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AES has been broken for over a decade. 256 bit AES is actually only 255 bits strong. It has not progressed any further, and AES is the most popular algorithm gl
by api 5y ago
AES has been broken for over a decade. 256 bit AES is actually only 255 bits strong. It has not progressed any further, and AES is the most popular algorithm globally and has had over two decades of eyes on it.
This definitely is not generally true, especially for “academic breaks” that don’t even approach feasibility.
I really think security people fear the wrong things. Unless they are fundamentally flawed very few actual crypto breaks happen in practice. Most real world breaks are the result of implementation bugs, side channel attacks, and social engineering.
If I had to choose between a buggy code base implementing Noise with the latest hipster crypto and a well written memory safe audited code base and protocol using RSA-1024 and RC4, I would feel safer with the latter. (Unless my adversary were the NSA or someone else at that level, in which case I would layer three or four systems for defense in depth.)
This is not an argument for the use of weak crypto. It’s an argument for fearing the implementation, deployment, and users more than the crypto.
Big blobs of C are scary regardless of what they implement, especially if they are messy and have not had many eyes on them. The meat bag in front of the computer is usually the least secure component. If you look at real world breaks it’s usually bad opsec or phishing. The hipsterest crypto won’t help you if you are tricked into running malware or you have an insecure PHP script on a web server.
- martinralbrecht 5y agoRC4: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wired_Equivalent_Privacy#Weak_security https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wired_Equivalent_Privacy#Weak_...
- api 5y agoPoint taken. I may have reached for too extreme an example, but AFAIK there were other issues with the WEP construction besides just RC4 being weak. I think the point still stands though. When I read about breaks (and when I saw them back when I did infosec) it was phishing most of the time. Someone would be tricked into running malware. That’s how most organizational compromises happen. The rest were memory errors like buffer overflows in non-security application code and bugs in bespoke code exposed to the Internet. My point was that people are afraid of the things that are sexy to be afraid of, and tend to ignore the more mundane but more commonly attacked vectors. The same applies to firewall obsession in netsec. People will obsess over the firewall and then type “npm install” on production systems. It’s not sexy to worry about that. Package managers scare the shit out of me…