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ding ding we have a correct answer
by roody15 5y ago
ding ding we have a correct answer
- shuckles 5y agoThis is a claim which should require extraordinary evidence, since Apple has very publicly resisted pressure to build technology at the government’s behest in the past.
- ComputerGuru 5y agoIt’s now common knowledge (as mentioned in the article) that Apple refrained from adding a feature at the government’s behest in the past. It’s a fine line between not adding a feature they don’t like and adding a feature they do.
- shuckles 5y agoThis claim is often repeated but the only source for it I’ve found is reporting in Reuters citing anonymous sources. The user experience challenges of end to end encryption are immense, especially since iPhone is many users’ only iCloud client, and I find it hard to believe Apple was moments away from announcing a solution to them but the FBI pressured them out of it. That is not the extraordinary evidence such a claim needs. For example, Bloomberg reported an even better sourced story about supply chain compromises to Apple’s cloud services which has been more or less entirely debunked. In addition, the emphasis on the on-device portion of this scanning project is evidence that Apple views losing access to iCloud data as part of its roadmap.
- matthewdgreen 5y agoThe Bloomberg claims were explicitly denied by Apple and several other companies. To the best of my knowledge, Apple has never publicly denied the Reuters reporting, and explicitly declined to comment when given the chance by Reuters. It’s certainly one thing to extend the benefit of the doubt to a company in a dispute with a reputable news agency; it’s entirely another thing to take issue with the claim when even the affected company won’t do so.
- shuckles 5y agoSo you are suggesting that FBI pressure is the primary reason Apple did not pursue plans to end to end encrypt iCloud Backups on the basis of one news article and lack of comment from Apple? (There is other counter-evidence: Apple rarely comments on speculation. In an interview with the WSJ, Apple’s answer to why now was that they figured out how to do known CSAM detection in a way they felt met their privacy requirements. The omission is at least slightly informative, if you think FBI pressure is critical. Finally, people more familiar with the legal context have argued it would jeopardize the program for there to be evidence that Apple is doing this work in response to FBI pressure as suggested. Finally, Tim Cook offered a more straightforward explanation and vision for iCloud end to end encryption in an interview with a German newspaper: SPIEGEL ONLINE: Is the data as secure on your iCloud online service as on the devices? COOK: Our users have a key there, and we have one. We do this because some users lose or forget their key and then expect help from us to get their data back. It is difficult to estimate when we will change this practice. But I think that in the future it will be controlled like the devices. We will therefore no longer have a key for this in the future. ) If so, what information would change your mind? How confident are you that this is the full story?
- matthewdgreen 5y agoI have specific reasons to believe that Apple has been subject to legal pressure. But if you didn’t believe six anonymous sources in a story by a reputable reporter, you’re not going to believe my secondhand reports either. Skepticism is fine: stubborn unfounded skepticism in the absence of a direct confirmatory statement from Apple isn’t possible to argue with. Apple being legally pressured is not the full story. It is absolutely true that they have been pressured by the FBI and others, and simultaneously that they also have real concerns about user experience with lost backups. If you read the Reuters story, it doesn’t draw a straight line from the FBI to the backup situation, it just points out that legal pressure is a factor in Apple’s reasoning. Apple spent a lot of money building an E2EE key vault based on HSMs several years ago, and it’s also fairly obvious that they had bigger plans than securing passwords and browser history. Yet they have not made full E2EE backup available even as an option for advanced users, despite the fact that even Android now supports E2EE backups. And prior to enabling E2EE backups (one assumes that’s coming this year) they paused to build exactly the on-device scanning system that law enforcement has been exhorting cryptographers to build since William Barr’s letter in 2018. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see the pattern, but obviously only Tim Cook can prove it to your satisfaction. ETA: Just to take this a step beyond “someone is arguing on HN”: this argument matters because I think we all intuitively understand how dangerous this system would be in a world where Apple’s engineering is responsive to government pressure. Your skepticism makes perfect sense if you want to believe this system is secure. I wish I could live in a world where I was able to share that skepticism, it would be a more relaxing place.
- A4ET8a8uTh0 5y agoTherein lies a problem. Most people would agree that a good predictor what people will do is what they have done in the past. If you read through some of the stories ( those of Snowden come to mind ), some declassified information over the course of the past few decades, a pattern emerges. There is no evidence, either because it does not exist or because it is hidden. The best we have is inference and whistleblowers. That said, I genuinely think we are not being tinfoil enough these days. And that is based only on what we know ( or at least avg. citizen should know ) was already done in the past.
- shuckles 5y agoThe PRISM revelations, to this day, are very ambiguous about their implications for cooperation. When they came out, most involved companies flat out denied cooperation. The types of data the NSA claimed to get were available by tapping into network backbones. Unless you are aware of a theory or evidence I’m not, I think it’s just as likely that the program described in the leaked slides involved unilateral or covert intrusion by the NSA rather than cooperation. It is reasonable to be conservative about data stored in someone else’s cloud, and there is undeniable value to end to end encryption that gives you control over who can access it. That said, especially if you read Apple’s letter in response to the PRISM allegations, Apple’s behavior seems quite consistent and sincere over time: https://www.apple.com/apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/ https://www.apple.com/apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/. I don’t think it’s likely they designed this feature under pressure from the government or with the intention to expand it to local data on your device.
- A4ET8a8uTh0 5y agoOk. If that is not the reason, then the question becomes what is the real reason. Some analysts seem to think Apple should be getting into advertising business, which would partially explain some of the proposed updates. Naturally, if that were the case, it would render Apple's commitment to privacy about as useful as T-Mobile's. Then again, I might be giving Apple too much crap. Most companies don't even pretend to care. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-could-be-apples-next-20-billion-business-11629906340?mod=home-page https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-could-be-apples-next-...
- adventured 5y ago> since Apple has very publicly resisted pressure to build technology at the government’s behest in the past. And they've also not done that. When Jobs died Apple promptly bent the knee and joined up to PRISM. Very publicly resisted? Nope. They went along, very quietly (it was Yahoo that tried to fight back). We only found out about Apple having joined up thanks to the man that wrote this article. How many human rights atrocities does Apple get to partake in before their credibility is shot, such that the burden is put on them instead, of proving - in such circumstances as this one - that they're not commiting more atrocities.
- roody15 5y agoPerhaps. However Apple has since released two security updates to iOS but has not patched the iMessage flaw that allows Pegasus software to spy on thousands (perhaps millions) of iphones. What are they waiting for? Hmm perhaps getting something else in place first.
- shuckles 5y agoYou are saying known CSAM detection for iCloud Photo Library will launch before the Pegasus 0-days are fixed? The two are entirely different. If Apple was working on behalf of the government, they could’ve already shipped over the contents of iCloud for all the users targeted. In any case, I’d happily take the other side of the bet at even odds that the security issue is patched after the child safety program goes live.