7 ms·
A Bayesian Approach to the Simulation Argument
- terse_malvolio 6y agoI'm reminded of this Richard Feynman quote: The question of whether or not when you see something, you see only the light or you see the thing you’re looking at, is one of those dopey philosophical things that an ordinary person has no difficulty with. Even the most profound philosopher, sitting eating his dinner, has many difficulties making out that what he looks at perhaps might only be the light from the steak, but it still implies the existence of the steak which he is able to lift by the fork to his mouth. The philosophers, who were unable to make that analysis, and that idea have fallen by the wayside from hunger.
- enkid 6y agoI totally disagree that people intuitively understand Plato's cave (which is what Feynman is referring to). Simply listen to the arguments in support of things like the flat Earth and you will hear people explicitly referring to what they see as being reality instead of the scientific process of discovery. This quote is a gross over simplification of what epistemology is and takes for granted a lot of thinking which goes hand in hand with a scientific education. If we don't have people exploring what we know and why we know it, the foundation is able to be undercut by people with "intuition" contradicting what a scientist says.
- mistermann 6y agoIt's also contradictory to the answer Feyneman gave in his "Aunt Minnie is in the hospital" story in response to being asked "If you get hold of two magnets, and you push them, you can feel this pushing between them. Turn them around the other way, and they slam together. Now, what is it, the feeling between those two magnets?": https://fs.blog/2012/01/richard-feynman-on-why-questions https://fs.blog/2012/01/richard-feynman-on-why-questions A somewhat similar approach can be taken to the simulation question itself - rather than the default response of pondering the likelihood of it being true or how it might be implemented, I much prefer the ~"Is there any utility in the question itself?" approach taken by George Hotz starting at the 2:30 point in this interview on the Lex Fridman podcast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SpptYg_0Rs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SpptYg_0Rs [Hotz] ...it wasn't a very practical talk about how to actually escape a simulation, it was more about a way of restructuring an us-versus-them narrative. If we continue on the path we're going with technology, I think we're in big trouble - like, as a species, and not just as a species but even me as an individual member of the species. So if we could change rhetoric to be more like...to think upwards...like, to think about that we're in a simulation and how we could get out...already we'd be on the right path. What you actually do once you do that, well, I assume I would have acquired way more intelligence in the process of doing that, so I'll just ask that. [Fridman] So the the thinking upwards, what kind of ideas, what kind of breakthrough ideas do you think thinking in that way could inspire, and what did you say, upwards? Upwards into space are you thinking? [Hotz] The space narrative that held for the modernist generation, doesn't hold as well for the postmodern generation. Like Elon Musk...like we're gonna build rockets, we're gonna go to Mars, we're gonna colonize the universe. The race to space. That was a great modernist narrative, but it doesn't seem to hold the same weight in today's culture. I'm hoping for good postmodern narratives that replace it. My interpretation of his thinking is, regardless of whether we are actually in a simulation, it is possible to think of reality as a simulation - it (and the characters within it) behaves like a simulation, and it can be acted upon as one can act upon a simulation (changing variables, observing the result, etc)...so, let us (humanity) start to collectively conceptualize it in this manner, and collectively act upon it in a logical, coordinated, systemic manner. The benefit of this approach is it can help humanity and the individuals within it break out of this kind of "trance" we seem to be in where we kind of act and think as if the state of the world is mostly beyond our control, that ~"nothing can be done" beyond that what we are doing now (what we have ~always done). Whether this idea would actually work is obviously speculative, but considering the existential predicament we find ourselves in, it seems to me like a fairly decent idea, especially compared to the competing ideas. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Hotz https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Hotz The original talk being discussed in the interview: Jailbreaking the Simulation with George Hotz | SXSW 2019 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ESXOAJRdcwQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ESXOAJRdcwQ
- jacobmoe 6y agoI agree. Seems like what Feynman really wants to say here is “this isn’t a question I’m personally interested in”, but frames it as “it’s dumb to be interested in this question”. We are only experiencing the end result of what our senses sample and our brain processes. That’s clearly true. How much that end result diverges from the real thing is difficult to answer, but in a straight forward way you can look at an optical illusion to see that there is some divergence.
- mannykannot 6y agoI, too, can speculate about what Feynman's message is, and while I think you are right in supposing he was not interested in the problem, I also think he is saying that not much in life depends on answering the question. It's not like even philosophy itself is hung up on this issue in the way that, for example, fundamental physics seems to be at something of an impasse over string theory. Neither our sensory perception nor our language are entirely accurate representations of the world we live in, but they are both good enough for most purposes, so long as we don't get nerd-swiped into obsessing over questions of what it all means.
- EGreg 6y agoThat’s not what Feynman is saying. He was against cargo-cult science based on end-results and appearances only. What he is referring to here is what he goes into at length about the “deep meaning” behind “why” something is happening, rather than just describing “what” is happening. Here is a full clip: https://themultidisciplinarian.com/2016/07/21/feynman-as-philosopher/ https://themultidisciplinarian.com/2016/07/21/feynman-as-phi... It’s similar to what David Hume, the great skepticist, observed centuries earlier, that one cannot really explain the endless “why” of physical processes, just the “how” of the apparent physical law determined by correlation. Today we call it “shut up and calculate.”
- mannykannot 6y agoI very much doubt that many flat-earthers and the like would be likely to change their minds on reading the Republic. After all, they have already rejected much more pragmatic arguments.
- fpoling 6y agoFeynman in his Nobel lecture described a formulation of classical electrodynamics that did not use electromagnetic waves where charged particles acts directly on each other. He tried to apply that to the quantum case, but eventually gave up. Still if such formulation is possible than the light that apparently reaches the philosopher from the food is an artifact of a model.
- leoc 6y agoFeynman enjoyed holding forth about philosopy of science, demarcation and so on but there doesn't seem to be much evidence that he had unusually good judgement on those issues: https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0508180 https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0508180 . But then Michael Jordan and Cristiano Ronaldo aren't particular authorities when it comes to questions of good sportsmanship. > Independent of his admitted naiveté and the job crisis in American physics, it is interesting to record how some leading physicists reacted to the physics he was doing. Clauser (2002a, p.71) reports that while he "was actually performing the first experimental test of the CHSH-Bell predictions as a postdoc at UC-Berkeley, [... he] made an appointment with Prof. Richard Feynman to discuss these same questions. Feynman was very impatient with [him]." Feynman's stance was: "Well, when you have found an error in quantum-theory's experimental predictions, come back then, and we can discuss your problem with it. " 82 > At this seminar, Aspect finished his talk by quoting a certain paper whose author derived results similar to Bell's inequalities and went on to discuss whether it was "a real problem." According to Aspect, this author gave an answer so unclear that he "had found it amusing to quote it as a kind of joke to conclude this presentation." Only at this point, did Aspect reveal the name of the author, Richard Feynman. According to Aspect, nobody in the audience laughed until Feynman laughed. Feynman checked the quotation and wrote to Aspect conceding he was right. 93 > [note 93]: [...] Feynman's quotation, in Feynman (1982, p. 471), is: "It has not yet become obvious to me that there's no real problem. I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there's no real problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem. So that's why I like to investigate things."
- noobermin 6y agoHate to do this but mdpi isn't really reputable from what I recall.
- michaelhoffman 6y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MDPI#Controversies https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MDPI#Controversies
- ta988 6y agoIt is complicated. Some journals have a decent quality, some are just publication-cliques nests, others will publish almost anything as long as you pay. Also MDPI never took position relative to their president verbal diarrhea on mailing lists. Definitively not an ethical publisher, but how many ethical publishers are out there?
- usgroup 6y agoThis is fun lots of fun, but Im surprised that this kind of thing could be published at all outside of philosophy.
- rhesa 6y agoThe author made a video about it on the Cool Worlds youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HA5YuwvJkpQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HA5YuwvJkpQ
- Ste_Evans 6y agoAlready shown to be pseudoscience: http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-simulation-hypothesis-is.html http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-simulation-hypo...
- lordnacho 6y agoSo from what I can tell the argument is roughly that there are VMs and there's bare metal, and some there's more VMs chances are we're in a VM. What exactly would actual, non - probabilistic evidence be? If we're in a VM x happens, if we're on bare metal y happens?
- Tenoke 6y agoIt depends, but it's quite possible a simulation of that scale will need some compression to reduce the amount of compute required to run it and that might be detectable once we dig deep and far enough in physics and astronomy.
- credit_guy 6y agoYes. For example, in the bare metal (i.e. non-simulated world) you have various conservation laws, like the conservation of momentum or of energy. In a simulation with finite precision arithmetic, you might observe some round-off errors, which would translate in violations of the conservation law. A smart algorithm might try to keep the errors below a certain tolerance level (let's say 10^(50)). But then in some cases it might turn out to be uncomputable (undecidable). See for example [1] for examples of undecidable ray-tracing problem. [1] https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02574009 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02574009
- wizzwizz4 6y agoExcept “bare metal” isn't well-defined. The biggest problem with these simulation arguments (imo) is that they assume an answer to “what is reality?” yet don't actually work with any of them.
- qsort 6y agoCan anyone explain why the simulation argument isn't just a meme? - By very definition, we will never be able to prove or disprove the claim. - Whether or not it is the case, it makes no difference. Why even bother? Why does this matter?
- usgroup 6y ago> By very definition, we will never be able to prove or disprove the claim. I don't think thats necessarily true. Here is a neat example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weyl's_tile_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weyl's_tile_argument To simulate continuous space and/or time would be impossible, so if you could show that space/time is continuous then it could not be simulated. Its interesting because the implications are interesting. Or rather, the implications of most other things are less interesting.
- qsort 6y agoA continuous simulation of a finite collection of objects is absolutely possible (even computably so). In general, I don't find this breed of arguments convincing: even if you found a feature X of the universe which simulation isn't computably possible, you could imagine a Turing machine augmented with an oracle that makes use of X to simulate the effects of X itself. It's really unclear how you can turn "we live in a simulation" into a testable prediction.
- lupire 6y agoWe'll never be able to prove the Universe is continuous (and non-discrete, which is the case that matters).
- smitty1e 6y agoBecause metaphysical speculation is the curse of the soul, or, Ecclesiastes 3:11 - He hath made every thing beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.
- exo-pla-net 6y ago
- bronzeage 6y agoThese kind of arguments forget that it would probably take more space and time to simulate a given space and time, simulations are less effective than the thing they simulate. So in order to simulate Earth we'd need much more space than the earth. Then when looking at the stars, those would either have to be copied from a real universe or badly simulated. It's going to be a hard task stimulating the signals seen from all the observable universe with time and space constrained within a planet. Something would be off.
- enkid 6y agoThis is assume there isn't some sort of "lossy compression" going on with the simulation. I don't know how that would work, but none of us know how a simulation would happen anyway.
- skj 6y agoThe compression algorithm is that reality only has to be simulated for one person: you, the reader of this comment.
- thendrill 6y agoThis. In sense we are always thinking some cpu simulation. Where in fact can be more of edge computing case. As in you only need to simulate the whole personal experience. In computer graphics terms. Culling. Objects are not simulated if u have no direct observer.
- skissane 6y ago> Objects are not simulated if u have no direct observer As Berkeley said, esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived) That's one of the reasons why the simulation argument interests me. I think it may give one a reason to choose idealism over materialism. Idealism has a greater "simulation resistance" than materialism has. To a materialist, the question of whether we are living in a simulation may seem profound. An idealist can just shrug their shoulders. A materialist has identified material reality as the most fundamental reality, and so the possibility that apparent material reality is not really the most fundamental reality does in some ways threaten the materialist worldview. For an idealist, for whom conscious minds and their experiences (qualia) are the most fundamental reality, the question of whether we are in a simulation is simply a question about whether their exist conscious minds who have the experience simulating us – and that may or may not be true, but either way it makes no difference to who or what we fundamentally are.
- nonameiguess 6y agoI don't think Bostrom is getting the sample space right in his original argument. One base reality versus potentially many simulated realities isn't the relevant measure. First, you have to consider all possible realities. We at least assume, if we're in a base reality, we're in one where at least one civilization developed after about 13 billion years or so and it has the ability to run computational simulations, though not even close to simulating a sentient animal brain. We can at least eliminate base realities where that never happens in trying to figure out which we're in. What about past that? Assuming we're in base reality, how many futures result in becoming able to simulate sentient brains? How many possible presents contain other civilizations? How many time slices of our universe, if it is a base reality, contain more simulated observer moments than non-simulated? How do you even begin to answer that? It isn't nearly as simple as Bostrom is making it seem. If some base reality civilization gains the ability to simulate but only has the computational capacity to try and trick Rick Sanchez into giving up the secret to making an interdimensional portal, that is several hours worth of one animal's observer moments versus however many some large number I don't know how to express worth of animal observer moments in base reality. There may need to be far, far more simulations than just "more than one" before the relative mass of simulated observer moments gets anywhere near the mass of real observer moments.
- usgroup 6y agoIt reminds me of Descarte's argument that even if we were just brains in vats coerced to believe in reality by some evil demon's manipulation, we still "know" something because "cogito ergo sum". A simple counter argument is that there's no reason the evil demon can't also coerce logic. For example, that we are in effect constantly entering into contradiction but are unable to see it by design. Same applies here.
- svara 6y agoThat seems to be a rather strong interpretation of "cogito", i.e. that thinking needs to work according to rules and regularities such as logic. I'm certainly no expert on what Descartes meant precisely when he wrote that, but the broader point, that there is something that one can be sure of, certainly stands. What exactly that something is might be hard to define. More recently it's been called "qualia", the thing that it's like to experience something.
- usgroup 6y ago"I think" therefore "I'm not" is false because it is contradictory: thinking implies being. Unless it is just our logic coerced by the evil demon which makes it so.
- fpoling 6y ago“Cogito ergo sum” can be also translated as I am thinking therefore I am. In which case “I am thinking therefore I am not” is not contradictory at all.
- thom 6y agoBertrand Russel critiqued Descartes along these lines: "But some care is needed in using Descartes' argument. 'I think, therefore I am' says rather more than is strictly certain. It might seem as though we were quite sure of being the same person to-day as we were yesterday, and this is no doubt true in some sense. But the real Self is as hard to arrive at as the real table and does not seem to have that absolute, convincing certainty that belongs to particular experiences. When I look at my table and see a certain brown colour, what is quite certain at once is not 'I am seeing a brown colour', but rather, 'a brown colour is being seen'. This of course involves something (or somebody) which (or who) sees the brown colour; but it does not of itself involve that more or less permanent person whom we call 'I'. So far as immediate certainty goes, it might be that the something which sees the brown colour is quite momentary, and not the same as the something which has some different experience the next moment."
- winstonewert 6y agoThe paper's argument appears to be: 1) There is a fifty percent chance that the sort of word-simulations postulated by the simulation argument are not possible, and thus we live in reality not a simulation. 2) Even if such simulations are possible, there is a small but non-zero chance that we still happen to live in base reality. By adding these two together, the paper concludes that we are slightly more likely to live in reality then a simulation. The author attempts to justify the 50% assumption on the basis of the principle of indifference.
- winstonewert 6y agoMy assessment is that invoking the principle of indifference here is dubious. The appropriate priors are debatable, but we have lots of information on the plausibility of building world-simulations.
- mannykannot 6y agoI am equally skeptical of applying the principle of indifference here, and note that Bostrom also leans heavily on it in his original argument. In situations where we really have no good idea of what the odds are, the principle of indifference seems to implicitly assume more knowledge than we actually have, allowing us to cloak our speculation in an aura of unjustified quantifiability.
- skissane 6y agoIf you are going to use Bayesian probability, you need to assign a prior probability. And the principle of indifference is the simplest non-informative prior, so it makes sense as a default choice, unless one has some good reason to choose a different prior instead. Using a subjective Bayesian approach, in which Bayesian probabilities are just an expression of your own subjective judgement, you can choose priors on subjective personal grounds such as your intuition, whims, or desires (what you want to be true). By contrast, in objective Bayesianism, we need to provide some objective rational justification of the prior we choose, in which case it is hard to justify any initial prior for the simulation hypothesis than 0.5. Does it really "implicitly assume more knowledge than we actually have"? To assign an epistemic probability of 0.5 exactly to a proposition is to be in a state of zero knowledge concerning its truth. As our knowledge moves away from zero, epistemic probability moves away from 0.5 and closer to either 0.0 or 1.0. To assign an epistemic probability of 0.5 exactly is to assume no knowledge at all.
- smitty1e 6y agoWhat chafes me about these simulation arguments is the "turtles all the way down" questions about: - in what broader execution context such a simulation could be managed, and - whether the context of our simulation, itself, could have a meta-simulation above it.
- thom 6y agoAre there other creation myths that don't suffer some from of the same issue, or do you just not lose sleep about it?
- smitty1e 6y agoLatter. The scientific inquiry is needful, but there just isn't any way we're going to know what happened before time0 outside of your metaphysical explanation of choice.