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Signal is becoming a joke that we should reconsider using, and now has dangerous bugs that is at the edge of compromising people's privacy. Has this app/servic

Signal is becoming a joke that we should reconsider using, and now has dangerous bugs that is at the edge of compromising people's privacy. Has this app/service really been audited properly? We now need to consider serious alternatives that we should get behind like Element [0] or Session [1] but I am open to user friendly alternatives other than Signal (at worst even Quill [2] or Delta Chat [3]). [0] https://element.io https://element.io [1] https://getsession.org https://getsession.org [2] https://quill.chat https://quill.chat [3] https://delta.chat https://delta.chat

deleted 5y ago
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eganist 5y ago
> Has this app/service really been audited properly? Yes, repeatedly: https://community.signalusers.org/t/wiki-overview-of-third-party-security-audits/13243 https://community.signalusers.org/t/wiki-overview-of-third-p... Edit: that said, this did make me revisit a question I asked signal via their Careers portal a long while back. Reposted here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27952315 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27952315
- colesantiago 5y ago
  And yet there are serious bugs like this that slip through the net, a simple benchmark of any chat app should not be showing other people's messages like what Signal is doing. I would expect that an app that has repetitive audits would have resulted in this bug being fixed already.
  - detaro 5y ago
    At least the main audits are clearly described as auditing internal components, so it's not surprising app-level errors aren't covered by them.
    - colesantiago 5y ago
      Which this bug was left open for months while users were experiencing this privacy issue. How can I recommend a chat app that does this and claim they are a privacy based app? and also does not respond to urgent bugs in this manner?
      - detaro 5y ago
        I'm not saying you should recommend Signal, just pointing out that "there are audits, why does it have such bugs" doesn't tell the entire story.
        colesantiago 5y ago
        > just pointing out that "there are audits, why does it have such bugs" doesn't tell the entire story. So? Isn't that the point though? Having regular audits should have caught this issue? I thought this being 'open source' this would made this even easier. Which leads me to believe a team that has $60M~ in funding is unable to fix this issue in a matter of urgency. Remember this issue was open for half a year with users noticing this, no matter how you slice this, this issue does not give me any more confidence in Signal being secure.
        maqp 5y ago
        >So? Isn't that the point though? Having regular audits should have caught this issue? I thought this being 'open source' this would made this even easier. You have it the wrong way. Testing, audits, and open source are all best practices. They should be done. None of them are guarantees of security. Open source is not guarantee of finding all bugs, it's a necessity to allow anyone to look for bugs (and backdoors). Audits can not be passed. They can only be failed. Kind of like how RNG tests can not be passed, they can only be failed. Example: Use SHAKE256 to extrude any keystream on initial value 0x00. It will not be secure, but it will pass any statistical test. >this issue does not give me any more confidence in Signal being secure. No application can actively prevent a bug like this. As an author of high assurance comms system, see what I wrote under threat model: "If hardware such as computers/optocouplers user has bought is pre-compromised to the point it actively undermines the security of the user, TFC (or any other piece of software for that matter) is unable to provide security on that hardware." This also applies to software issues that actively undermine the security of the user. So the thing is, a software bug that outputs sensitive data to wrong contact, can not be absolutely prevented. You would need a friendly MITM-guard node that runs a Google-grade image recognition algorithm that detects you're trying to output a legal document to the wrong client, or a nude to not-your-SO. Again, bugs are unavoidable, what matters is the incident response, and is Signal actively trying to protect you from everyone, including themselves. Another PoV: If you punitively fire people that get caught in social engineering pentests, you're replacing a person who now has real-life experience with social engineers, with someone who may or may not have such experience. Sure, if the person fails multiple times, it's time to let them go, but Signal's reaction is indication of a good employee who takes personal responsibility in making sure it won't happen again. I'm extremely careful about what I recommend, and I have serious trouble finding a way to agree with your assessment that just because a rare bug is open 6 months is of serious concern. It wasn't being sat on for six months. But you're very keen on giving that idea. Would you care to elaborate?
- soziawa 5y ago
  The protocol has been reviewed plenty of times. The rest of the app has not. At least according to your list.
egberts1 5y ago
Quill? Why would we want to use Quill that needs all of our private data? Have you not seen over at Apple App Store what they’re sucking off of your phone from your Quill app?
- colesantiago 5y ago
  Which is why I said at worst. Please read. Could you recommend a better chat app that is user friendly enough for regular people to use that is not Signal or WhatsApp and is cross platform? Quill are at least working on E2E, not introducing a cryptocurrency like Signal and don't require your phone number.
  - dunefox 5y ago
    That is idiotic. It's strictly, objectively worse than Signal and not even acceptable in the worst case.
    - colesantiago 5y ago
      How can you be so sure if you haven't tried it? I'd rather use a chat app that takes security matters seriously and urgently and will eventually have E2E. What's more 'idiotic' is prioritising and bolting on cryptocurrencies [0] than fixing urgent security issues, leaving it for months unfixed, while also claiming to be private and secure, and also requiring your phone number. [0] https://www.wired.com/story/signal-mobilecoin-payments-messaging-cryptocurrency/ https://www.wired.com/story/signal-mobilecoin-payments-messa...
      - maqp 5y ago
        >I'd rather use a chat app that takes security matters seriously and urgently and will eventually have E2E. Deploying messaging app without E2EE being the first four chars on the security design paper -- even before the product name -- is the opposite of taking security matters seriously.
      - dunefox 5y ago
soziawa 5y ago
I‘ve been on Threema ever since I learned that WhatsApp did not even use TLS. It‘s a great chat app and nothing else (which is a feature in my book).
maqp 5y ago
>serious alternatives How is Quill Chat that's proprietary and not E2EE a serious alternative? Element's UX is behind Signal but at least the encryption is E2EE by default. Session is a Signal fork with bad metadata protection: There's 60 entities owning Loki nodes, and top three players own 80% of nodes. Delta chat leaks metadata to email providers, and PGP has no forward secrecy or deniability. Element is the only one that's even remotely fixing the issue. The issue here was client side, and no architectural design, not even hardware system can prevent the "wrong contact receives plaintext message" vulnerability categorically. The fix is now in place, and I'll eat my shorts if they don't have a unit test in place to detect reintroduction of this issue.
- h_anna_h 5y ago
  > Delta chat leaks metadata to email providers, and PGP has no forward secrecy or deniability. Signal leaks metadata to the signal server. Deniability is useless. Forward secrecy is cool as long as you are not using more than one device.
  - henryaj 5y ago
    Signal publishes their response to any subpoenas they receive; they only ever respond with the timestamp of when the user in question signed up and when they were last active - which I guess implies that's all the data they have? https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/
- deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]

deleted 5y ago

[deleted]

eganist 5y ago

> Has this app/service really been audited properly? Yes, repeatedly: https://community.signalusers.org/t/wiki-overview-of-third-party-security-audits/13243 https://community.signalusers.org/t/wiki-overview-of-third-p... Edit: that said, this did make me revisit a question I asked signal via their Careers portal a long while back. Reposted here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27952315 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27952315

colesantiago 5y ago
And yet there are serious bugs like this that slip through the net, a simple benchmark of any chat app should not be showing other people's messages like what Signal is doing. I would expect that an app that has repetitive audits would have resulted in this bug being fixed already.
- detaro 5y ago
  At least the main audits are clearly described as auditing internal components, so it's not surprising app-level errors aren't covered by them.
  - colesantiago 5y ago
    Which this bug was left open for months while users were experiencing this privacy issue. How can I recommend a chat app that does this and claim they are a privacy based app? and also does not respond to urgent bugs in this manner?
    - detaro 5y ago
      I'm not saying you should recommend Signal, just pointing out that "there are audits, why does it have such bugs" doesn't tell the entire story.
      - colesantiago 5y ago
        > just pointing out that "there are audits, why does it have such bugs" doesn't tell the entire story. So? Isn't that the point though? Having regular audits should have caught this issue? I thought this being 'open source' this would made this even easier. Which leads me to believe a team that has $60M~ in funding is unable to fix this issue in a matter of urgency. Remember this issue was open for half a year with users noticing this, no matter how you slice this, this issue does not give me any more confidence in Signal being secure.
        maqp 5y ago
        >So? Isn't that the point though? Having regular audits should have caught this issue? I thought this being 'open source' this would made this even easier. You have it the wrong way. Testing, audits, and open source are all best practices. They should be done. None of them are guarantees of security. Open source is not guarantee of finding all bugs, it's a necessity to allow anyone to look for bugs (and backdoors). Audits can not be passed. They can only be failed. Kind of like how RNG tests can not be passed, they can only be failed. Example: Use SHAKE256 to extrude any keystream on initial value 0x00. It will not be secure, but it will pass any statistical test. >this issue does not give me any more confidence in Signal being secure. No application can actively prevent a bug like this. As an author of high assurance comms system, see what I wrote under threat model: "If hardware such as computers/optocouplers user has bought is pre-compromised to the point it actively undermines the security of the user, TFC (or any other piece of software for that matter) is unable to provide security on that hardware." This also applies to software issues that actively undermine the security of the user. So the thing is, a software bug that outputs sensitive data to wrong contact, can not be absolutely prevented. You would need a friendly MITM-guard node that runs a Google-grade image recognition algorithm that detects you're trying to output a legal document to the wrong client, or a nude to not-your-SO. Again, bugs are unavoidable, what matters is the incident response, and is Signal actively trying to protect you from everyone, including themselves. Another PoV: If you punitively fire people that get caught in social engineering pentests, you're replacing a person who now has real-life experience with social engineers, with someone who may or may not have such experience. Sure, if the person fails multiple times, it's time to let them go, but Signal's reaction is indication of a good employee who takes personal responsibility in making sure it won't happen again. I'm extremely careful about what I recommend, and I have serious trouble finding a way to agree with your assessment that just because a rare bug is open 6 months is of serious concern. It wasn't being sat on for six months. But you're very keen on giving that idea. Would you care to elaborate?
soziawa 5y ago
The protocol has been reviewed plenty of times. The rest of the app has not. At least according to your list.

egberts1 5y ago

Quill? Why would we want to use Quill that needs all of our private data? Have you not seen over at Apple App Store what they’re sucking off of your phone from your Quill app?

colesantiago 5y ago
Which is why I said at worst. Please read. Could you recommend a better chat app that is user friendly enough for regular people to use that is not Signal or WhatsApp and is cross platform? Quill are at least working on E2E, not introducing a cryptocurrency like Signal and don't require your phone number.
- dunefox 5y ago
  That is idiotic. It's strictly, objectively worse than Signal and not even acceptable in the worst case.
  - colesantiago 5y ago
    How can you be so sure if you haven't tried it? I'd rather use a chat app that takes security matters seriously and urgently and will eventually have E2E. What's more 'idiotic' is prioritising and bolting on cryptocurrencies [0] than fixing urgent security issues, leaving it for months unfixed, while also claiming to be private and secure, and also requiring your phone number. [0] https://www.wired.com/story/signal-mobilecoin-payments-messaging-cryptocurrency/ https://www.wired.com/story/signal-mobilecoin-payments-messa...
    - maqp 5y ago
      >I'd rather use a chat app that takes security matters seriously and urgently and will eventually have E2E. Deploying messaging app without E2EE being the first four chars on the security design paper -- even before the product name -- is the opposite of taking security matters seriously.
    - dunefox 5y ago

soziawa 5y ago

I‘ve been on Threema ever since I learned that WhatsApp did not even use TLS. It‘s a great chat app and nothing else (which is a feature in my book).

maqp 5y ago

>serious alternatives How is Quill Chat that's proprietary and not E2EE a serious alternative? Element's UX is behind Signal but at least the encryption is E2EE by default. Session is a Signal fork with bad metadata protection: There's 60 entities owning Loki nodes, and top three players own 80% of nodes. Delta chat leaks metadata to email providers, and PGP has no forward secrecy or deniability. Element is the only one that's even remotely fixing the issue. The issue here was client side, and no architectural design, not even hardware system can prevent the "wrong contact receives plaintext message" vulnerability categorically. The fix is now in place, and I'll eat my shorts if they don't have a unit test in place to detect reintroduction of this issue.

h_anna_h 5y ago
> Delta chat leaks metadata to email providers, and PGP has no forward secrecy or deniability. Signal leaks metadata to the signal server. Deniability is useless. Forward secrecy is cool as long as you are not using more than one device.
- henryaj 5y ago
  Signal publishes their response to any subpoenas they receive; they only ever respond with the timestamp of when the user in question signed up and when they were last active - which I guess implies that's all the data they have? https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/
deleted 5y ago
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