5 ms·
So the fact that some ISPs are apparently untrustworthy is enough to blow up the whole thing which has worked pretty well for the past 30 years? Right. In plac
by Animats 5y ago
So the fact that some ISPs are apparently untrustworthy is enough to blow up the whole thing which has worked pretty well for the past 30 years?
Right. In place of that, we get one central point of DNS censorship.
Where any unapproved site can be made to disappear.
"CIRA Canadian Shield" "Truly free". Right. "Freedom is Slavery" is more like it.
In the US, Mozilla is apparently putting users under the thumb of Cloudflare.[1]
I'd rather have a mode where regular DNS and centrally controlled DNS are compared, and you get a popup if they differ. That warns you of censorship attempts. But that doesn't seem to be an option.
[1] https://forum.netgate.com/topic/133679/heads-up-be-aware-of-trusted-recursive-resolver-trr-in-firefox/2 https://forum.netgate.com/topic/133679/heads-up-be-aware-of-...
- josephcsible 5y ago> In the US, Mozilla is apparently putting users under the thumb of Cloudflare. Even if you don't think Cloudflare is perfect, don't you trust them way more than, e.g., Comcast? > I'd rather have a mode where regular DNS and centrally controlled DNS are compared, and you get a popup if they differ. That warns you of censorship attempts. But that doesn't seem to be an option. This would only fix the censorship problem, not the surveillance problem.
- ComputerGuru 5y ago> Even if you don't think Cloudflare is perfect, don't you trust them way more than, e.g., Comcast? Why would I trust a company I have no binding contract with, that doesn’t gain anything from my using their services, that doesn’t stand to lose anything if they lose me and others as a user of this particular service, etc over a company I entered into a legal agreement with, pay a monthly sum to provide a named service, and can sue in a court of law with some modicum of standing if things go sour?
- hlieberman 5y agoYou can't sue Comcast; you signed away your right to do so, individually and as a class, when you signed up for their service[1]. Most ISPs have class action waivers and binding arbitration, these days. In fact, you explicitly agreed to let them aggregate your data and sell it to others for their profit[2], assist third-parties in targeting you for advertisements[3], and combine data they have on file with you from other companies databases[4]. So, no, if I were in your shoes, I wouldn't trust Comcast at all. [1]: Comcast Agreement for Residential Service, Section 13 and 14. https://www.xfinity.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/SubscriberAgreement https://www.xfinity.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/Subscri... [2]: Xfinity Privacy Policy. https://www.xfinity.com/privacy/policy https://www.xfinity.com/privacy/policy "Create measurement and analytics reports for us and others" [3]: Ibid. "We use the information we collect to... deliver personalized marketing and advertising for our own and others’ products and services" [4]: Ibid. "We may combine information across our systems, platforms, and databases. This includes combining information we receive from third parties and information about your use of our Services."
- viraptor 5y ago> you signed away your right to do so, individually and as a class Has this ever been tested in court? Specifically in a situation of a service almost everyone needs and they don't have a choice in the company? The contract can say lots of things, but none of them have to be legally binding.
- Hizonner 5y agoBecause Comcast has a repeated, long-term pattern of manipulating the contract to be one-sided against you, of taking every bad action that the contract might even possibly allow, and arguably of violating the contract, whereas Cloudflare does not have a comparable pattern of such actions? Because there's about a 99 percent chance that the contract is either completely silent about the matters of immediate concern, or has some language that implies they are actively allowed to act badly in those ways; the contract therefore offers you absolutely zero protection; and there is absolutely no way you can renegotiate the contract? Lawsuits are incredibly impractical, and that's assuming you even ever detect the behavior you expect to be suing over.
- danShumway 5y ago> In place of that, we get one central point of DNS censorship. Just don't use Cloudflare as your DoH resolver. What is preventing DNS from becoming centralized, and why is DoH different? You can still use any resolver you want, and network-wide settings will come out once network hardware and operating systems catch up to the ecosystem and start implementing their own support. It is easier to block DNS queries and censor specific sites over unencrypted DNS than it is to block specific sites when you can encrypt your queries to any DoH provider, even ones that are running locally on your own network. In fact, one of the primary criticisms of DoH from UK ISPs is that it will make it harder for them to block pirate sites and fulfill court orders to block websites[0]. When you listen to the actual censors, they all want DNS to stick around. That should tell you something about whether DoH really is a tool for censorship. > I'd rather have a mode where regular DNS and centrally controlled DNS are compared Why would this be harder to do with DoH than it would be to do with DNS? [0]: https://indico.uknof.org.uk/event/46/contributions/668/attachments/898/1109/UKNOF43_Potential_ISP_challenges_with_DNS_over_HTTPS_Issue_1A_050419.pdf https://indico.uknof.org.uk/event/46/contributions/668/attac...
- schoen 5y ago> I'd rather have a mode where regular DNS and centrally controlled DNS are compared, and you get a popup if they differ. That warns you of censorship attempts. But that doesn't seem to be an option. This is difficult with CDNs because it's commonly intended that you get a different RR-set response depending on where your query originated from. So, somewhat awkwardly, there's no unique correct answer to a particular DNS query in many cases today. I just looked up IN A www.google.com from two different networks, and got two different answers, yet I think both of them are correct and are the answers that Google intended for me to get! (These discrepancies are themselves one reason that CDNs have been wary of large numbers of users not using ISP-provided recursive resolvers. There is a sort of compromise workaround called ECS, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet, in which the recursive resolver gives the authoritative server a hint about where the query came from, to facilitate giving a response that may be most relevant to that specific client, typically a nearby CDN instance.)
- Animats 5y agoA useful check is to then compare the certificates presented by the sites the DNS wants you to talk to. If both paths present the same cert, you're good. If they present different certs, there's a problem. Cloudflare's creation of fake TLS certs for sites they front-end may mess that up, though. Do you see the same TLS cert from all Cloudflare MITM nodes?
- zo1 5y agoWould a networking expert with some historical perspective then not say that we're misusing DNS for routing or load balancing?
- schoen 5y agoI'm sure there was a huge debate about this when CDNs first started doing it. (I think Akamai was already doing it 20 years ago or so, so it wasn't just invented now.) You could, of course, try to handle it at a higher protocol layer. For example, you could try to dynamically generate HTML like <img src="https://dallastx.mycdn.com/mysite/someimage.png https://dallastx.mycdn.com/mysite/someimage.png"> for one visitor, whereas a different visitor would get <img src="https://seoul.mycdn.com/mysite/someimage.png https://seoul.mycdn.com/mysite/someimage.png"> This would mean that latency for an initial HTTPS page load would be higher, but then for subresources and maybe other pages on the site it would be lower. But there are other difficulties, like requiring the web server to generate page content (at least slightly) dynamically instead of statically. I'm sure that there are many people who felt that there was something seriously improper about intentionally serving different RRs within the same zone at the same point in time. From what I've heard, this practice is so common that most people working on related Internet standards just assume that this practice has to be accommodated because CDNs and their customers will definitely refuse to give it up. (I know this issue came up a ton in ESNI because in the first version there was a risk that you could cache one version of an A record and another version of an ESNI key record, so the two could be out of sync and therefore inconsistent, if they pointed to different CDNs or different CDN instances that had different public keys. A "nice" solution might be to say "well, don't create deliberately inconsistent sets of DNS records in your DNS zone, then" but apparently nobody found that solution at all acceptable for performance, so they created a more complicated workaround where both pieces of information are merged into a single rrtype.)
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 5y ago"I'd rather have a mode where regular DNS and centrally controlled DNS are compared, and you get a popup if they differ." Not sure about "mode" and "popup" as I am not a fan of browsers and GUIs but I have been comparing results from about 50 or so DoH providers. I use DoH without a browser to gather DNS data in bulk. We all have a clear idea about what "censorship" means but as we go further down the rabbit hole of myriad third party, non-ISP DNS providers how do we distinguish between "filtering" and "censorship". Projects like OpenDNS made a business out of DNS filtering. Now we are seeing others trying to make a business out of filtering ads. It is well-known from studies using different DNS vantage points (looking glass) that DNS-based censorship is active in some countries and also that the number of countries doing this is generally rising. On a personal level, I do see differences in results from different DoH providers. What really bothered me recently was one provider returning "0.0.0.0" for certain domains, I am guessing because they were websites that report on the online ad industry. I am OK if they want to exclude certain domains, but returning the network equivalent of "any address" is, IMO, not an acceptable way to block access. Personally, I think relying wholly on third party DNS is a bad idea. It is a useful resource, it's good to have many sources of DNS data, but third party operated DNS caches will never be authoritative for any domain. These third parties are usually just more internet middleman who want to make money from being in the middle of users network traffic. We always need access to the authoritative servers for each domain. That's our "source of truth". DoH can be useful because I can download DNS data in bulk over TCP using HTTP pipelining. I load bulk data into haproxy's memory via a map file and I never need to do a single remote lookup. I run an authoritative DNS server that just answers all queries with the address of the proxy. Even more, I can add or delete entries from the map without restarting the proxy. The map is just a simple two column text file. This makes monitoring changes in DNS easy. While I do not need "modes" and "popups" or other GUI-style conveniences, I can build a "no DNS" system into an OS that boots from USB stick into memory, never touches "disk" (can pull out the USB stick) and runs on a wide variety of hardware.