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Yes, but, it's very unlikely that these reasons outweigh the benefits for you from having a Security Key. * Cheaper devices may not support cool new features.
by tialaramex 6y ago
Yes, but, it's very unlikely that these reasons outweigh the benefits for you from having a Security Key.
* Cheaper devices may not support cool new features. For example FIDO 2 allows resident credentials †. The cheapest behaviour for SSH is that your laptop (or whatever) stores some data, and you need that data plus the Security Key to authenticate to GitHub but with resident credentials that extra data can live on the USB Security Key and so that's a huge benefit if you git push from random PCs. There are several features like this - for example one way to replace that boot-up password on encrypted disks uses another optional feature of Security Keys - and there may be more in the future, the cheapest devices only have the core feature. But hey, if you discover you want those features you can always buy a fancier device later.
* The cryptographic Quality of Implementation can matter. What we see today is some corner cutting maybe, some lack of polish, but nothing that seems like a plausible avenue of attack. But I haven't purchased every supposed different brand of Security Key, maybe some of them are quite awful. It seems likely that unless they're intentionally made to weaken your security they will always be much better than stuff like SMS 2FA.
Here's a rather old post by Adam Langley about the crypto problems he found in various Security Keys:
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2017/10/08/securitykeytest.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2017/10/08/securitykeytest.ht...
* The physical QoI can really vary. If you're buying the cheapest you can find, maybe the touch sensor or button wears out much faster than expected, or the USB connector is a tighter fit than you'd like. Or maybe not. Your mileage may vary a lot. I own a device with a ludicrously bright LED when its powered up, not just when authenticating, always if it has power. Doesn't bother me, but a lot of people would hate that.
† Essentially without resident credentials the device has no "memory" of who you are. On web sites the natural back-and-forth makes this feel normal. You tell the site your email address or username, it finds one or more IDs in its database and asks your Security Key to authenticate with one of those IDs, the Security Key recognises an ID and does so. But a cheap Security Key can't remember that ID, it just knows (because of Authenticated Encryption if you care about the technical details) when it sees one it can authenticate. With SSH the protocol is designed differently, the remote site doesn't get an opportunity to store an ID and then ask your Security Key to authenticate, so that ID needs to live in a local disk file, unless you have resident credentials.
- Dylan16807 6y ago> With SSH the protocol is designed differently, the remote site doesn't get an opportunity to store an ID and then ask your Security Key to authenticate Why not? Being able to work around a gap/flaw in the authentication protocol is nice but I definitely wouldn't call that "cool". Also a yubikey being able to hold 25 of those is kind of pathetic.
- tialaramex 6y agoWhy not, as in, why was the SSH standard, finished in 2006, not prepared for the way we'd prefer to authenticate in 2021? Because of time's arrow, locally stuff happens in order. I was actually impressed that the OpenSSH team figured out a way to make this work at all without adding an entirely new mechanism to SSH which would then have taken ages to propagate out into the world and doubtless been the source of weird problems with poorly made proprietary SSH servers for many years after that. If you go back far enough in HN there's a comment where I supposed that couldn't be done.
- Dylan16807 6y agoThey could have added a new optional mechanism. I'm asking about github's servers specifically, not the long tail rest of the world. Also, wait, if github isn't doing custom things on their end, how are they enforcing this rule that you need to tap once per connection?
- lxgr 6y agoThe touch/no-touch requirement is controlled by the server (or in FIDO2 terminology, the "relying party"). OpenSSH exposes this as a new sshd option called "no-touch-required", which Github probably just does not set.
- tialaramex 6y agoSpecifically, Security Keys sign a blob of data to authenticate. Most of that blob is nonsense to the Security Key. It might mean something to a big complicated web browser or your SSH client, but not the simple, and thus hopefully secure, Security Key. But, there's a field of bitflags. The Security Key knows what those mean. One of those bitflags is "User Present" or UP, which means, "I promise I have some means to verify a human interacted with me and they did". For U2F and WebAuthn UP is just mandatory. So, most devices you will find just always set UP, even if the Relying Party doesn't ask them to. However some devices you could choose not to ask for UP, and a device could in this case just skip the touch step, but it must not sign a message with that UP bitflag set in this case. Some of the flags are currently unused, one that's also interesting for SSH in some environments is UV, "User Verified" which means the device claims to have some way to know if this is its real owner or just a toddler clicking the button. UV is typically set for fingerprint readers, facial recognition, or the cheapest option, a Yubikey with a PIN can set UV if you entered your PIN.