9 ms·

Now that a fully built system for breaking end-to-end encryption is shipped directly in the OS, we're one configuration change away from massive scope creep. F

by feross 5y ago

Now that a fully built system for breaking end-to-end encryption is shipped directly in the OS, we're one configuration change away from massive scope creep. First terrorist content, then "misinformation", then political speech. Apple will be unable to resist government demands to use this preexisting backdoor with a different set of perceptual hashes.

shuckles 5y ago
Disabling end to end encryption is always “one configuration change” away, presumably by substituting keys. How closely do you keep track of which keys are used to encrypt Health data - which is end to end encrypted - versus photos - which are not?
- dannyw 5y ago
  If Apple substitutes keys, then that is a detectable event (by jailbroken devices) and that would make news. This is Apple explicitly announcing they are actively backdooring all iOS and Mac devices, and using your CPU cycles to determine whether you should be reported to the government.
  - shuckles 5y ago
    Not really. Key management is done by the SEP, which can’t be introspected. And again, database updates take an iOS update so the back door threat is the exact same.
    - Hackbraten 5y ago
      > database updates take an iOS update macOS already supports silent database updates, for example for Gatekeeper and MRT signatures. Why wouldn’t Apple use this feature on iOS, too?
      - shuckles 5y ago
        Because it’s bad for privacy.
        Hackbraten 5y ago
        What do you mean by that?
davidcbc 5y ago
It's not built to break end-to-end encryption because photos in iCloud aren't end-to-end encrypted https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
- feross 5y ago
  Then ask yourself why they shipped this scanning on the client-side. This is the first step towards normalizing client-side scanning of encrypted content across the entire device.
  - davidcbc 5y ago
    Hopefully so they can remove their current ability to decrypt user photos for whatever reason they want. The current state is they can decrypt any user photos on iCloud. Doing client side scanning and this CSAM detection implementation could allow them to remove their ability to decrypt EXCEPT in very specific situations. It's not true end-to-end encryption since in some cases the content can be decrypted without the user key but it's significantly closer than what they have today. That being said I don't know if that is their plan or not, but it is a plausible reason to make this change.
    - ScoobleDoodle 5y ago
      If they can decrypt in a “specialized” situation, then they can decrypt in any situation. All that has to be done is to broaden the classifier step by step. Or someone else gets access to the back door. That’s why there can be zero allowed back doors.
      - Thorrez 5y ago
        They can decrypt iCloud content currently, so it wouldn't be a step back. On the topic of backdoors, automatic update systems could be used as backdoors.
        5y ago
midev 5y ago
This doesn't break end-to-end encryption. If you're going to comment on this topic you need to be technically aware of how it works. You're just spreading nonsense.

by feross 5y ago

shuckles 5y ago

Disabling end to end encryption is always “one configuration change” away, presumably by substituting keys. How closely do you keep track of which keys are used to encrypt Health data - which is end to end encrypted - versus photos - which are not?

dannyw 5y ago
If Apple substitutes keys, then that is a detectable event (by jailbroken devices) and that would make news. This is Apple explicitly announcing they are actively backdooring all iOS and Mac devices, and using your CPU cycles to determine whether you should be reported to the government.
- shuckles 5y ago
  Not really. Key management is done by the SEP, which can’t be introspected. And again, database updates take an iOS update so the back door threat is the exact same.
  - Hackbraten 5y ago
    > database updates take an iOS update macOS already supports silent database updates, for example for Gatekeeper and MRT signatures. Why wouldn’t Apple use this feature on iOS, too?
    - shuckles 5y ago
      Because it’s bad for privacy.
      - Hackbraten 5y ago
        What do you mean by that?

davidcbc 5y ago

It's not built to break end-to-end encryption because photos in iCloud aren't end-to-end encrypted https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

feross 5y ago
Then ask yourself why they shipped this scanning on the client-side. This is the first step towards normalizing client-side scanning of encrypted content across the entire device.
- davidcbc 5y ago
  Hopefully so they can remove their current ability to decrypt user photos for whatever reason they want. The current state is they can decrypt any user photos on iCloud. Doing client side scanning and this CSAM detection implementation could allow them to remove their ability to decrypt EXCEPT in very specific situations. It's not true end-to-end encryption since in some cases the content can be decrypted without the user key but it's significantly closer than what they have today. That being said I don't know if that is their plan or not, but it is a plausible reason to make this change.
  - ScoobleDoodle 5y ago
    If they can decrypt in a “specialized” situation, then they can decrypt in any situation. All that has to be done is to broaden the classifier step by step. Or someone else gets access to the back door. That’s why there can be zero allowed back doors.
    - Thorrez 5y ago
      They can decrypt iCloud content currently, so it wouldn't be a step back. On the topic of backdoors, automatic update systems could be used as backdoors.
      - 5y ago

midev 5y ago

This doesn't break end-to-end encryption. If you're going to comment on this topic you need to be technically aware of how it works. You're just spreading nonsense.