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> you should not be using RSA today Also, always remember that ECC is believed to be just as weak against quantum computers as RCA. So you'll probably want som
by marcosdumay 6y ago
> you should not be using RSA today
Also, always remember that ECC is believed to be just as weak against quantum computers as RCA. So you'll probably want some fusion of pre and post-quantum algorithms.
Or, anyway, get your perfect forward secrecy working and don't rely on asymmetric crypto for confidentiality. Yeah, PFS is very hard to get on some use cases, but it's really the best way to solve this problem.
- formerly_proven 6y agoYes, that's how pqcrypto is done today. Run two key exchanges, one we're pretty sure is solid, and one that might be post-quantum-secure but has some risk of actually not being secure at all, and use a robust combiner on their outputs.
- dfox 6y agoPFS still involves asymmetric cryptography. And in fact in essentially every modern cryptography stack (ie. (EC)DLP-based) the "PFS primitive" (Diffie-Hellman, ie. scalar multiplication/exponentiation) is the one thing that everything else is derived from. RSA is in fact somewhat notable for being the only widely used asymmetric cryptosystem where the underlying operation is block cipher-ish encryption primitive and not key agreement primitive.
- SAI_Peregrinus 6y ago> RSA is in fact somewhat notable for being the only widely used asymmetric cryptosystem where the underlying operation is block cipher-ish encryption primitive and not key agreement primitive. Debatable. It's sort of true of RSA-OAEP. That's not true of RSA-PSS (signatures), nor of RSA-KEM (key encapsulation). Really it's the OAEP that's block-cipher like, and the fundamental RSA operation (modular exponentiation) isn't "encryption" or "signing" or "decryption" or "encapsulation" or anything else cryptographic on its own.
- CodesInChaos 6y agoForward secrecy relies on asymmetric crypto, it merely uses short lived/one-time keys instead of long lived keys. The most popular algorithm for ephemeral key exchange is (Elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman which is just as weak against quantum attacks as RSA. So adding a post-quantum algorithm is just as important for PFS as for plain RSA.