5 ms·
One of the reasons Mozilla couldn't "do" DNSSEC 10 years ago over plaintext DNS is that for some (enough) clients this doesn't work. Their DNS is broken, it was
by tialaramex 5y ago
One of the reasons Mozilla couldn't "do" DNSSEC 10 years ago over plaintext DNS is that for some (enough) clients this doesn't work. Their DNS is broken, it was always broken, but so long as you only ever ask something easy like "news.ycombinator.com A?" it worked well enough. Asking DNSSEC queries doesn't work. "Last Change Broke It" rules apply so Mozilla gets the blame.
With DoH of course this is much less relevant. The people operating Trusted Resolvers for DoH are obliged to actually implement the protocol correctly.
If you choose a DoH provider which does DNSSEC for you (such as Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1), and you trust that provider, your answers are DNSSEC validated, today, without any changes to Firefox. Millions of people benefit, zero work.
If you're concerned that Trusted Resolvers aren't enough privacy, Oblivious DoH eventually means that the TRs don't see your query any more, so the people answering the query don't know who you are, and people who know who you are don't know what your query is.
- Hizonner 5y agoI'll bet a comparable number of clients won't be able to reach DoH servers for one reason or another. Especially because there seem to be people who are going to actively try to block them. Whenever you change anything, something will break. And it would have been relatively easy to put up a notice that said "your DNS server seems to be dropping all EDNS0 data or whatever stupid thing it's doing; would you like to switch servers"? Which would have avoided centralizing everybody by default. I know there were enterprise firewalls that broke DNSSEC on any packet that went through them... but frankly the sellers of those firewalls deserved to get heat, and any enterprise that would deploy that kind of broken crap isn't an organization I'd want to support as user. And that still doesn't justify putting DNS on top of HTTP of all things. But that's another story. As for Cloudflare doing DNSSEC checks, the fact that I shouldn't be trusting Cloudflare to do the validation for me is kind of the point. Validation (final validation, at least) belongs in the endpoint. If "oblivious DoH" is what it sounds like, it sounds like maybe I have to retract "zero interest in exotic anonymity". Which I am very happy to have to do.
- tptacek 5y agoDNSSEC has never validated at the endpoints. By design, validation occurs --- has to occur --- at the recursive server. The channel between you and your recursor is "secured" with a single bit, which says "yeah, sure, I did DNSSEC validation". Don't blame the systems software for this; it's a terrible protocol.
- Hizonner 5y agoI am typing this on an endpoint that does DNSSEC validation.
- tptacek 5y agoYou can also run default-free full-feed BGP4 on your endpoint, if you're just trying to make a point.
- Hizonner 5y agoI don't run it to make a point. I run it because it's relatively easy to set up even with the presently available software, and it improves my confidence in what I get from the DNS. It would be even easier to set up on an endpoint if DNSSEC were something that people providing OSes cared about. In fact, there's no reason that setting it up intrinsically requires any user interaction at all; it could easily be the default. You claimed that it "by design, validation occurs -- has to occur -- at the recursive server". That is false, and it is false in a way that's important to the issues under discussion. Nothing forces validation to happen at servers other than laziness and inertia.
- tptacek 5y agoI'm not sure you understand what I'm saying. DNSSEC validation occurs step by step through the recursive resolution process. You can't simply request records from a recursive server and then DNSSEC-validate them yourself. I don't think DNSSEC works the way you think it does. Basically the message here is "DNSSEC will work when customer DNS servers go away and everyone just runs their own". Ok, I'll add that to the (long) list of obstacles to its adoption.