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They're telling you to use the unsigned executable because they screwed up renewing their signing certificate. Bad excuse. Very bad security practice for a Bitc
by Animats 6y ago
They're telling you to use the unsigned executable because they screwed up renewing their signing certificate. Bad excuse. Very bad security practice for a Bitcoin wallet. They do offer SHA-256 hashes for the executables, so people can check by hand, but the download and the hashed check come from the same site. If someone can spoof the download site, they can Make Money Fast.
Somewhere, someone is probably working out a way to exploit this right now.
- pstrateman 6y agoThe SHA-256 hashes are gpg signed with the key at https://bitcoin.org/laanwj-releases.asc https://bitcoin.org/laanwj-releases.asc Nobody actually checks the executable signatures, they're buried in the file properties.
- garmaine 6y agoEveryone on macOS and Windows checks the executable signatures automatically on first run.
- ddtaylor 6y agoCan't an attacker modify the executable to not do that?
- freeone3000 6y agoNo, because the check isn't part of the executable, it's part of the operating system. An attacker would have to modify the executable to have a valid certificate, which would take several months and a few hundred dollars, which usually makes it not worth it.
- tinus_hn 6y agoThe alternative is signing it with another certificate which is about $100
- freeone3000 6y agoFrom who? It can't be a non-EV cert, since those are trusted less and present the same dialog. A 1-year from Verisign is $500. Comodo is $229. Setigo is $329. All of them require verification that you own a business, which is another $50 to set up an LLC, and the issuance lead time for both of these providers are a few months. If you have a quick, trusted way of getting an EV code-signing cert trusted by SmartScreen, please, let me know.
- tinus_hn 6y agoThey do present a dialog but not the same one you get with no or an invalid signature.
- h_anna_h 6y agoSigning the hashes instead of the executable leaves you open to collision attacks.
- gojomo 6y agoAre you aware of any practical SHA-256 collision attacks? What do you expect the results would be, if within the next few days it were discovered that there were two different files, with the same SHA-256, each claiming to be the Bitcoin-0.21.1 release?
- nullc 6y agoIf you know a sha256 collision the bitcoin network will currently pay you about 0.476 BTC (~about $26k USD right now) to publish it. https://blockstream.info/address/35Snmmy3uhaer2gTboc81ayCip4m9DT4ko https://blockstream.info/address/35Snmmy3uhaer2gTboc81ayCip4... https://blockstream.info/address/39VXyuoc6SXYKp9TcAhoiN1mb4ns6z3Yu6 https://blockstream.info/address/39VXyuoc6SXYKp9TcAhoiN1mb4n... https://blockstream.info/address/3DUQQvz4t57Jy7jxE86kyFcNpKtURNf1VW https://blockstream.info/address/3DUQQvz4t57Jy7jxE86kyFcNpKt...
- drexlspivey 6y agoIn practice, if you try to claim those coins by broadcasting a transaction with the collision the most likely outcome is someone will snatch the coins by changing the output address with his own address (since the scripts contains no signature checking). You would have to give your tx straight to a miner (and hope for the best)
- gojomo 6y agoBut also, in practice, the fame of announcing such a discovery (with or without an explanation of the method for creating it) could be worth more than $26k. And if you wanted to profit from it, via submitting the transaction or not, you could likely make far more by speculating on the effects of that announced collision on the Bitcoin price – likely sharply negative.
- nullc 6y agoFirst, the releases are signed-- just not with the windows code signing infrastructure. For windows the CA improperly revoked the certificate in response to a renewal request and back dated the revocation and are refusing to issue a new certificate (my understanding and that the CA now believes open source collaborations aren't eligible for code signing certs, or some such nonsense... it's being worked out) The releases are still PGP signed by an official project key which has been in use for many years and is cross signed by many parties-- just as they have the last decade--, as well as by another 16 parties that independent reproduced the binaries through the deterministic build process: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gitian.sigs/tree/master/0.21.1-win-unsigned https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gitian.sigs/tree/master/0.21... which has also been used for the last ten years. Anyone who already has an older faithful copy has the scripts to automatically download and verify the other signatures. By comparison, the windows code signing provides relatively little security assurance. Not too dissimilar from the HTTPS used on the download site. It, like the https, does have the advantage that it is widely checked while many users don't bother checking the actual release signatures. It's useful to have for sure, but it's not the only protection and, unfortunately, it exist only at the whim of a third party that isn't accountable to the users of Bitcoin. But if someone can spoof the download site the executable signing won't do much to stop them from causing problems.
- ddtaylor 6y agoI think the problem here is that it's training end-users to step outside of the normal security practices and normalizing that behavior. In the same way that most reputable companies would tell you "We'll never ask you for your password" and over time that has been well relegated to scammer-only territory. What if one day a company said "Hey, we're just gonna ask for your password this one time, but it's okay" - it mostly defeats the entire purpose of the protection scheme if users can easily be duped into not following it.
- fastball 6y agoRight, but what is the solution if this "normal security practice" relies on having a 3rd party sign your stuff but they refuse to do so, for non-security reasons?
- Black101 6y ago> They do offer SHA-256 hashes for the executables, so people can check by hand I never understood how this is useful... If someone would replace the executables, wouldn't they also replace the SHA-256 hashes that you are getting from the same source?
- Aachen 6y agoMirrors. Remember when you were asked to pick a mirror? And they'd invariably use plain http. And CDNs are still common, whereas the hash sum comes from the https main site. At least that was the original point. These days you usually just host stuff yourself (on your domain or someone you pay, like a paid CDN) rather than having people mirror stuff independently. And it's all https, so it's mostly moot like you say, but old habits seem to die hard though it's already far less common than in the past. Whenever you still see one, look at where the download really comes from. Often it's third party whereas the hash is first party. If not, then it's probably just a page with old habits.
- Black101 6y ago> Mirrors. Remember when you were asked to pick a mirror? And they'd invariably use plain http. With http, you can man-in-the-middle the file and the hash.
- nullc 6y agoThe practice of checkums/hashes with files really stems back to FTP and even less reliable transfer mechanisms would randomly corrupt your data. They also let you use a less trustworthy source, while you get just the hashes from a slow but more trustworthy source. In Bitcoin's case what is actually provided is a PGP signature. The relevant key isn't provided along with the download files for the reason you mention. Though there are instructions on obtaining and validating the key on the download site. ... and if you're depending on reading those instructions' they're vulnerable to substitution.
- h_anna_h 6y ago> but the download and the hashed check come from the same site. If someone can spoof the download site Someone should tell the nixos devs that. Not being able to verify the authenticity of something as important as your OS does not seem very safe.
- nullc 6y agoIf nixos is doing that they're not alone. Fedora is in essentially the same camp unless it changed in the latest release: It's pgp signed but with a totally new key with every release and that pgp key isn't signed by anything else, and the only way to verify it is ... to download it from the same place you got your iso from. A number of years back openssl changed their pgp key and for a month didn't publish it anywhere. AFAICT I was the first person to complain about it-- which also suggests that all the distros that had already shipped the update hadn't checked it.