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> Photos and videos should at minimum be signed/cryptographically verifiable if they are used as key testimony in court. This kind of "verification" doesn't w
by AnthonyMouse 6y ago
> Photos and videos should at minimum be signed/cryptographically verifiable if they are used as key testimony in court.
This kind of "verification" doesn't work. You're trying to have the device authenticate the image. That implies a root of trust that goes through the device manufacturer, which state actors will immediately compromise, making the signatures untrustworthy regardless. Then people will find vulnerabilities in the devices themselves, or convincing ways to have the device take a picture of a doctored photograph instead of a picture of the world, extending the ability to forge signatures to the general public.
The resources needed to forge a signature aren't going to be much different than the resources needed to create a deepfake to begin with. The creator gets to choose which device to use and can choose based on which device they find a vulnerability in. So it's more likely to be a liability than a benefit because it lends false credence to the authenticity of fakes.
For it to work you would need all devices to be secure against all attackers. It's not realistic.
- chrisco255 6y ago> The resources needed to forge a signature aren't going to be much different than the resources needed to create a deepfake to begin with. How? If you have a public/private key pair and then do some kind of multisig process wherein the manufacturer can sign the photo, the OS can sign the photo, and then a user supplied signature could also sign the photo. You're not going to be able to fake 3 cryptographic signatures without 3 private keys. It would be extremely difficult to fake all of that. It would take a concerted, concentrated effort and would be extremely rare in practice. It would certainly improve the situation.
- AnthonyMouse 6y agoOnce you compromise the device it doesn't matter how many keys there are because they all have to be on the device.
- titzer 6y agoAs a user, why does my private key need to be on the device? Especially, because I wouldn't want it there, because devices get stolen.
- AnthonyMouse 6y agoIt has to be where the camera is. Otherwise the device holding your private key would need some way to authenticate photos from the device with the camera, which was the original problem.
- chrisco255 6y agoFirst off, you'd have to steal the actual device. Then you'd have to break the device encryption itself to then extract a an encrypted version of a private key. (the private key itself can be encrypted with a password not stored on the device) You pair the 3 sigs plus a blockchain to track timestamps and photo hash signatures and maybe pair that with a different blockchain app to report lost or stolen devices...and you've got yourself as secure of a system as you can conceive in the age of deep fakes.
- xyzzy123 6y agoOne threat is that a malicious actor uses a compromised device to fake a "legitimate" verified image. This image can now be injected into the news cycle and be taken seriously. Keeping a secret on the camera is more or less the "jailbreak problem", aka being able to make a dvd player or console that only does the things that the manufacturer wants. I will be pretty sad if this problem is actually "solved" effectively because it portends a future where manufacturers can completely curtail user freedom. But... If the key on the device is compromised by reverse engineering or because the manufacturer is compromised then the whole root of trust is gone. Attackers can choose the weakest brand of camera. You now have some doubt about any image that has been "verified" because it could have come from a compromised camera secret. All the rest of the stuff, the blockchain, etc depends on the root of trust in the camera. You also now have debates around camera country of origin because there is no near future world where governments can't lean on local manufacturers. Finally, doubt can be thrown on images retro-actively if we later learn that a camera we thought was secure, has vulnerabilities.
- Rule35 6y agoYou'd make the camera reach out to a signing server for the user's signature. You'd even sign the whole photo, not a hash supplied by the camera, to give you (via the server) a chance to verify the image was correct. Or, you'd adapt a hardware wallet to do the same. Either way, there'd be two devices from two manufacturers, communicating over a transparent protocol.
- nharada 6y ago> The resources needed to forge a signature aren't going to be much different than the resources needed to create a deepfake to begin with I imagine deepfakes will become way easier in the near future because there are legitimate commercial reasons to make them easy and accessible (for example digital art assets). I don't see the same happening for cracking devices, which is more a standard security cat and mouse game between hackers and device manufacturers.
- AnthonyMouse 6y agoAll you're saying is that creating deepfakes would get easier, not that cracking devices would get harder. And it's already not hard enough to be a significant barrier.
- Asraelite 6y agoOne possibility would be for all recording devices to immediately upload checksums of their recorded footage to multiple trusted online authorities upon recording. If someone presents altered footage, you can show that the checksum of the original was uploaded earlier. This of course only covers certain cases. If the deepfake is crafted from scratch or from a camera that doesn't upload its checksums, and the incentive for the creation of the deepfake arises before the supposed time the deepfake takes place, then this method won't be of use.
- AnthonyMouse 6y agoOpt out and it's an invasion of privacy, opt in and nobody does and it isn't applicable to 99% of authentic footage. And subject to attack. Don't want to be recorded? Jam wireless so they can't have anyone sign their videos, then claim they're fake. Also doesn't work for state actors. A country can compromise three separate signing authorities.
- Asraelite 6y agoI don't quite understand how it would be an invasion of privacy. All that's needed is a checksum paired with a timestamp, you don't even need to identify yourself. There is no way anyone could extract any meaningful information out of that without the footage. And you can just upload it to ten different authorities in ten different jurisdictions, or even a hundred if you're paranoid. States are powerful but they're not _that_ powerful. It's the same principle that makes Tor work. I agree jamming wireless could be an issue, but only for prosecution. In the case of proving innocence it's a moot point because this checksum system only covers after-the-fact fabrication anyway.
- krageon 6y ago> you don't even need to identify yourself. They'd also have logged the IP, which combined with a time will probably significantly narrow down the individual in question if you can also access telco records. Especially if inadvertently more information is also documented (such as a user agent). > It's the same principle that makes Tor work. Tor doesn't work for this kind of problem, unless you are significantly more technically savvy (and even then...) then the average smartphone user.
- jjk166 6y agoChain of custody is standard for evidence already. It might not be 100% infallible, but it certainly works better than nothing. Yes, if a state actor wants to create evidence to frame you, and they didn't care about cost or returns, they could do so. But they could always do so. The fact is most of us are never going to get framed by a nation state. The notion that you're either secure against all possible attacks or nothing is absurd.
- AnthonyMouse 6y agoChain of custody implies you have some impartial authority who was actually there at the time to authenticate the recording. But then you would already have an impartial eyewitness. That doesn't work the other 99% of the time when the two parties to the case each tell a different story and one of them is offering evidence they have in their possession. The chain of custody then contains someone partial to the case and untrustworthy. > Yes, if a state actor wants to create evidence to frame you, and they didn't care about cost or returns, they could do so. But they could always do so. The fact is most of us are never going to get framed by a nation state. This is a major problem for elections. Nation states absolutely will doctor video of adversarial political candidates and for other propaganda purposes. > The notion that you're either secure against all possible attacks or nothing is absurd. But that's how signatures work. You're trusting every device in the world to sign the output of its camera. If the attacker can compromise any device, they can produce signed forgeries.
- jjk166 6y agoYou're describing a situation where the recording ought not to be admissible anyways. If you can't trust where evidence came from, it's not evidence. Again, nation states have always been able to doctor video of adversarial political candidates. Lookup pictures where the KGB made someone disappear. Yes, if an attacker can compromise any device they can produce a signed forgery. But that's a really big if. There are a lot of potential attackers who can't compromise any and all devices, and signatures protect against them.
- moftz 6y agoI guess the weakpoint in all of these techniques to prove a photo was taken by a certain device, at a certain time, in a certain place is for someone wearing a very good disguise to publicly commit crimes in your name. Any witnesses or photo evidence is going to point to you. A full movie costume makeup kit probably costs less than what it takes to hack Apple for someone's iPhone private key.
- tshaddox 6y agoYou’ve explained why it wouldn’t work flawlessly, but that doesn’t mean it wouldn’t work better than the current state of affairs. Video evidence is already useful in the legal system despite “video evidence” obviously not being a flawless system. A state actor or even a competent video effects studio with a modest budget could already create a convincing fake video!