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Quantum computers of this scale are probably 5-15 years out. Basically this is a warning that if you have secrets that should still be kept secret over that ti
by dzdt 6y ago
Quantum computers of this scale are probably 5-15 years out. Basically this is a warning that if you have secrets that should still be kept secret over that timeframe, you should not be using RSA today.
- hannob 6y agoI'd be willing to bet a lot that it's not 5 years, and am still quite confident it's not 15. Of course nobody knows, but these things are still very far from anything that is running today.
- cronin101 6y agoAt this rate, maybe the first commercial Fusion plants will have asymmetric quantum encryption securing their management portal.
- albertgoeswoof 6y agono no no, you need high performance enterprise grade http on port 80 listening on all interfaces for a power plant portal
- tatersolid 6y agoBuilt with Java(TM) EnterpriseServletContainerGeneratorSingletBean Technology. Has been continuously running since GWB was in office, not a single patch applied!
- dandellion 6y agoBut even if I agree that it's almost impossible in 5 years it's better to be cautious and assume it could be broken in 5. And there's also the fact it could be broken by some governments long before anyone finds out I guess.
- carlmr 6y agoEven if it was, 177days for cracking your password with the most advanced technology that exists in the world, still means you have some very powerful enemies. Practically you don't need to think about it.
- PeterisP 6y agoI.e. you can solve it by rotating your keys/certificates every 90 days, like the expiry term given by Letsencrypt.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- carlmr 6y agoAlso probably you should think about all the other security low-hanging fruit first.
- codeulike 6y agoThey would have a 50% chance of cracking it within 90 days, I would have thought.
- CodesInChaos 6y agoRotating keys works for authentication, but not for confidentiality, since nothing stops an attacker from recording the ciphertext and decrypting past messages.
- PeterisP 6y agoIn common practice RSA keys/certificates are used for TLS and similar protocols where it does not allow to decrypt past recorded communications, as those are encrypted with an ephemeral session keys that can not be determined from observing the handshake even if you have the keys. Obtaining a private key would allow you to MITM future sessions and decrypt them, but it would not break confidentiality of past messages. Things like PGP-encrypted email files would be vulnerable, but that niche is extremely rare in comparison to other uses of RSA and similar encryption.
- marcosdumay 6y ago> you should not be using RSA today Also, always remember that ECC is believed to be just as weak against quantum computers as RCA. So you'll probably want some fusion of pre and post-quantum algorithms. Or, anyway, get your perfect forward secrecy working and don't rely on asymmetric crypto for confidentiality. Yeah, PFS is very hard to get on some use cases, but it's really the best way to solve this problem.
- formerly_proven 6y agoYes, that's how pqcrypto is done today. Run two key exchanges, one we're pretty sure is solid, and one that might be post-quantum-secure but has some risk of actually not being secure at all, and use a robust combiner on their outputs.
- dfox 6y agoPFS still involves asymmetric cryptography. And in fact in essentially every modern cryptography stack (ie. (EC)DLP-based) the "PFS primitive" (Diffie-Hellman, ie. scalar multiplication/exponentiation) is the one thing that everything else is derived from. RSA is in fact somewhat notable for being the only widely used asymmetric cryptosystem where the underlying operation is block cipher-ish encryption primitive and not key agreement primitive.
- SAI_Peregrinus 6y ago> RSA is in fact somewhat notable for being the only widely used asymmetric cryptosystem where the underlying operation is block cipher-ish encryption primitive and not key agreement primitive. Debatable. It's sort of true of RSA-OAEP. That's not true of RSA-PSS (signatures), nor of RSA-KEM (key encapsulation). Really it's the OAEP that's block-cipher like, and the fundamental RSA operation (modular exponentiation) isn't "encryption" or "signing" or "decryption" or "encapsulation" or anything else cryptographic on its own.
- CodesInChaos 6y agoForward secrecy relies on asymmetric crypto, it merely uses short lived/one-time keys instead of long lived keys. The most popular algorithm for ephemeral key exchange is (Elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman which is just as weak against quantum attacks as RSA. So adding a post-quantum algorithm is just as important for PFS as for plain RSA.
- IncRnd 6y agoFive years is incredibly close for this type of computer to be built!