4 ms·
> The researchers connected a Saleae logic analyzer to the CMOS. In short order, they were able to extract every byte moving through the chip. The researchers t
by sparker72678 5y ago
> The researchers connected a Saleae logic analyzer to the CMOS. In short order, they were able to extract every byte moving through the chip. The researchers then used the bitlocker-spi-toolkit written by Henri Numi to isolate the key inside the mass of data.
Clever, and certainly feels like a design flaw that should be addressed.
But also not something most people are going to be able to pull off. If you have physical access to the computer, it's always going to be game over. And, if you don't, social engineering always works if you try hard enough.
- gruez 5y ago>Clever, and certainly feels like a design flaw that should be addressed. Solution: use fTPM (integrated into the CPU)
- bobcostas55 5y agoIf it doesn't protect against physical access what's the point of TPM?
- smitty1110 5y agoCYA, so you can blame someone else for breaches or stolen material. It's really for enterprise IT departments, not end users.
- causi 5y agoSecurity theater in order to generate headlines and sales.
- toast0 5y agoSounds like it's a convenient place to store the key that's not on the disk. When it's time to retire the machine, wiping the TPM or just disposing of the TPM separately from the disk renders the data on the disk unreadable even if it doesn't get wiped.
- jnwatson 5y agoIt does if you use it correctly.
- marcosdumay 5y agoProtecting against any kind of remote exploit is kinda useful too.
- EvanAnderson 5y agoIf you use a PIN w/ the TPM then the attack goes from "read bits off a bus" to "pull apart the TPM", which dramatically raises the bar. (That's not to say that it wouldn't be possible to add a hardware "implant" to record the bitstream from the TPM and put the unit back into service so that the user can unlock it.)
- tracker1 5y agoOf course, the next parts are appropriate backups, and securing said backups.
- EvanAnderson 5y agoIf you're talking about key backup Microsoft handles that in Active Directory environments by storing a recovery key in the Directory protected by an ACL that limits access. It would be really nice (If anybody from MSFT is reading this!) if they encrypted that key w/ a public key. At this point at least, they just store it there in plaintext.
- jnwatson 5y agoThis is only an issue because Microsoft chose not to use an encrypted session to the TPM.
- NorwegianDude 5y ago> If you have physical access to the computer, it's always going to be game over. Not if it's off and you don't leave the key around.