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The TPM provides a number of useful functions but the use case upon which it was created was to act as a tamper-evident seal. We have such seals on all sorts of

The TPM provides a number of useful functions but the use case upon which it was created was to act as a tamper-evident seal. We have such seals on all sorts of things in our lives: Food containers, shipping containers, etc. The big difference between the TPM and something like a food seal is that the end user is the one that opens the food and knows that yes, "I did that myself; this is intended." Whereas with the TPM the only "user" with the right to break the seal is a 3rd party that has completely different--and often conflicting--interests to the end user (and owner of the device). If the end user/owner breaks the seal they're treated as an attacker. This is the big problem and the big bad thing that must not be allowed. The entertainment/music industry (the only ones that actually want this) are looking for a guarantee that the end user has not modified the device that they own in order to play back their content. It's ridiculous. It's not just ridiculous that they are seeking what is essentially a veto right over everyone's systems it's also ridiculous in that it assumes it'll actually be effective in any way, shape, or form. There's a million and one ways to work around this kind of "protection" many of which are trivial (e.g. point a camera at the device). The industry knows this! So then the question becomes: Why do it? The answer is simple: So they can be the gatekeepers for all devices sold and therefore be able to veto in essence any devices the don't like. They may even be able to extract a tidy profit from those who require certification. The whole notion is anti-consumer and just generally a really bad idea from the perspective of technological progress and innovation. Content owners should not have any say whatsoever in how general purpose devices are made or used. They should conform to the market; not the other way around.

gruez 5y ago
>They should conform to the market; not the other way around. But they are. It's just that the vast majority of the market are indifferent so it gets accepted.
- brokenmachine 5y ago
  That's not conforming to the market, that's doing what you want because people are indifferent. Conforming to the market would be to not add something that nobody wants.
jnwatson 5y ago
Approximately 0 companies have used a TPM for DRM even though they have been put in PCs for 15 years now. At the same time, boot sector attacks have become prevalent, which TPMs can protect from. The net effect is the paranoid "never use anything that might possibly one day might be used for DRM" folks have made practical computer security worse by threatening anyone that adds TPM functionality into their product. Good job.
- michaelmrose 5y ago
  Normally full disk encryption and booting security is the province of your OS. To my recollection both Bitlocker and LUKS can optionally use the TPM which means it can be used for 100% of the use cases which would improve computer security. What are we missing out on exactly?
- raxxorrax 5y ago
  TPM isn't active on many private devices, so the ability to abuse its capability was more or less impossible. That would come after it is firmly established. What we do know thought is the software landscape of devices that are indeed locked down mostly to the benefit of the manufacturers. Turns out the uniformity of that software landscape didn't stop NSO from silently taking over phones. Different threat scenario, but I think the pattern is clear. I think we need a closer examination on how often private devices are affected by firmware attacks or messing with boot. As far as I know they have become quite rare. Perhaps I need to shift my paranoia there, but I am not convinced. But these questions are irrelevant if TPM stays optional. A lot of IT security comes down to trust problems, so I fail to see why possible disadvantages shouldn't be examined. As far as I know I could activate TPM right now, so I also fail to see how "folks" hold practical security back. Weighting security mechanisms is also an essential step. I am just not convinced it does improve my practical security, while maybe it proves detrimental to general computing.
- ajklsdhfniuwehf 5y ago
  > even though they have been put in PCs for 15 years now. i have never seen a consumer motherboard with a TPM device in the last 15 years. In fact, the last batch of enthusiast AM4 ones ("pro" model), the TPM doesn't even have the Header populated, only the holes for one that you can solder a header. And non-workstation office machines from hp and dell ship weird ones that probably won't even pass the win11 test.
duskwuff 5y ago
> Whereas with the TPM the only "user" with the right to break the seal is a 3rd party that has completely different--and often conflicting--interests to the end user (and owner of the device). This is completely false, and is in fact contradicted by the Lenovo PDF that we're discussing.

gruez 5y ago

>They should conform to the market; not the other way around. But they are. It's just that the vast majority of the market are indifferent so it gets accepted.

brokenmachine 5y ago
That's not conforming to the market, that's doing what you want because people are indifferent. Conforming to the market would be to not add something that nobody wants.

jnwatson 5y ago

Approximately 0 companies have used a TPM for DRM even though they have been put in PCs for 15 years now. At the same time, boot sector attacks have become prevalent, which TPMs can protect from. The net effect is the paranoid "never use anything that might possibly one day might be used for DRM" folks have made practical computer security worse by threatening anyone that adds TPM functionality into their product. Good job.

michaelmrose 5y ago
Normally full disk encryption and booting security is the province of your OS. To my recollection both Bitlocker and LUKS can optionally use the TPM which means it can be used for 100% of the use cases which would improve computer security. What are we missing out on exactly?
raxxorrax 5y ago
TPM isn't active on many private devices, so the ability to abuse its capability was more or less impossible. That would come after it is firmly established. What we do know thought is the software landscape of devices that are indeed locked down mostly to the benefit of the manufacturers. Turns out the uniformity of that software landscape didn't stop NSO from silently taking over phones. Different threat scenario, but I think the pattern is clear. I think we need a closer examination on how often private devices are affected by firmware attacks or messing with boot. As far as I know they have become quite rare. Perhaps I need to shift my paranoia there, but I am not convinced. But these questions are irrelevant if TPM stays optional. A lot of IT security comes down to trust problems, so I fail to see why possible disadvantages shouldn't be examined. As far as I know I could activate TPM right now, so I also fail to see how "folks" hold practical security back. Weighting security mechanisms is also an essential step. I am just not convinced it does improve my practical security, while maybe it proves detrimental to general computing.
ajklsdhfniuwehf 5y ago
> even though they have been put in PCs for 15 years now. i have never seen a consumer motherboard with a TPM device in the last 15 years. In fact, the last batch of enthusiast AM4 ones ("pro" model), the TPM doesn't even have the Header populated, only the holes for one that you can solder a header. And non-workstation office machines from hp and dell ship weird ones that probably won't even pass the win11 test.

duskwuff 5y ago

> Whereas with the TPM the only "user" with the right to break the seal is a 3rd party that has completely different--and often conflicting--interests to the end user (and owner of the device). This is completely false, and is in fact contradicted by the Lenovo PDF that we're discussing.