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Exactly, I think people are just getting a little too worked up over this whole thing. Apple computes a hash of each image you upload to iCloud then check it ag

Exactly, I think people are just getting a little too worked up over this whole thing. Apple computes a hash of each image you upload to iCloud then check it against a list of CP hashes. Of all the things in the world to get worked up over, this is ridiculous. I get it, the mechanism they're using has apparent flaws, and maybe some whacko could somehow get access to your phone and start uploading things that trick the algorithm into thinking you have CP. But, that alone is such a ridiculous phobia, if someone has that level of access to your phone, they could upload real CP and maybe even upload it to your Facebook for good measure.

gjsman-1000 5y ago
Also, all of the "situations" where this could be abused are already applicable on all other platforms. There's no reason your Ex couldn't upload CSAM to your Google Photos account, or to your Facebook account. Google Photos and predecessors have scanned since, what, 2013?, and would detect it, and would report it to law enforcement. Despite this having been a possibility for almost a decade... there's a suspicious lack of headlines of this attack occurring.
carnitas 5y ago
Apple hashes all of your photos offline and then pinky promises to only check the hashes against the official on phone database when the user initiated an upload. The problem isn’t about wackos it’s about governments forcing Apple to do things with this new weapon
- gjsman-1000 5y ago
  Every other cloud storage provider has implemented scanning since 2011-2013.
  - merpnderp 5y ago
    I haven't seen a single person concerned about Apple scanning photos in iCloud. The problem is entirely that the scan is happening on your personal phone with apparently some janky implementation that in one week has already shown to have serious flaws.
  - musha68k 5y ago
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whataboutism https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whataboutism
- tpush 5y ago
  > Apple hashes all of your photos offline [...] No, only the ones designated for upload to iCloud. > [...] it’s about governments forcing Apple to do things with this new weapon Governments can already force Apple to do any kind of scanning, "weapon" being built already or not.
  - withinboredom 5y ago
    Says who? Apple? How much is that worth?
    - Tagbert 5y ago
      If Apple were going to lie about this process, they didn't need to announce it and go into so much detail at all. They could have just kept it quiet the way the current server side CSAM scanning is done by others already. The legal and market impacts of Apple lying would be severe.
  - nottorp 5y ago
    > > Apple hashes all of your photos offline [...] > No, only the ones designated for upload to iCloud. How do you verify that?
    - theshrike79 5y ago
      If you turn off iCloud, the hash list will never get downloaded on your phone. No scanning will take place in that case.
      - nottorp 5y ago
        How do you verify that? :) You're just quoting what apple says. Which may be all they're allowed to say due to the national security letter thing.
        theshrike79 5y ago
        I'm trusting in the hacker community with this. If Apple really is trying to sneak in a CSAM database on your phone with iCloud disabled, someone WILL catch it and raise so much hell we'll all hear it.
ApolloFortyNine 5y ago
This kinda of sounds like "let them put a camera in my living room, I'm not doing anything wrong". The biggest complaint here is clearly this is not where it'll end, and it's not a unique hash, so there will be false positives. And since it's publicly announced, this is very unlikely to catch any producers of CP, and would only catch the dumbest consumers. So it's an invasion of privacy with very little chance of having a noticeable impact.
randomdata 5y ago
> I think people are just getting a little too worked up over this whole thing. They aren't, but the blame is misguided. This isn't a problem with Apple. What is Apple going to do if they do detect something identified as CSAM on your device? Refuse to sell you another? Oh well. The real worry is what other parties will do if they get ahold of the information. That is what needs to be fixed. Apple is exposing the underlying problem, not causing the problem themselves.
- scoopertrooper 5y ago
  Apple have said what they're going to do. If the number of hash hits reaches 30, then they'll scale the image down and send it off to their manual review team. If they confirm it's CP, then they call the police.
  - randomdata 5y ago
    Exactly. They're not going do much of anything. It is what happens after the final step outlined that actually concerns people, and that is where the real problem lies. Apple is simply exposing the problem; or perhaps more accurately bringing the problem we all understand exists into the limelight. Had Apple not implemented this feature, or implemented it differently (scanning server-side, for example), the problem would still be there.
    - scoopertrooper 5y ago
      If a pedophile takes their computer (loaded with CP) to a repair shop and they find CP they call the police. If a pedophile uploads CP to the internet and the host finds CP they call the police. Both seem like reasonable responses to me.
      - randomdata 5y ago
        Again, it is what happens after that which has people worried. Apple is simply bringing attention to it.
jrockway 5y ago
Apple's using my electricity and my silicon to call the cops on me. We have no idea what hashes they're checking images against; we can't see the raw data, and we can't see the hashes, and we can't see what they're sending to their servers. There is no technical reason why this needs to exist. If they want to scan iCloud photos for something, they can do that on their servers. iCloud is not end-to-end encrypted. Law enforcement can do whatever they want with the data you send there. Since they chose the client-side route, they have to be up to something, and it all smells very fishy. Today, they say it's for CSAM. Tomorrow, it will be for any discontent against whatever government wants to oppress its people this week -- and as time goes forward, that is not just third-world countries where you don't live, it could be your own. Do you really want to explain to the police at your door at 3:30 in the morning why you read a website called Hacker News? This is the first step towards that reality. Imagine I wrote a program that contained the phone numbers of people I don't like. The database is encrypted, and the only way to see if you're on that list is to install the app on your phone. The app does two things -- nothing if you're not on my list, or it sends me your location (at your expense!) if you are. Would you install that app? Absolutely not, that would be crazy. But that is basically what is bundled into iOS now. I really like my iPhone and iPad Pro. I like how Apple handles privacy in general. But I can't accept this. It's a step too far. You don't have to draw the line there, but I draw the line there.
- zepto 5y ago
  > iCloud is not end-to-end encrypted Yet. Have you considered that this might be a necessary precursor to making iCloud e2e?
  - IncRnd 5y ago
    Scanning people's on-phone photos clearly has nothing to do with being a precursor to e2e encryption. The photos get transferred either way, so one has nothing to do with the other.
    - hkt 5y ago
      Except for giving the authorities a way in to replace the one they're losing.
syntaxstic 5y ago
This is only applicable in the US?
- gjsman-1000 5y ago
  Yes - only the US has this "feature."
IncRnd 5y ago
> Exactly, I think people are just getting a little too worked up over this whole thing. Apple computes a hash of each image you upload to iCloud then check it against a list of CP hashes. If that is what is supposed to happen, then it makes no sense for any new code to run on the device! > Of all the things in the world to get worked up over, this is ridiculous. Well, it is not crazy to get worked up over Apple saying they will check uploads to iCloud by checking what's on your phone - instead of simply adding code to iCloud. That seems obvious not ridiculous.
- scoopertrooper 5y ago
  > If that is what is supposed to happen, then it makes no sense for any new code to run on the device! The new code calculates the hash as part of the upload process. The comparison of the hash against known CP hashes happen on the server. > Well, it is not crazy to get worked up over Apple saying they will check uploads to iCloud by checking what's on your phone - instead of simply adding code to iCloud. They're still doing the checks in iCloud, but the hash is being computed on the client.
  - IncRnd 5y ago
    You simply repeated back to me what I wrote without addressing any of it.
    - scoopertrooper 5y ago
      Okay, well they're likely doing it to save money. I work in data engineering and I can tell you calculating the hash of every iCloud upload wouldn't come cheap. Mystery solved?
      - IncRnd 5y ago
        You are completely missing the point. The answer to a privacy and security question shouldn't be, "it is easy for us to do things this way." You are inadvertently making the point that you are arguing against.
pshirshov 5y ago
> if someone has that level of access to your phone, they could upload real CP and maybe even upload it to your Facebook for good measure. Many messengers, including Whatsapp, save all the incoming pics into camera roll by default.
- merrywhether 5y ago
  And if you have iCloud Photos turned on, those images are already being uploaded and then CSAM-scanned on Apple’s servers. The chain is just being configured differently, but this risk is already active.
  - pshirshov 5y ago
    The actual problem is not CSAM scanning. The actual problem is that they've created a great surveillance tool which will inevitably get broader capabilities and they are normalising client-side data scanning (we need to eradicate terrorism, now we need to eradicate human trafficking, and now we need to eradicate tax evasion, oh, we forgot about gay russians, hmm, what about Winnie memes?).
    - gjsman-1000 5y ago
      But this was already true. There is no reason the governments couldn't have required this tool to be built at anytime all along. Remember EARN IT where Senators said figure something out (like this CSAM tool) or they'll do it for Apple? The EU is similar, with upcoming draft legislation saying they have to do it if they don't figure something (like this) out.
      - pshirshov 5y ago
        You still may donate to liberty and FOSS NGOs, switch to ungoogled Android and drop macOS in favour of Linux. Also you have your rights and opportunities for activism and peaceful protest. This is not illegal yet (effectively illegal in Russia/China though).
      - 5y ago
vbezhenar 5y ago
> I get it, the mechanism they're using has apparent flaws, and maybe some whacko could somehow get access to your phone and start uploading things that trick the algorithm into thinking you have CP. Whatsapp by default adds all received images into Photos. So all it takes is to send you few dozens of pictures while you're sleeping.
cartoonworld 5y ago
>Apple computes a hash of each image you upload to iCloud then check it against a list of CP hashes. I don't think it computes a hash of the image, it's a tad more involved than that. Simple hashing is easily evaded. They must be computing an identifier from the contents of the images in the CSAM database. This requires computational analysis on the handset or computer. If that's all that were happening that would be no problem, but of course there are management interfaces to the classifer/analyzer, catalog, backend, &c The contents of the identifiers are purposefully opaque to prevent spoofing of the identifier database. I don't know what is included in the images; what if I take a picture at Disneyland with a trafficked person in the frame? Will that make it into the qualifier database? What is added to the CSAM signature database and why? What is the pipeline of hashesfrom NCMEC and other child-safety organizations->Apple's CSAM image classifer alarm? >I get it, the mechanism they're using has apparent flaws, and maybe some whacko could somehow get access to your phone and start uploading things that trick the algorithm into thinking you have CP. The CSAM analyzer could be subverted in any number of ways. I question how the CSAM identifiers are monitored for QA (I actually shudder thinking there are already humans doing this :( how unpleasant.) and the potential for harmful adversaries to repurpose this tool for other means. One contrived counterfactual: Locating pictures of Jamal Kashoggi in people's computer systems by 0-day malware. Another: Locating images of Edward Snowden. A more easily conceived notion: Locating amber alert subjects in people's phones, geofenced or not. To my eyes, it appears we will soon have increased analysis challenges. Self analysis of device activity and functions for image scanning malware (for example) is slightly harder, we have added a blessed one with unknown characteristics running on the systems. Does this pose a challenge to system profiling? How/does this interact with battery management? Is only iCloud scanning, or is everything scanned and then only checked before being sent to iCloud? (this appears to be the case[X]) There should be user notification too. If some sicko sends me something crazy somehow, I would surely want to know so I can call the cops!! All in all this makes me feel bad. There is not a lot of silver lining from my perspective. While the epidemic of unconscionable child abuse continues, I question the effectiveness of this approach. I would not consider jailbreaking my iPhone but for this kind of stuff. I would like to install network and permissions monitoring software on my iPhone such as Bouncer[0], Little Snitch[1], although these are helpfully not available for iOS. I feel grateful that I am unlikely to be affected by this image scanning software, I'm planning to continue my personal policy of never storing any pictures of any people whatsoever. I don't even store family photos this way. My Life is not units in a data warehouse. [0] - https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.samruston.permission&hl=en_US&gl=US https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.samruston.... [1] - https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html [X] - Apple's Whitepaper: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
nobodyandproud 5y ago
What happens if someone with access to the database maliciously crafts innocent-looking images that collide with of the registered images? Maybe include children so that on first glance the reviewer will just forward to the authorities. You get these images, store it, then you get flagged. Now what? What’s your recourse when the FBI insists that you’re guilty, and your reputation is ruined? There absolutely is a problem of pedophiles, but the process that Apple is using seems ripe for abuse.
andrei_says_ 5y ago
Maybe consider that CP is just the excuse for the backdoor. So apart from every Apple user being treated like a proven-until-innocent owner of CP, at all times, this will (yes, a matter of time) be used for political purposes, to find and silence activists, journalists, to discredit opposition leaders, to prosecute Uyugur/Muslims/women/palestinians etc. Do we really believe that CP owners store their collections in iCloud / google cloud / Dropbox and view them on their phones? And that this is an issue on a massive scale? Please. These are the most expensive phones on the market, with an incredible profit margin for Apple. The part of these devices that we actually own is a shrinking territory. Why not have the mics on all the time in case “someone says something related to a CP ring?”
deleted 5y ago
[deleted]

gjsman-1000 5y ago

Also, all of the "situations" where this could be abused are already applicable on all other platforms. There's no reason your Ex couldn't upload CSAM to your Google Photos account, or to your Facebook account. Google Photos and predecessors have scanned since, what, 2013?, and would detect it, and would report it to law enforcement. Despite this having been a possibility for almost a decade... there's a suspicious lack of headlines of this attack occurring.

carnitas 5y ago

Apple hashes all of your photos offline and then pinky promises to only check the hashes against the official on phone database when the user initiated an upload. The problem isn’t about wackos it’s about governments forcing Apple to do things with this new weapon

gjsman-1000 5y ago
Every other cloud storage provider has implemented scanning since 2011-2013.
- merpnderp 5y ago
  I haven't seen a single person concerned about Apple scanning photos in iCloud. The problem is entirely that the scan is happening on your personal phone with apparently some janky implementation that in one week has already shown to have serious flaws.
- musha68k 5y ago
  https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whataboutism https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whataboutism
tpush 5y ago
> Apple hashes all of your photos offline [...] No, only the ones designated for upload to iCloud. > [...] it’s about governments forcing Apple to do things with this new weapon Governments can already force Apple to do any kind of scanning, "weapon" being built already or not.
- withinboredom 5y ago
  Says who? Apple? How much is that worth?
  - Tagbert 5y ago
    If Apple were going to lie about this process, they didn't need to announce it and go into so much detail at all. They could have just kept it quiet the way the current server side CSAM scanning is done by others already. The legal and market impacts of Apple lying would be severe.
- nottorp 5y ago
  > > Apple hashes all of your photos offline [...] > No, only the ones designated for upload to iCloud. How do you verify that?
  - theshrike79 5y ago
    If you turn off iCloud, the hash list will never get downloaded on your phone. No scanning will take place in that case.
    - nottorp 5y ago
      How do you verify that? :) You're just quoting what apple says. Which may be all they're allowed to say due to the national security letter thing.
      - theshrike79 5y ago
        I'm trusting in the hacker community with this. If Apple really is trying to sneak in a CSAM database on your phone with iCloud disabled, someone WILL catch it and raise so much hell we'll all hear it.

ApolloFortyNine 5y ago

This kinda of sounds like "let them put a camera in my living room, I'm not doing anything wrong". The biggest complaint here is clearly this is not where it'll end, and it's not a unique hash, so there will be false positives. And since it's publicly announced, this is very unlikely to catch any producers of CP, and would only catch the dumbest consumers. So it's an invasion of privacy with very little chance of having a noticeable impact.

randomdata 5y ago

> I think people are just getting a little too worked up over this whole thing. They aren't, but the blame is misguided. This isn't a problem with Apple. What is Apple going to do if they do detect something identified as CSAM on your device? Refuse to sell you another? Oh well. The real worry is what other parties will do if they get ahold of the information. That is what needs to be fixed. Apple is exposing the underlying problem, not causing the problem themselves.

scoopertrooper 5y ago
Apple have said what they're going to do. If the number of hash hits reaches 30, then they'll scale the image down and send it off to their manual review team. If they confirm it's CP, then they call the police.
- randomdata 5y ago
  Exactly. They're not going do much of anything. It is what happens after the final step outlined that actually concerns people, and that is where the real problem lies. Apple is simply exposing the problem; or perhaps more accurately bringing the problem we all understand exists into the limelight. Had Apple not implemented this feature, or implemented it differently (scanning server-side, for example), the problem would still be there.
  - scoopertrooper 5y ago
    If a pedophile takes their computer (loaded with CP) to a repair shop and they find CP they call the police. If a pedophile uploads CP to the internet and the host finds CP they call the police. Both seem like reasonable responses to me.
    - randomdata 5y ago
      Again, it is what happens after that which has people worried. Apple is simply bringing attention to it.

jrockway 5y ago

Apple's using my electricity and my silicon to call the cops on me. We have no idea what hashes they're checking images against; we can't see the raw data, and we can't see the hashes, and we can't see what they're sending to their servers. There is no technical reason why this needs to exist. If they want to scan iCloud photos for something, they can do that on their servers. iCloud is not end-to-end encrypted. Law enforcement can do whatever they want with the data you send there. Since they chose the client-side route, they have to be up to something, and it all smells very fishy. Today, they say it's for CSAM. Tomorrow, it will be for any discontent against whatever government wants to oppress its people this week -- and as time goes forward, that is not just third-world countries where you don't live, it could be your own. Do you really want to explain to the police at your door at 3:30 in the morning why you read a website called Hacker News? This is the first step towards that reality. Imagine I wrote a program that contained the phone numbers of people I don't like. The database is encrypted, and the only way to see if you're on that list is to install the app on your phone. The app does two things -- nothing if you're not on my list, or it sends me your location (at your expense!) if you are. Would you install that app? Absolutely not, that would be crazy. But that is basically what is bundled into iOS now. I really like my iPhone and iPad Pro. I like how Apple handles privacy in general. But I can't accept this. It's a step too far. You don't have to draw the line there, but I draw the line there.

zepto 5y ago
> iCloud is not end-to-end encrypted Yet. Have you considered that this might be a necessary precursor to making iCloud e2e?
- IncRnd 5y ago
  Scanning people's on-phone photos clearly has nothing to do with being a precursor to e2e encryption. The photos get transferred either way, so one has nothing to do with the other.
  - hkt 5y ago
    Except for giving the authorities a way in to replace the one they're losing.

syntaxstic 5y ago

This is only applicable in the US?

gjsman-1000 5y ago
Yes - only the US has this "feature."

IncRnd 5y ago

> Exactly, I think people are just getting a little too worked up over this whole thing. Apple computes a hash of each image you upload to iCloud then check it against a list of CP hashes. If that is what is supposed to happen, then it makes no sense for any new code to run on the device! > Of all the things in the world to get worked up over, this is ridiculous. Well, it is not crazy to get worked up over Apple saying they will check uploads to iCloud by checking what's on your phone - instead of simply adding code to iCloud. That seems obvious not ridiculous.

scoopertrooper 5y ago
> If that is what is supposed to happen, then it makes no sense for any new code to run on the device! The new code calculates the hash as part of the upload process. The comparison of the hash against known CP hashes happen on the server. > Well, it is not crazy to get worked up over Apple saying they will check uploads to iCloud by checking what's on your phone - instead of simply adding code to iCloud. They're still doing the checks in iCloud, but the hash is being computed on the client.
- IncRnd 5y ago
  You simply repeated back to me what I wrote without addressing any of it.
  - scoopertrooper 5y ago
    Okay, well they're likely doing it to save money. I work in data engineering and I can tell you calculating the hash of every iCloud upload wouldn't come cheap. Mystery solved?
    - IncRnd 5y ago
      You are completely missing the point. The answer to a privacy and security question shouldn't be, "it is easy for us to do things this way." You are inadvertently making the point that you are arguing against.

pshirshov 5y ago

> if someone has that level of access to your phone, they could upload real CP and maybe even upload it to your Facebook for good measure. Many messengers, including Whatsapp, save all the incoming pics into camera roll by default.

merrywhether 5y ago
And if you have iCloud Photos turned on, those images are already being uploaded and then CSAM-scanned on Apple’s servers. The chain is just being configured differently, but this risk is already active.
- pshirshov 5y ago
  The actual problem is not CSAM scanning. The actual problem is that they've created a great surveillance tool which will inevitably get broader capabilities and they are normalising client-side data scanning (we need to eradicate terrorism, now we need to eradicate human trafficking, and now we need to eradicate tax evasion, oh, we forgot about gay russians, hmm, what about Winnie memes?).
  - gjsman-1000 5y ago
    But this was already true. There is no reason the governments couldn't have required this tool to be built at anytime all along. Remember EARN IT where Senators said figure something out (like this CSAM tool) or they'll do it for Apple? The EU is similar, with upcoming draft legislation saying they have to do it if they don't figure something (like this) out.
    - pshirshov 5y ago
      You still may donate to liberty and FOSS NGOs, switch to ungoogled Android and drop macOS in favour of Linux. Also you have your rights and opportunities for activism and peaceful protest. This is not illegal yet (effectively illegal in Russia/China though).
    - 5y ago

vbezhenar 5y ago

> I get it, the mechanism they're using has apparent flaws, and maybe some whacko could somehow get access to your phone and start uploading things that trick the algorithm into thinking you have CP. Whatsapp by default adds all received images into Photos. So all it takes is to send you few dozens of pictures while you're sleeping.

cartoonworld 5y ago

>Apple computes a hash of each image you upload to iCloud then check it against a list of CP hashes. I don't think it computes a hash of the image, it's a tad more involved than that. Simple hashing is easily evaded. They must be computing an identifier from the contents of the images in the CSAM database. This requires computational analysis on the handset or computer. If that's all that were happening that would be no problem, but of course there are management interfaces to the classifer/analyzer, catalog, backend, &c The contents of the identifiers are purposefully opaque to prevent spoofing of the identifier database. I don't know what is included in the images; what if I take a picture at Disneyland with a trafficked person in the frame? Will that make it into the qualifier database? What is added to the CSAM signature database and why? What is the pipeline of hashesfrom NCMEC and other child-safety organizations->Apple's CSAM image classifer alarm? >I get it, the mechanism they're using has apparent flaws, and maybe some whacko could somehow get access to your phone and start uploading things that trick the algorithm into thinking you have CP. The CSAM analyzer could be subverted in any number of ways. I question how the CSAM identifiers are monitored for QA (I actually shudder thinking there are already humans doing this :( how unpleasant.) and the potential for harmful adversaries to repurpose this tool for other means. One contrived counterfactual: Locating pictures of Jamal Kashoggi in people's computer systems by 0-day malware. Another: Locating images of Edward Snowden. A more easily conceived notion: Locating amber alert subjects in people's phones, geofenced or not. To my eyes, it appears we will soon have increased analysis challenges. Self analysis of device activity and functions for image scanning malware (for example) is slightly harder, we have added a blessed one with unknown characteristics running on the systems. Does this pose a challenge to system profiling? How/does this interact with battery management? Is only iCloud scanning, or is everything scanned and then only checked before being sent to iCloud? (this appears to be the case[X]) There should be user notification too. If some sicko sends me something crazy somehow, I would surely want to know so I can call the cops!! All in all this makes me feel bad. There is not a lot of silver lining from my perspective. While the epidemic of unconscionable child abuse continues, I question the effectiveness of this approach. I would not consider jailbreaking my iPhone but for this kind of stuff. I would like to install network and permissions monitoring software on my iPhone such as Bouncer[0], Little Snitch[1], although these are helpfully not available for iOS. I feel grateful that I am unlikely to be affected by this image scanning software, I'm planning to continue my personal policy of never storing any pictures of any people whatsoever. I don't even store family photos this way. My Life is not units in a data warehouse. [0] - https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.samruston.permission&hl=en_US&gl=US https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.samruston.... [1] - https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html [X] - Apple's Whitepaper: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...

nobodyandproud 5y ago

What happens if someone with access to the database maliciously crafts innocent-looking images that collide with of the registered images? Maybe include children so that on first glance the reviewer will just forward to the authorities. You get these images, store it, then you get flagged. Now what? What’s your recourse when the FBI insists that you’re guilty, and your reputation is ruined? There absolutely is a problem of pedophiles, but the process that Apple is using seems ripe for abuse.

andrei_says_ 5y ago

Maybe consider that CP is just the excuse for the backdoor. So apart from every Apple user being treated like a proven-until-innocent owner of CP, at all times, this will (yes, a matter of time) be used for political purposes, to find and silence activists, journalists, to discredit opposition leaders, to prosecute Uyugur/Muslims/women/palestinians etc. Do we really believe that CP owners store their collections in iCloud / google cloud / Dropbox and view them on their phones? And that this is an issue on a massive scale? Please. These are the most expensive phones on the market, with an incredible profit margin for Apple. The part of these devices that we actually own is a shrinking territory. Why not have the mics on all the time in case “someone says something related to a CP ring?”

deleted 5y ago

[deleted]