7 ms·

> Navy Admiral William F. Halsey, Third Fleet commander, was quoted in the press as saying that the Japanese had been on the verge of surrunder before the atom

> Navy Admiral William F. Halsey, Third Fleet commander, was quoted in the press as saying that the Japanese had been on the verge of surrunder before the atom bombs were dropped in the summer of 1945 and that the "atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment..." I suspect that the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were as much to impress Stalin as for any other purpose. At the time of the bombings, there were literally millions of battle-hardened Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. They were also commanded by very able generals (see Zhukov). If Stalin wanted them to, they could have easily rolled west, and the American and British armies would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army. However, the USA had the bomb. I think Hiroshima and Nagasaki were at least in part about demonstrating the awesome power of the atomic bomb to Stalin and forestalling any temptation he might have to continue west.

mitjak 5y ago
why did you get downvoted? it seems a plausible theory that's at least worth discussing / is a reasonable contribution to this thread.
- diogenescynic 5y ago
  Because anyone who knows the actual history, knows that's bullshit and OP could have just looked up the facts instead of making up something. Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child. They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks. The Pacific theater was already one of the bloodiest battle fronts in the war and the US was battle weary and didn't want to expend another 500,000 Americans to invade Japan. They dropped nukes to avoid another extended and unbelievably bloody conflict. Go listen to the Hardcore History podcasts "Supernova in the East" and it'll make it much more clear.
  - engineer_22 5y ago
    I don't think it's bullshit. I think Navy Admiral William F. Halsey did say those things. "The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before."[1] Those are the facts... GP made nothing up. OTOH - the Cold War should be ample evidence of the West's distrust of Stalin and USSR generally. I think it's entirely plausible the motivation to drop the bomb included Soviet deterrence. [1] http://www.doug-long.com/ga1.htm http://www.doug-long.com/ga1.htm
    - mezentius 5y ago
      I made a post about this above, but the difference between a negotiated peace and an unconditional surrender is rather crucial. The Japanese were willing to seek the former but found the latter politically unacceptable until sufficient pressure was applied.
    - TedDoesntTalk 5y ago
      > [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, He may have said that, but after reading books on Oppenheimer and other scientists at the Manhatten Project, I don't believe it is accurate
    - diogenescynic 5y ago
      The quote exists but doesn’t mean it’s correct.
  - beepbooptheory 5y ago
    you are right, I am convinced, this was obviously the best action the Americans could have done. Why is it so hard for people to get that?
    - misiti3780 5y ago
      I suspect (as some have indicated), this is a very centric version of the history, but that does not mean it is incorrect.
    - dghlsakjg 5y ago
      Because there is a lot of evidence that it wasn’t the case and that we knew it wasn’t the case. The most damning evidence against it being necessary is that the Japanese were actively trying to get the Soviets to help them negotiate peace in the weeks leading up to the bombing. The soviets played them, and didn’t carry the message since they were secretly in the process of staging an invasion against Japan in Manchuria, an event that the Japanese knew would be fatal to their war. It’s worth noting that Hirohito did not order the surrender of Japan after hearing of Hiroshima, but after hearing of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria, which happened a few hours before Nagasaki. Much of the reluctance to surrender was around guaranteeing that Hirohito could remain. A concession that we granted in the end. Also keep in mind that the nuclear attacks weren’t even the most destructive aerial attacks that the US possessed. The firebombing of Tokyo did more damage to a wider area and killed more people. In fact, Hiroshima was the 6th most destructive bombing raid as far as land area destroyed goes. American forces wiped dozens of cities off the map using conventional attacks before Hiroshima. Before August 6 the Japanese politicians were more than aware that the war was lost, and that surrender was necessary. There is a lot of the historical record that shows this. There is also a lot of records that the bombing was as much a demonstration of power to Stalin as anything else. Many of the justifications that we see know don’t appear in the written record until after 1945. You are welcome to do the research. Most serious historians of the time acknowledge that the bombings might have shortened the war, but the effect was minimal. On the order of a few days or weeks at best. Most of this is not disputed fact. The interpretation is certainly debatable, but we hide the complexity of the situation by perpetuating the story that it was either nuclear bombings or an invasion that would have killed millions. More info with citations: https://www.thenation.com/article/world/why-the-us-really-bombed-hiroshima/ https://www.thenation.com/article/world/why-the-us-really-bo...
  - pessimizer 5y ago
    > Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child. This is not history, this is a hypothetical. > They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks. I suspect this would have been ineffective.
    - misiti3780 5y ago
      The Japanese were not known for surrendering. There were mass suicides because they refused to be taken alive: https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/japanese-mass-suicides https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/japanese-mass-suicide...
    - TedDoesntTalk 5y ago
      It's not ineffective in all situations. A single soldier, isolated from his group, fighting 10 seniors or children simultaneously, is not going to do well. Plenty of people are killed in the Middle-East from rock throwing.
    - jp57 5y ago
      It's not an implausible hypothesis that an invasion of Japan would have been a larger, and proportionally bloodier, version of the takings of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, two very bloody battles.
      - Matticus_Rex 5y ago
        Right, but at no point were those the only options (even according to key military figures).
    - kragen 5y ago
      The firebombs the Japanese flew across the Pacific, setting fires in the Pacific Northwest of the US, were largely built by children. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu-Go_balloon_bomb https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu-Go_balloon_bomb
- mcguire 5y ago
  The problem is that there exist first-hand and second-hand (i.e. MAGIC intercepts) primary sources for decisions from both sides in the summer of 1945 (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/) and they don't really support the theory. (It's possible you could find some reasoning to support the "impress the Soviets" part, but to make that the primary motive would be to ignore the majority.) Also, keep in mind that Halsey had a bit of a problem with Nimitz and much of the Navy, particularly over the matter of two typhoons and Leyte Gulf, so he may not be entirely unbiased.
- Matticus_Rex 5y ago
  There are very few defensible historical positions that seem to rile up unreasonable criticism more than saying the use of atomic weapons on Japan might not have been justified, usually in the form of uneducated meme responses such as "they would never have surrendered" and "it's easy to say that now." Given that we have evidence that many of those who were there at the time disagreed with the decision and that Japan had already been trying to work towards peace through back-channels, these responses seem to point to a deep need to feel like the United States didn't unjustifiably kill over 100k civilians. There is little question that the bombings were a better strategic choice than Operation Downfall, which would likely have killed more on both sides, but to paint this as the only alternative is a false dilemma. There is even debate among (prominent, non-revisionist) historians and political scientists as to whether the bombings were the primary reason for the surrender -- contemporary letters from within Japan indicate that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria may have actually been the primary factor (though the bombings certainly played some part, and were a larger factor in arguments made by some particular officials).
  - mezentius 5y ago
    I would argue the opposite; criticism of the use of atomic weapons on Japan tends to ramp up during periods of increasing skepticism toward American power (e.g., now). Unfortunately, that criticism is rarely rooted in credible historical argument. I wouldn't say you're arguing from a "uneducated meme response," but I would say that the position that you're taking is the symptom of a post-Vietnam/Watergate narrative regarding CIA conspiracies, the legitimacy of war, and the trustworthiness of American authority. It is, however, not a terribly useful way to approach the context of 1945. While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable. The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel). I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.
- ThrowawayR2 5y ago
  Because it's been debunked over and over and over. It's just not supported by historical evidence, even by Japanese historians interviewing surviving Japanese officials. Somebody else has recommended in this thread but I will as well: "Japan's Longest Day" makes for fascinating reading. The reality is that there was a peace faction in the Japanese government who did want to surrender but the ultranationalistic Japanese military was quite firmly in control and was very much _not_ interested in surrendering, even at the cost of millions of Japanese military and civilian casualties involved in continuing the war. (It's worth remembering that the Allied aerial firebombing campaigns had already devastated every other major city in Japan and caused far more civilian casualties than both atomic bombs did; both the Japanese and Allied militaries accepted this as part of the toll of war.) The aim (and preference of all factions) would have been a peace treaty that let Japan keep its ill-gotten gains in Asia. It took an unprecedented direct order from the Emperor to initiate the surrender, over the objections of the military. Even the high level overview provided by the Wikipedia article has excerpts like "[On August 9,] The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. ... The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged." and "As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup." that directly contradict the idea that Japan was eager to surrender. And beyond that, at the last minute, a coup attempt was made by fanatics willing to defy even the Emperor in an attempt to prevent the surrender proclamation from being broadcast (the Kyuujou incident). Does any of this sound like a Japan that was eager to surrender? No, and that's why war historians generally deride this theory, quotes from Halsey, Eisenhower, etc. notwithstanding. Even just reading the Wikipedia article would make this clear: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan
trzy 5y ago
More importantly than their presence in Eastern Europe, said battle-hardened troops had advanced into Manchuria and Korea. History would have looked quite different indeed if they had proceeded to invade Japan.
- drocer88 5y ago
  Reds did invade northern Japanese islands and still occupy them today. Yalta agreement carved out areas south of this for the U.S.
- thrwway34 5y ago
  They had no experience in successful landing assault operations. And besides, all big cities in Manchuria and Korea were captured only after Japanese surrender.
jbay808 5y ago
When I went to high school in Canada, this analysis was more or less the standard treatment of the subject. I'm surprised you're getting downvoted.
mezentius 5y ago
The history does not credibly support this analysis. For Halsey to say that the Japanese were on "the verge of surrender" is somewhat misleading; while the Japanese may have been willing to seek a negotiated end to the conflict, they were certainly not willing to surrender unconditionally, and in fact were throwing away an appalling number of lives in India, New Guinea, and islands all across the Pacific to prove this. An unconditional surrender was seen as necessary because the Western Allies believed that they needed a free hand in the postwar period to drastically restructure the political systems of the Axis countries and prevent future militarism. If you look at the example of the interwar period (in which negotiated truces had repeatedly failed in the face of determined militarism) and then note the result of the postwar period for both the Japanese and German economies, it would be very hard to argue that the Allies were wrong.
- mcguire 5y ago
  The conditions the Japanese Supreme War Council (made up of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs; the only higher authority was the Emperor) were willing to accept were: 1. The Emperor continued unmolested as the head of state, 2. Japan was responsible for its own disarmament, 3. There would be no occupation, and 4. Japan would conduct its own war crime trials.
  - Wohlf 5y ago
    This was not possible, the Allies had all agreed on unconditional surrender so no separate peace could be carved out.
    - mezentius 5y ago
      Yes—and beyond the important question of separate peace, those conditions were seen as too onerous given the perceived need to transform Japan's political and social institutions after the war. Beyond this was the political requirement to address widespread and well-known atrocities committed by the Japanese Army, as well as the failure of voluntary arms control treaties in the interwar period. In the end, of course, the Allies did decide to leave the Emperor in place as nominal head of state—but had not decided to do so before the Japanese capitulated, and certainly did not want to commit themselves to that course.
drocer88 5y ago
"the American and British armies would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army". U.S. , Britain, Canada and France had millions of battle hardened troops, too ... and air and sea supremacy.
- kragen 5y ago
  I see people touting the amazing prowess of the American and British armies in WWII a lot, and I have to wonder if those people are mystified about how Stalin ended up with half of Europe. How do they fit it into their worldview? About a third of the total casualties of World War II were in Operation Barbarossa, 25 million out of 75 million, about 14% of the Soviet population, mostly within a few months in 01941. The battle hardened troops of the US and even France could mostly go back home to their families, barring Jody; the Soviet troops had, in many cases, had their families killed or starved to death by the Germans. And, when it came to land combat, the Soviets were enormously outproducing not only Germany, though not the US; in 01944, the last full year of war, they produced some 17000 tanks, and nearly 20000 in 01943. (The US numbers were 37000 in 01944 and 27000 in 01943.) However, Russian tanks had a significant advantage over US tanks for combat in Europe: they were in Europe. And so were the farms that fed their crews. So, I'm not sure if they "would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army", but I'm sure glad they didn't have to find out.
  - jbay808 5y ago
    I think the wide availability of US and British war stories, tales, and legends, relative to those of other countries, is probably due to them being in English. I'm sure every side has their stories of cunning tricks they pulled, daring midnight raids, undercover operations, ingenious hardware, extreme training, victory against all odds, and everything else. But we hear our stories from our grandparents, books, and the English internet. It's less common to look across to the other sides and learn about how they saw things. That's one of the reasons this article is very important.
  - cmrdporcupine 5y ago
    Not only this, but a significant number of the resistance movements against the Nazi occupation or Fascist governance in France, Italy, etc were organized by Communists or sympathetic to them. The Communist Parties maintained popularity for decades after WWII partially as a result of the role they played in resisting the Nazis, organizing resistance, etc. Remember that the rest of western Europe and North America stood by and let Franco overrun Spain while the communist movement (small c and big-C) actively tried to fight him. So there were in fact forces on the ground in many parts of Europe that would not have seen potential Red Army invasion forces as the same kind of invasion force as the Germans. At least for a period of time.
FridayoLeary 5y ago
I'm not sure why you getting downvoted. The first one was little short of a war crime from what i can see. Blow up a mountain maybe, to demonstrate the unlimited power of the a-bomb, but why drop it on a populated city? But even if the first one can be justified (we only had 2 bombs and they were fanatical etc.) why the second bomb? At least give them a bit more time to think. I think maybe this subject gets taught differently in America to the rest of the world.
refurb 5y ago
How does one conclude the Japanese were "on the verge of surrender" when it took not one, but two atomic bombs before they capitulated? And it took six days after the second bomb before they officially surrendered. That doesn't sound like "on the verge of surrender" to me.
- Animats 5y ago
  This is an old argument. Read "Japan's Longest Day", from 1965, which is a detailed reconstruction of what went on before the Japanese surrender, from interviews with some of the people involved. Nobody was in overall charge. The Army barely spoke to the Navy. Planning meetings consisted of the heads of the Army and Navy making statements. The emperor's role was primarily ceremonial. The civilian government had little or no control over the military. (For why, see [1]). The surrender was a near thing, with one faction almost succeeding in prevent the Emperor from broadcasting a surrender message. The US side of that story is presented in "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb", by Paul Fussell. (1981) Fussell is a well-known essayist. He was in the Army during WWII, and he was in a unit scheduled for the invasion of Japan if the atomic bomb didn't work. Look up "Operation Olympic". The first phase, the invasion of Kyushu, was scheduled for November 1, 1945, less than three months after the atomic bombing. This wasn't just planned; the equipment and soldiers were already in Okinawa and Saipan, the staging areas, and that invasion was going to happen if the atomic bomb didn't force a surrender. The operation was at least 3x the size of D-day and over a 500km sea approach. A million dead were expected on the Allied side. Far more on the Japanese side, because the defense was mostly infantry without enough heavy weapons, armor, or ammo. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_15_Incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_15_Incident [2] https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/hf/iakh/HIS1300MET/v12/undervisningsmateriale/Fussel%20-%20thank%20god%20for%20the%20atom%20bomb.pdf https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/hf/iakh/HIS1300MET/v12/unde...

mitjak 5y ago

why did you get downvoted? it seems a plausible theory that's at least worth discussing / is a reasonable contribution to this thread.

diogenescynic 5y ago
Because anyone who knows the actual history, knows that's bullshit and OP could have just looked up the facts instead of making up something. Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child. They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks. The Pacific theater was already one of the bloodiest battle fronts in the war and the US was battle weary and didn't want to expend another 500,000 Americans to invade Japan. They dropped nukes to avoid another extended and unbelievably bloody conflict. Go listen to the Hardcore History podcasts "Supernova in the East" and it'll make it much more clear.
- engineer_22 5y ago
  I don't think it's bullshit. I think Navy Admiral William F. Halsey did say those things. "The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before."[1] Those are the facts... GP made nothing up. OTOH - the Cold War should be ample evidence of the West's distrust of Stalin and USSR generally. I think it's entirely plausible the motivation to drop the bomb included Soviet deterrence. [1] http://www.doug-long.com/ga1.htm http://www.doug-long.com/ga1.htm
  - mezentius 5y ago
    I made a post about this above, but the difference between a negotiated peace and an unconditional surrender is rather crucial. The Japanese were willing to seek the former but found the latter politically unacceptable until sufficient pressure was applied.
  - TedDoesntTalk 5y ago
    > [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, He may have said that, but after reading books on Oppenheimer and other scientists at the Manhatten Project, I don't believe it is accurate
  - diogenescynic 5y ago
    The quote exists but doesn’t mean it’s correct.
- beepbooptheory 5y ago
  you are right, I am convinced, this was obviously the best action the Americans could have done. Why is it so hard for people to get that?
  - misiti3780 5y ago
    I suspect (as some have indicated), this is a very centric version of the history, but that does not mean it is incorrect.
  - dghlsakjg 5y ago
    Because there is a lot of evidence that it wasn’t the case and that we knew it wasn’t the case. The most damning evidence against it being necessary is that the Japanese were actively trying to get the Soviets to help them negotiate peace in the weeks leading up to the bombing. The soviets played them, and didn’t carry the message since they were secretly in the process of staging an invasion against Japan in Manchuria, an event that the Japanese knew would be fatal to their war. It’s worth noting that Hirohito did not order the surrender of Japan after hearing of Hiroshima, but after hearing of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria, which happened a few hours before Nagasaki. Much of the reluctance to surrender was around guaranteeing that Hirohito could remain. A concession that we granted in the end. Also keep in mind that the nuclear attacks weren’t even the most destructive aerial attacks that the US possessed. The firebombing of Tokyo did more damage to a wider area and killed more people. In fact, Hiroshima was the 6th most destructive bombing raid as far as land area destroyed goes. American forces wiped dozens of cities off the map using conventional attacks before Hiroshima. Before August 6 the Japanese politicians were more than aware that the war was lost, and that surrender was necessary. There is a lot of the historical record that shows this. There is also a lot of records that the bombing was as much a demonstration of power to Stalin as anything else. Many of the justifications that we see know don’t appear in the written record until after 1945. You are welcome to do the research. Most serious historians of the time acknowledge that the bombings might have shortened the war, but the effect was minimal. On the order of a few days or weeks at best. Most of this is not disputed fact. The interpretation is certainly debatable, but we hide the complexity of the situation by perpetuating the story that it was either nuclear bombings or an invasion that would have killed millions. More info with citations: https://www.thenation.com/article/world/why-the-us-really-bombed-hiroshima/ https://www.thenation.com/article/world/why-the-us-really-bo...
- pessimizer 5y ago
  > Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child. This is not history, this is a hypothetical. > They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks. I suspect this would have been ineffective.
  - misiti3780 5y ago
    The Japanese were not known for surrendering. There were mass suicides because they refused to be taken alive: https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/japanese-mass-suicides https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/japanese-mass-suicide...
  - TedDoesntTalk 5y ago
    It's not ineffective in all situations. A single soldier, isolated from his group, fighting 10 seniors or children simultaneously, is not going to do well. Plenty of people are killed in the Middle-East from rock throwing.
  - jp57 5y ago
    It's not an implausible hypothesis that an invasion of Japan would have been a larger, and proportionally bloodier, version of the takings of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, two very bloody battles.
    - Matticus_Rex 5y ago
      Right, but at no point were those the only options (even according to key military figures).
  - kragen 5y ago
    The firebombs the Japanese flew across the Pacific, setting fires in the Pacific Northwest of the US, were largely built by children. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu-Go_balloon_bomb https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu-Go_balloon_bomb
mcguire 5y ago
The problem is that there exist first-hand and second-hand (i.e. MAGIC intercepts) primary sources for decisions from both sides in the summer of 1945 (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/) and they don't really support the theory. (It's possible you could find some reasoning to support the "impress the Soviets" part, but to make that the primary motive would be to ignore the majority.) Also, keep in mind that Halsey had a bit of a problem with Nimitz and much of the Navy, particularly over the matter of two typhoons and Leyte Gulf, so he may not be entirely unbiased.
Matticus_Rex 5y ago
There are very few defensible historical positions that seem to rile up unreasonable criticism more than saying the use of atomic weapons on Japan might not have been justified, usually in the form of uneducated meme responses such as "they would never have surrendered" and "it's easy to say that now." Given that we have evidence that many of those who were there at the time disagreed with the decision and that Japan had already been trying to work towards peace through back-channels, these responses seem to point to a deep need to feel like the United States didn't unjustifiably kill over 100k civilians. There is little question that the bombings were a better strategic choice than Operation Downfall, which would likely have killed more on both sides, but to paint this as the only alternative is a false dilemma. There is even debate among (prominent, non-revisionist) historians and political scientists as to whether the bombings were the primary reason for the surrender -- contemporary letters from within Japan indicate that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria may have actually been the primary factor (though the bombings certainly played some part, and were a larger factor in arguments made by some particular officials).
- mezentius 5y ago
  I would argue the opposite; criticism of the use of atomic weapons on Japan tends to ramp up during periods of increasing skepticism toward American power (e.g., now). Unfortunately, that criticism is rarely rooted in credible historical argument. I wouldn't say you're arguing from a "uneducated meme response," but I would say that the position that you're taking is the symptom of a post-Vietnam/Watergate narrative regarding CIA conspiracies, the legitimacy of war, and the trustworthiness of American authority. It is, however, not a terribly useful way to approach the context of 1945. While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable. The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel). I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.
ThrowawayR2 5y ago
Because it's been debunked over and over and over. It's just not supported by historical evidence, even by Japanese historians interviewing surviving Japanese officials. Somebody else has recommended in this thread but I will as well: "Japan's Longest Day" makes for fascinating reading. The reality is that there was a peace faction in the Japanese government who did want to surrender but the ultranationalistic Japanese military was quite firmly in control and was very much _not_ interested in surrendering, even at the cost of millions of Japanese military and civilian casualties involved in continuing the war. (It's worth remembering that the Allied aerial firebombing campaigns had already devastated every other major city in Japan and caused far more civilian casualties than both atomic bombs did; both the Japanese and Allied militaries accepted this as part of the toll of war.) The aim (and preference of all factions) would have been a peace treaty that let Japan keep its ill-gotten gains in Asia. It took an unprecedented direct order from the Emperor to initiate the surrender, over the objections of the military. Even the high level overview provided by the Wikipedia article has excerpts like "[On August 9,] The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. ... The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged." and "As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup." that directly contradict the idea that Japan was eager to surrender. And beyond that, at the last minute, a coup attempt was made by fanatics willing to defy even the Emperor in an attempt to prevent the surrender proclamation from being broadcast (the Kyuujou incident). Does any of this sound like a Japan that was eager to surrender? No, and that's why war historians generally deride this theory, quotes from Halsey, Eisenhower, etc. notwithstanding. Even just reading the Wikipedia article would make this clear: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan

trzy 5y ago

More importantly than their presence in Eastern Europe, said battle-hardened troops had advanced into Manchuria and Korea. History would have looked quite different indeed if they had proceeded to invade Japan.

drocer88 5y ago
Reds did invade northern Japanese islands and still occupy them today. Yalta agreement carved out areas south of this for the U.S.
thrwway34 5y ago
They had no experience in successful landing assault operations. And besides, all big cities in Manchuria and Korea were captured only after Japanese surrender.

jbay808 5y ago

When I went to high school in Canada, this analysis was more or less the standard treatment of the subject. I'm surprised you're getting downvoted.

mezentius 5y ago

The history does not credibly support this analysis. For Halsey to say that the Japanese were on "the verge of surrender" is somewhat misleading; while the Japanese may have been willing to seek a negotiated end to the conflict, they were certainly not willing to surrender unconditionally, and in fact were throwing away an appalling number of lives in India, New Guinea, and islands all across the Pacific to prove this. An unconditional surrender was seen as necessary because the Western Allies believed that they needed a free hand in the postwar period to drastically restructure the political systems of the Axis countries and prevent future militarism. If you look at the example of the interwar period (in which negotiated truces had repeatedly failed in the face of determined militarism) and then note the result of the postwar period for both the Japanese and German economies, it would be very hard to argue that the Allies were wrong.

mcguire 5y ago
The conditions the Japanese Supreme War Council (made up of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs; the only higher authority was the Emperor) were willing to accept were: 1. The Emperor continued unmolested as the head of state, 2. Japan was responsible for its own disarmament, 3. There would be no occupation, and 4. Japan would conduct its own war crime trials.
- Wohlf 5y ago
  This was not possible, the Allies had all agreed on unconditional surrender so no separate peace could be carved out.
  - mezentius 5y ago
    Yes—and beyond the important question of separate peace, those conditions were seen as too onerous given the perceived need to transform Japan's political and social institutions after the war. Beyond this was the political requirement to address widespread and well-known atrocities committed by the Japanese Army, as well as the failure of voluntary arms control treaties in the interwar period. In the end, of course, the Allies did decide to leave the Emperor in place as nominal head of state—but had not decided to do so before the Japanese capitulated, and certainly did not want to commit themselves to that course.

drocer88 5y ago

"the American and British armies would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army". U.S. , Britain, Canada and France had millions of battle hardened troops, too ... and air and sea supremacy.

kragen 5y ago
I see people touting the amazing prowess of the American and British armies in WWII a lot, and I have to wonder if those people are mystified about how Stalin ended up with half of Europe. How do they fit it into their worldview? About a third of the total casualties of World War II were in Operation Barbarossa, 25 million out of 75 million, about 14% of the Soviet population, mostly within a few months in 01941. The battle hardened troops of the US and even France could mostly go back home to their families, barring Jody; the Soviet troops had, in many cases, had their families killed or starved to death by the Germans. And, when it came to land combat, the Soviets were enormously outproducing not only Germany, though not the US; in 01944, the last full year of war, they produced some 17000 tanks, and nearly 20000 in 01943. (The US numbers were 37000 in 01944 and 27000 in 01943.) However, Russian tanks had a significant advantage over US tanks for combat in Europe: they were in Europe. And so were the farms that fed their crews. So, I'm not sure if they "would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army", but I'm sure glad they didn't have to find out.
- jbay808 5y ago
  I think the wide availability of US and British war stories, tales, and legends, relative to those of other countries, is probably due to them being in English. I'm sure every side has their stories of cunning tricks they pulled, daring midnight raids, undercover operations, ingenious hardware, extreme training, victory against all odds, and everything else. But we hear our stories from our grandparents, books, and the English internet. It's less common to look across to the other sides and learn about how they saw things. That's one of the reasons this article is very important.
- cmrdporcupine 5y ago
  Not only this, but a significant number of the resistance movements against the Nazi occupation or Fascist governance in France, Italy, etc were organized by Communists or sympathetic to them. The Communist Parties maintained popularity for decades after WWII partially as a result of the role they played in resisting the Nazis, organizing resistance, etc. Remember that the rest of western Europe and North America stood by and let Franco overrun Spain while the communist movement (small c and big-C) actively tried to fight him. So there were in fact forces on the ground in many parts of Europe that would not have seen potential Red Army invasion forces as the same kind of invasion force as the Germans. At least for a period of time.

FridayoLeary 5y ago

I'm not sure why you getting downvoted. The first one was little short of a war crime from what i can see. Blow up a mountain maybe, to demonstrate the unlimited power of the a-bomb, but why drop it on a populated city? But even if the first one can be justified (we only had 2 bombs and they were fanatical etc.) why the second bomb? At least give them a bit more time to think. I think maybe this subject gets taught differently in America to the rest of the world.

refurb 5y ago

How does one conclude the Japanese were "on the verge of surrender" when it took not one, but two atomic bombs before they capitulated? And it took six days after the second bomb before they officially surrendered. That doesn't sound like "on the verge of surrender" to me.

Animats 5y ago
This is an old argument. Read "Japan's Longest Day", from 1965, which is a detailed reconstruction of what went on before the Japanese surrender, from interviews with some of the people involved. Nobody was in overall charge. The Army barely spoke to the Navy. Planning meetings consisted of the heads of the Army and Navy making statements. The emperor's role was primarily ceremonial. The civilian government had little or no control over the military. (For why, see [1]). The surrender was a near thing, with one faction almost succeeding in prevent the Emperor from broadcasting a surrender message. The US side of that story is presented in "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb", by Paul Fussell. (1981) Fussell is a well-known essayist. He was in the Army during WWII, and he was in a unit scheduled for the invasion of Japan if the atomic bomb didn't work. Look up "Operation Olympic". The first phase, the invasion of Kyushu, was scheduled for November 1, 1945, less than three months after the atomic bombing. This wasn't just planned; the equipment and soldiers were already in Okinawa and Saipan, the staging areas, and that invasion was going to happen if the atomic bomb didn't force a surrender. The operation was at least 3x the size of D-day and over a 500km sea approach. A million dead were expected on the Allied side. Far more on the Japanese side, because the defense was mostly infantry without enough heavy weapons, armor, or ammo. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_15_Incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_15_Incident [2] https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/hf/iakh/HIS1300MET/v12/undervisningsmateriale/Fussel%20-%20thank%20god%20for%20the%20atom%20bomb.pdf https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/hf/iakh/HIS1300MET/v12/unde...