Senator Graham commented, “My advice to you is to get on with it, because this time next year, if we haven't found a way that you can live with, we will impose our will on you.” Apple is doing exactly what Graham told them to do. They have come up with a system that manages to increase security for most users by ensuring that nobody - not even Apple - has the decryption keys for your data, while also satisfying law enforcement to the degree necessary to prevent really harmful anti-privacy legislation. They managed to do it in a really creative way. It's not perfect of course. There are plenty of people with valid concerns, such as the potential for hash collisions and how a country like China might try to abuse the system and whether Apple would give into that pressure (as they did in the past). All of that is valid, and I'm glad to see Apple stop and examine all the complaints before pushing the release. But strictly on the topic of privacy, the new system will be a massive improvement. 2. User privacy. Yes, everyone thinks this is an invasion of privacy, but I just don't see how. The proposed on-device scanning solution provides MORE privacy than either the current iCloud system (in which Apple can be compelled to decrypt nearly all of your data) or the proposed [2] legislation – MORE privacy even for people found to meet the CSAM threshold! It seems to me there must be a lot of misunderstanding surrounding the encryption mechanisms Apple has proposed. But having read the technical documents, my view (again, strictly from a privacy standpoint) is that it appears to be extremely sound. Essentially, there are currently two parties that can decrypt your iCloud data with master keys – you and Apple. In VERY greatly simplified terms the new system will set one master decryption key on your device. But Apple will now instead use shared key encryption, which requires ALL of the ~31 keys to be present to decrypt the photos. Apple will have one of those keys. The other 30 (the "threshold") keys will be generated by a hash (of a hash of a hash) of the match found in the CSAM database. If no match is found, then the shared key needed to decrypt that image is never generated. It doesn't exist. One way to look at this is that it's the CSAM images that are the keys to unlocking the CSAM images. Without them, Apple cannot comply with a subpoena (for photos ... for now). Even people who meet the CSAM threshold, can only have the CSAM images decrypted. All other photos that have no match in the CSAM database cannot be decrypted without access to the suspect's phone. On the flip side, Apple is bending to congress's demands by voluntarily sharing information with law enforcement. I can absolutely understand how this behavior could make even perfectly innocent people feel uncomfortable. But in the context of the understanding that you have more privacy for yourself, while exposing those who deal in CSAM (and are dumb enough to store it in their iCloud account), I have to push my logical understanding to overcome my natural but unwarranted discomfort. Anything that prevents the government from getting universal backdoor into everyone's phone is a win, in my opinion. [1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/senate-judiciary-committee-wants-everyone-know-its-concerned-about-encryption https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/senate-judiciary-commi... [2] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/senates-new-anti-encryption-bill-even-worse-earn-it-and-thats-saying-something https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/senates-new-anti-encry...

mulmen 5y ago

> That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. You caught someone, You have enough evidence to investigate the person, you are allowed to search his/her home then maybe it can be O.K. to run a fingerprint scan on the phone to look for evidence. This was an unreasonable and unnecessary capability, no amount of comprise makes it a good idea. I don't want my devices to tattle on me. They exist to serve me, not the state. Don't negotiate with terrorists.

FabHK 5y ago

> Automatically scanning your stuff and reporting the bad things to the police is like the concept of God always watching. ... like all cloud providers scan your stuff and report the bad things (and Apple has not been doing it, but now proposed doing it in a more privacy preserving manner).

CydeWeys 5y ago
There's a big difference though between cloud providers scanning files stored on their hardware that they own and Apple scanning files on your hardware that you own.
- FabHK 5y ago
  Is there? It's just running a blinded hashing and private set intersection locally, doesn't even know on device whether something has matched or what.
  - mrtksn 5y ago
    It is your own device actively checking on you for misbehaving. Completely different from cloud providers checking on renters for misbehaving in their infrastructure. Your phone will listen to instructions from 3.rd parties to check on you and report you to the police(with Apple as a dispatcher).
    - FabHK 5y ago
      Well, no... the cloud provider (Apple in the case of iCloud) will check on you and potentially report you (just like all the other cloud providers do), but without scanning all your files in the cloud (unlike all the other cloud providers). As I said, your phone doesn't even know if anything matched.
      - mrtksn 5y ago
        The point is, your phone follows instructions from 3rd parties on scanning your data and reporting back the results. It’s processing your files accordingly, with the intent to to make sure you are not doing anything wrong according to those 3rd parties. Your own device is policing you according to the requirements of those 3rd parties.

joe_the_user 5y ago

That being said, I would be O.K. if the scan is performed on the device upon physical access by the authorities. Let me call Yet Another Insideous Concession (YAIC). It seems like this has the sell that "this has safe search built in so in the event of seizure, authorities won't have to do a full search". But actual situation is authorities would never be satisfied with things limiting their search on seizure but would be happy for this to be added where they'd wind-up using it primarily through some automatic mechanism.

qualudeheart 5y ago
Yet Another Insidious Combinator sounds like a cool name for a startup incubator.

alatkins 5y ago

Not to mention the potential severe consequences of the inevitable false positives, given the target subject matter.