5 ms·

A few thoughts. 1. Sean is leaving CalTech at the end of next year. It's not a huge surprise, given his interests, that he is pursuing the issues in the philos

A few thoughts. 1. Sean is leaving CalTech at the end of next year. It's not a huge surprise, given his interests, that he is pursuing the issues in the philosophy of mind that intersect with quantum physics. Most work in this area is unadulterated quackery, and he is one of the few physicists who understands philosophy well enough to not make me cringe. 2. Most physicists implicitly engage in ontological metaphysics—that the world's fundamental construction is of objects, and not say, facts (Wittgenstein) or logical structures or relations (Carnap). Which I suppose explains why Carroll is interested in the mental aspects of ontology. 3. His conclusion is that the laws of physics explain consciousness, but not to the degree of satisfying everyone. We need to develop better philosophical models for understanding it, rather than positing new (ahem, outlandish) metaphysical theories such as panpsychism. Hard to disagree here. 4. I wonder if Carroll's future work in philosophy will cause him to revisit the many-worlds interpretation of QM, which a fair share of philosophers believe carries too much metaphysical baggage. The idea of many worlds "existing" is a philosophical idea; it's not something you learn from studying physics.

mykowebhn 5y ago
But facts are only facts if they correspond with that to which they refer, oftentimes other objects, so when you include facts, ultimately it boils down to external objects. I think you also failed to include Idealism, that the world's fundamental construction is of Reason. For the uninitiated or the naive, the notion of Idealism often degenerates in their minds to Solipsism, but it is far from that.
- vehemenz 5y ago
  > But facts are only facts if they correspond with that to which they refer, oftentimes other objects, so when you include facts, ultimately it boils down to external objects. Only if ontological questions are legitimate questions about the world and not simply practical decisions about language. I, and many others, remain unconvinced.
  - mykowebhn 5y ago
    What judges whether an ontological question is legitimate or not? In order to ask such a question you are implying that there is something beyond the ontological questioner who can determine these things. What or who is this ultimate judge? God? A phantom? A unicorn? When you write "I, and many others, remain unconvinced" you are already under the assumption that you, and many others, can be this judge. And what is it about you, and many others, that can make this judgment? REASON! On one level you bring forth an argument against my points about Idealism, but your implicit assumptions in your arguments bely your reliance on many of these same points that I brought up.
gliptic 5y ago
> 4. I wonder if Carroll's future work in philosophy will cause him to revisit the many-worlds interpretation of QM, which a fair share of philosophers believe carries too much metaphysical baggage. The idea of many worlds "existing" is a philosophical idea; it's not something you learn from studying physics. I think he would argue it carries the least metaphysical baggage as the worlds exist in the equations we have, unlike things posited by other interpretations.
- vehemenz 5y ago
  That is exactly what he argues. But I think it's a tough position, given that relational quantum mechanics also works "out of the box" and doesn't require ontological realism and a deeply speculative metaphysics. Sean Carroll discusses this with Carlo Rovelli in two separate Mindscape episodes.
  - gliptic 5y ago
    Interesting, I'll have to listen to that. Sounds pretty much like QBism though.
  - ithkuil 5y ago
    I don't grasp essential the difference between everettian and RQM. I'm both cases different observers observe different results. IIUC the "worlds" on the many worlds interpretation is just a convenient way to talk about the relationship between an observer and the possible states it can observe after the system and the observer have been entangled. The emergence of a world branch is not something that happens at some specific moment in time. This is also why branching can be viewed as happening at superluminal speeds, because it's not a physical phenomenon, just a shortcut for us to use to discard states that are no longer accessible to us. Whether that makes the many worlds interpretation more useful or less useful, it's a matter of context. However I have the impression that most people who oppose the view (e.g. citing how much more baggage it requires etc) fundamentally come from the mental trap of thinking that a conscious observer had a unique stream of consciousness and that anything that deviates from it would be inconceivable because "we don't experience it"
ulisesrmzroche 5y ago
I dunno, it’s hard to tell. Everett never wavered. It’s not like everyone bought into MWI in the first place. As in everyone thought he was crazy until everyone realized he wasn’t. Why go with general consensus now when general consensus was wrong from the start? Downvotes of course. Y’all do realize that the consensus of physics at one point was that the earth was flat right?
- ulisesrmzroche 5y ago
  The essay is good tho. I fall on the camp that feels there’s some surprises yet but it’s definitely not panpsychics
Maursault 5y ago
> Most work in this area is unadulterated quackery Citation needed: please say, exactly, to what or to whom you are referring.[0] In my experience with the study the work is precisely opposite of quackery: integrity, veracity, forthrightness.[1] My favorites are rivals Searle and Dennett, and though I believe Churchland(s) are incorrect, their work provides deep insight into brain and neurology for an excellent foundation for students of Philosophy of Mind. The point here is, even those that are incorrect (such as Descartes and other dualists) are not quacks: only through dissent do things move forward. Please give us examples of "quackery" in Philosophy of Mind. Because from where I am standing, any of them that rely on reductionism, which I expect a physicist would, are likely in error, because no matter how you slice up brain, you will never find mind. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_philosophers_of_mind https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_philosophers_of_mind [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind

mykowebhn 5y ago

But facts are only facts if they correspond with that to which they refer, oftentimes other objects, so when you include facts, ultimately it boils down to external objects. I think you also failed to include Idealism, that the world's fundamental construction is of Reason. For the uninitiated or the naive, the notion of Idealism often degenerates in their minds to Solipsism, but it is far from that.

vehemenz 5y ago
> But facts are only facts if they correspond with that to which they refer, oftentimes other objects, so when you include facts, ultimately it boils down to external objects. Only if ontological questions are legitimate questions about the world and not simply practical decisions about language. I, and many others, remain unconvinced.
- mykowebhn 5y ago
  What judges whether an ontological question is legitimate or not? In order to ask such a question you are implying that there is something beyond the ontological questioner who can determine these things. What or who is this ultimate judge? God? A phantom? A unicorn? When you write "I, and many others, remain unconvinced" you are already under the assumption that you, and many others, can be this judge. And what is it about you, and many others, that can make this judgment? REASON! On one level you bring forth an argument against my points about Idealism, but your implicit assumptions in your arguments bely your reliance on many of these same points that I brought up.

gliptic 5y ago

> 4. I wonder if Carroll's future work in philosophy will cause him to revisit the many-worlds interpretation of QM, which a fair share of philosophers believe carries too much metaphysical baggage. The idea of many worlds "existing" is a philosophical idea; it's not something you learn from studying physics. I think he would argue it carries the least metaphysical baggage as the worlds exist in the equations we have, unlike things posited by other interpretations.

vehemenz 5y ago
That is exactly what he argues. But I think it's a tough position, given that relational quantum mechanics also works "out of the box" and doesn't require ontological realism and a deeply speculative metaphysics. Sean Carroll discusses this with Carlo Rovelli in two separate Mindscape episodes.
- gliptic 5y ago
  Interesting, I'll have to listen to that. Sounds pretty much like QBism though.
- ithkuil 5y ago
  I don't grasp essential the difference between everettian and RQM. I'm both cases different observers observe different results. IIUC the "worlds" on the many worlds interpretation is just a convenient way to talk about the relationship between an observer and the possible states it can observe after the system and the observer have been entangled. The emergence of a world branch is not something that happens at some specific moment in time. This is also why branching can be viewed as happening at superluminal speeds, because it's not a physical phenomenon, just a shortcut for us to use to discard states that are no longer accessible to us. Whether that makes the many worlds interpretation more useful or less useful, it's a matter of context. However I have the impression that most people who oppose the view (e.g. citing how much more baggage it requires etc) fundamentally come from the mental trap of thinking that a conscious observer had a unique stream of consciousness and that anything that deviates from it would be inconceivable because "we don't experience it"

ulisesrmzroche 5y ago

I dunno, it’s hard to tell. Everett never wavered. It’s not like everyone bought into MWI in the first place. As in everyone thought he was crazy until everyone realized he wasn’t. Why go with general consensus now when general consensus was wrong from the start? Downvotes of course. Y’all do realize that the consensus of physics at one point was that the earth was flat right?

ulisesrmzroche 5y ago
The essay is good tho. I fall on the camp that feels there’s some surprises yet but it’s definitely not panpsychics

Maursault 5y ago

> Most work in this area is unadulterated quackery Citation needed: please say, exactly, to what or to whom you are referring.[0] In my experience with the study the work is precisely opposite of quackery: integrity, veracity, forthrightness.[1] My favorites are rivals Searle and Dennett, and though I believe Churchland(s) are incorrect, their work provides deep insight into brain and neurology for an excellent foundation for students of Philosophy of Mind. The point here is, even those that are incorrect (such as Descartes and other dualists) are not quacks: only through dissent do things move forward. Please give us examples of "quackery" in Philosophy of Mind. Because from where I am standing, any of them that rely on reductionism, which I expect a physicist would, are likely in error, because no matter how you slice up brain, you will never find mind. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_philosophers_of_mind https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_philosophers_of_mind [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind