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I'd say they can. Enforcement divisions have sole heads who can make unilateral decisions that the commissioners never review. Commissioners and Chairs can ma

I'd say they can. Enforcement divisions have sole heads who can make unilateral decisions that the commissioners never review. Commissioners and Chairs can make make rulings favorable or ignore making unfavorable rulings, they can do anything they want regardless of what happens during the comment periods. The CFTC, OCC, CFPB all have single head directors. The SEC has up to 5, and the FRB is the most decentralized but its Board of Governor's head is the primary sole signal to the international market on this entire planet regardless of how much they actually do behind the scenes. The Treasury doesn't have to be adversarial either, no matter how much it wants us to tie our national identity and ego to its currency, not all Treasuries or Central Banks have this concern. Right now, crypto related topics are either ignored or adversarial. Crypto related topics can be collaborative or simply favorable. Capture in this context (and all contexts of regulatory capture) just mean that someone joins for a certain purpose, does all of the other tasks correctly and with high competence, but also makes sure their single issue is protected.

joe_the_user 6y ago
Enforcement divisions have sole heads who can make unilateral decisions that the commissioners never review. I'd just point out that at the end of the day, broad power of social institutions are going to trump the overt lines of command. Capture in this context (and all contexts of regulatory capture) just mean that someone joins for a certain purpose, does all of the other tasks correctly and with high competence, but also makes sure their single issue is protected. Well, Regulatory capture can have a lot of meanings I suppose. One really pernicious phenomena is when things that don't have institutional power on their own ("the environment", "average people's health", overall cyber-security of the country, etc) get shunted aside for particular institutional interests (chemical companies, IoT sellers/consumers etc). This is the umbrella where "regulatory capture" lets these externalities run wild. Now, if you want to use "regulatory capture" as more akin the general phenomena known as "getting a seat at the table", know yourself out. The point is that seats of that allow some special consideration, yes, but you can't carve up existing institutions the EPA can carve up restrictions on pesticides. I wish it was the opposite, obviously but there you are.

joe_the_user 6y ago

Enforcement divisions have sole heads who can make unilateral decisions that the commissioners never review. I'd just point out that at the end of the day, broad power of social institutions are going to trump the overt lines of command. Capture in this context (and all contexts of regulatory capture) just mean that someone joins for a certain purpose, does all of the other tasks correctly and with high competence, but also makes sure their single issue is protected. Well, Regulatory capture can have a lot of meanings I suppose. One really pernicious phenomena is when things that don't have institutional power on their own ("the environment", "average people's health", overall cyber-security of the country, etc) get shunted aside for particular institutional interests (chemical companies, IoT sellers/consumers etc). This is the umbrella where "regulatory capture" lets these externalities run wild. Now, if you want to use "regulatory capture" as more akin the general phenomena known as "getting a seat at the table", know yourself out. The point is that seats of that allow some special consideration, yes, but you can't carve up existing institutions the EPA can carve up restrictions on pesticides. I wish it was the opposite, obviously but there you are.