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> I still can't believe that whole business managed to interpret 2FA for whole EU as "you MUST use SMS for 2FA!". Weeeeeelll... I'm familiar with two (2) comm
by thaumasiotes 5y ago
> I still can't believe that whole business managed to interpret 2FA for whole EU as "you MUST use SMS for 2FA!".
Weeeeeelll...
I'm familiar with two (2) common kinds of "2FA" implementations. TOTP and SMS.
Of those two, only SMS is actually a second factor, albeit not a particularly secure one. TOTP is fundamentally a password, and two passwords are no different than one password.
- wffurr 5y agoDoesn’t answering a TOTP challenge prove that you “have” the HMAC shared key that seeds the code generator?
- thaumasiotes 5y agoYes, that shared key is a password, a piece of knowledge known in common between you and them.
- jimktrains2 5y agoA password is something you're supposed to "know", i.e. something in your head. A second factor is something you have, i.e. your phone, a hardware token, or access to a shared secret you don't store in your head. Password managers kind of mangle the idea and turn the password from something you know to something you have.
- thaumasiotes 5y agoA password is information, something that can be freely duplicated. The idea of "something you have" is that the thing can't be duplicated. As soon as it can, it's no longer "something you have". Any number of people might have it. A person who has it might not be you. SMS hijacking, for example, converts your phone-based authentication to a password, where the password is your phone number. (Since an attacker who knows that number can pass the test.) TOTP starts its life as a password.
- tremon 5y agoYes, it starts its life as a password. After that, it is never communicated ever again, and therefore, after the initial exchange, it's something you have. It seems to me you are ascribing properties to "something you have" that aren't warranted. The "something you have" needs to prove you were party to the initial exchange, not necessarily that you were the only one present -- that's why we use two factors, and not only TOTP.
- thaumasiotes 5y agoI can't follow what you're trying to say. > The "something you have" needs to prove you were party to the initial exchange This is not something that can be proven at all. Accordingly, proving it is not a goal. Anything that can be had can also be transferred. Your delegated agent's login attempt is just as valid as yours is.
- jimktrains2 5y agoI would argue that since the totp secret is never in my head it is not a password. Sms hijacking doesn't "convert" anything anymore than someone with a telephoto lens "converts" an old-style hardware token to a password. (Yes, I know the p in otp is password, and called that because it's entered by the user. It's not a password in terms of a factor you "know" because it's time-limited.) These are also fluid ideas that are used to describe roughly different failure modes for different types of authentication: Passwords are thought of as things the user can disclose. Totp and other "second factors" are thought of as things that must be stolen, or if disclosed have a very short viability time. Biometric are things that can't be disclosed, but can be lost, and (and when properly implemented) not stolen. You're trying to argue that these categories of authentication factors have hard lines and definitions when they're fluid categories being used to think about failure modes of a method. Each specific authentication method has its own strengths and weaknesses. Also, sms hijacks require a lot more than simply "knowing" a phone number. While sim cloning and ss7 attacks are known and very possible, they're still fairly complex. You can also social engineering tech support at phone companies to activate your sim for an account, but that is also significantly more difficult than simply "knowing" a phone number and also a failure of the authentication the phone carrier is using.
- Aeolun 5y agoNot entirely. The thing I know turns into the main password to get into the password manager for every site.
- im3w1l 5y agoThe key thing is that an attacker wont be able to keylog the shared secret, or trick me into typing it on the wrong site.
- hedora 5y agoThey will be able to trick you into typing it on the wrong site (more likely, wrong terminal) if they’ve compromised your machine. They just need to wait for you to log in. Similarly, they can grab the shared secret from the server. It’s marginally better than a password manager (though some of those support TOTP now), since they can’t pull all your credentials by keylogging your master password.
- izacus 5y agoThe issue was that it was ONLY SMS - they immediately deprecated private certificates, 2FA "calculators" and other 2FA schemes. After the security backlash they now backpedaled and implemented 2FA with ONLY apps. Apps that ONLY work on iOS and Google Android. I had endless calls from family where they couldn't access their banks anymore because they had a Huawei phone or a dumb phone. Banks are citing "security" as explanation why they can't use smartcards, hardware tokens or even bring apps to desktop computers or phones without Google services. The funny part is - ALL banks did this at once. Why? Because the security consultants had "must have app" and "must check Google Safety net" on their check lists.
- jsnell 5y agoThe benefit of apps and SMS over hardware tokens, TOTP, smartcards, etc. is to have a out of band communications channel, not merely a second factor. This is crucial for dealing with malware that can change the transactions a user is entering on a banking site, and it being literally impossible for them to notice that it's happened just on the browser. With apps / SMS, they can be informed of the transaction details as part of the verification process on a secondary communications channel that hopefully is not affected by the malware.
- noAnswer 5y agochipTAN/Sm@rt-TAN device shows you the transaction details before showing you the TAN. This devices receive their information visually. Either via blinking code or via a coloured QR-Code. So they are are air-gapped.
- noAnswer 5y ago> The funny part is - ALL banks did this at once. What country are you taking about? In regards to the EU 2FA thingy I start to belief to see a pattern. In countries who had established online banking standards with 2FA, nothing changed. But countries without, went ballistic. SMS or App only 2FA on every login and on every transaction. Yah, I can see that this is annoying. While for me with my German banks I still access them using the FinTS protocol with a banking software of my choosing. For transaction above 20€* I need a TAN from my chipTAN/Sm@rt-TAN device (Which shows you the transaction details). Optional I could choose an app. SMS was phased out years ago (By my banks. Others perhaps still have it.) (*only 3 transaction a day I believe. You can deactivate that so that you get asked for a TAN every time.)
- loloquwowndueo 5y agoYou’re not familiar with U2F? Would you not install two deadbolts on your door if you needed the extra security?
- nl 5y agoTOTP is a second factor. The hash seed that generates a password is connected to the device.
- thaumasiotes 5y agoThe seed is all you need. The device is unnecessary.
- nl 5y agoSure.
- ascar 5y agoNo need to be sarcrastic. He is absolutely right. The seed is all you need in case of the common TOTP algorithm. There is no connection to the device. In fact, in Google Authenticator you can even conveniently export all running TOTP to another Google Authenticator without any connection with the apps or anything else whatsoever.
- nl 5y agoThat wasn't supposed to be sarcastic at all. I was in total agreement with him - you can in theory run the algorithm by hand. It isn't especially relevant though - 2-factor is "something you know, something you have". You need to have the hash.
- hedora 5y agoSo, it’s a password. All I need for password authentication is the password and a device that can generate a one time proof that I know the password. TOTP just seems more secure because the password is never displayed to the end-user.
- nl 5y agoIt's not a password. A password/passphrase/passcode is something you know. A hash for a TOTP is something you have. 2 factor means something you know and something you have (or something you are): https://dis-blog.thalesgroup.com/security/2011/09/05/three-factor-authentication-something-you-know-something-you-have-something-you-are/ https://dis-blog.thalesgroup.com/security/2011/09/05/three-f... (And yes in theory you could remember the hash, and have a custom TOTP client that lets you enter it in. But unless you do this it is a theoretical argument only).
- donatzsky 5y agoTOTP is no more a password than whatever one-time code you'd get by SMS. In fact, TOTP is arguably more secure, since it isn't nearly as vulnerable to hijacking as SMS is.
- thaumasiotes 5y ago> In fact, TOTP is arguably more secure, since it isn't nearly as vulnerable to hijacking as SMS is. Indeed, this is an argument you can reasonably make. > TOTP is no more a password than whatever one-time code you'd get by SMS. But this isn't; this is just a blatant lie.
- lucideer 5y ago> TOTP is fundamentally a password I see this view a lot. It's wrong. TOTP is fundamentally different to a password, as the stored "password" (by which I presume you mean the key) is never transmitted anywhere. TOTP in fact has one property that makes it potentially* the most secure of all 2FA methods: it can be used airgapped. As the credential you type into the 2FA form is not the saved secret. * I say "potentially" because the relative inconvenience + human factors conspire to make it less secure than e.g. U2F in most cases. But assuming hypothetical perfect conditions, there would be nothing more secure than TOTP for 2FA.
- thaumasiotes 5y ago> TOTP is fundamentally different to a password, as the stored "password" (by which I presume you mean the key) is never transmitted anywhere. Are you familiar with SRP? TOTP has all of the properties of passwords, and no properties that passwords don't have. That makes it... a password.
- lucideer 5y agoI guess you can argue the definition of the word "password"; language is fluid, especially English. I would say SRP is strictly a misnomer (though it's a useful conflation). Generally speaking password is a value provided for authentication (if it's no longer being "provided", as in SRP, it's something different... but I understand using a familiar word for that something different is helpful when communicating). Either way, in saying TOTP was "just a password", the point you were trying to make was that TOTP is "no different than and therefore no better than a 2nd traditional password". The fact it's not transmitted makes it very different to, and better than, a traditional password. So whatever you want to define the definition as, the point stands. > and no properties that passwords don't have It has 1 property that passwords don't have: it is not transmitted!
- batch12 5y agoThere are authentication mechanisms that rely on passwords but work by not transmitting the password too. One example is kerberos. TOTP is a password. The fact that it is a password doesn't matter though since it is something you have (and can't know) which augments the something you know. This satisfies the intent of MFA.
- backspace_ 5y agoTop of the pops?