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At least on first reading, I find this unpersuasive. He correctly lists a variety of problems. But he doesn't explain how his proposed solution, listing all the
by wpietri 6y ago
At least on first reading, I find this unpersuasive. He correctly lists a variety of problems. But he doesn't explain how his proposed solution, listing all the components of a technological product, would make a practical difference. Creating a list is valuable only if people a) read the list, b) recognize problems, and c) do something based on that.
And for some of the examples he gives, it seems pretty obvious to me that an SBOM wouldn't help. The Equifax breach, for example. They knew [1] that they needed to upgrade Apache Struts. Somebody was supposed to make the upgrade. They just didn't do it. Who would an SBOM help here? Since it's a consumer-facing website, the only people who weren't informed were consumers. So is he proposing to make public the SBOM for every website? I'm not sure that on balance that helps security.
[1] https://www.csoonline.com/article/3444488/equifax-data-breach-faq-what-happened-who-was-affected-what-was-the-impact.html https://www.csoonline.com/article/3444488/equifax-data-breac...
- mikepurvis 6y agoWouldn't having to advertise your out of date dependencies help to shame companies into upgrading on a reasonable schedule? So that upgrades are actually a priority and not just a thing that happens when literally everything else is already done?
- sokoloff 6y agoIf that became a problem, companies intending to skirt the disclosure would fork and “maintain” private branches of dependencies such that it couldn’t be determined if they were out of date.
- spacemanmatt 6y agoTrue story: They already do. I know one company that forked Ruby, and would likely claim every library they run under it is thereby forked for the sake of reporting.
- mattcwilson 6y agoOk, but there would still be some point of contact where an SBOM would show “company X fork of Ruby, company X fork of package Z” etc, right? And then the choice gets back to how much to trust company X and package Z, weighed against alternative solutions.
- mannykannot 6y agoUnless penalties for doing so are legislated, they need not claim that the fork they are actually using is a fork of anything; they could treat it as if part of their proprietary code (though they might be in violation of license agreements if they do this.)
- sokoloff 6y agoIt seems like it could equally be “internal package UUID1 version X, internal package UUID2 version Y” if malicious compliance and/or industrious laziness was the goal.
- TeMPOraL 6y agoIt's a natural next step after pinning versions and keeping all dependencies cached in-house. If the rolling disaster that NPM is taught us anything, is that it's critical to have control over the update process of the code that goes into your product. Not to mention, CI runs faster if you don't have to redownload everything from GitHub on each build :). (Though then developers don't get a day off when GitHub goes down, as it does every couple months.)
- jacques_chester 6y agoA good asset graph / asset transparency log / whathaveyou would help a lot. If an SBOM is asserted and timestamped, you can compare assets you download to the earlier assertion to see if they are the same. When I worked on buildpacks we added something like this. Each buildpack carried a simple BOM of the binaries it referred to and digests for them. When it fetched dependencies it compared the digests and bombed out if there were any mismatches. This led us to capture far more of our dependency graph than before. It is surprising how many folks will replace binaries in-place without changing version numbers. We also managed to catch bugs in our own CI/CD process.
- zvr 6y agoIt's not about "shaming", as these SBOMs might not be publicly available. But serious customers might have something to say when they realize that they are getting obsolete versions of components full of security issues.
- njitbew 6y agoWithout reading the article, I can imagine that listing the components of a technological product (i.e., an SBOM) is a _first step_ towards the goal of solving all those problems. Once you have a standardized way of communicating what a software product is made of, you can start thinking of automatically upgrading dependencies (Maven's pom.xml does this to some extent, and Dependabot and Renovatebot leverage this semi-standard to automatically upgrade your dependencies). If you take this one step (or two steps) further, you can start to automatically rebuild the code, automatically deploy the code, patch running systems, detect when CVEs are actively being abused, and so on. Basically, automate the heck out of this so that the "they just didn't do it" will not happen. And for automation, you need standards.
- rixrax 6y agoIn my mind SBOM is similar to food ingredients being listed on the packaging. FDA or someone requires them, very few read them or cares what is in there. BUT now that they are listed on every food product, those who care can read them and make informed decisions. And raise alarm when it is found that someone uses unhealthy amounts of whatever in their cakes or sausages. As for software, if I had up to date reliable SBOMs for everything I run, it would certainly give me piece of mind. And maybe, even if unlikely, I might be able to do purchasing decisions based on used components, their CVE/etc. history, or sheer amount (in less being generally better, unless there is a reason to suspect the vendor e.g. rolled their own TLS instead of using one of the usual suspects).
- daniellarusso 6y agoLike ‘natural flavors’ and ‘artificial flavors’ are just different uses of ‘git rebase’?
- pessimizer 6y ago> In my mind SBOM is similar to food ingredients being listed on the packaging. FDA or someone requires them, very few read them or cares what is in there. BUT now that they are listed on every food product, those who care can read them and make informed decisions. And raise alarm when it is found that someone uses unhealthy amounts of whatever in their cakes or sausages. And sue them if they lie about it. I think a lot of the benefit of these types of regulations is to force businesses to commit active frauds instead of passive frauds. Not doing something you were supposed to do is incompetence. Lying on a form about doing something that you haven't is deceit. The profits from incompetence and deceit are equal until one gets caught, then the lesser punishment for incompetence as compared to deceit makes deceit more expensive. Smart businesses will choose incompetence every time, and engineer it into the system everywhere where fraud would be profitable. Of course, they can also hire temps to sign forms, like the banks did in 2008[1], but the current administration has to really want you to get away with it for that to work. [1] https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/false-affidavits-foreclosures-what-robo-34185.html https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/false-affidavits-for... Note: it was strangely difficult to find information on this still on the web. ----- edit: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26530786 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26530786
- perlgeek 6y agoAt my employer, we have a company-wide database of which package is installed in which version on each machine (several ten thousands of them). This allows the compliance department to follow known security issues, and they can then open tickets to the affected operating teams stating on which machines the software needs to be upgraded (or mitigations implemented), and they set deadlines based on vulnerability ratings. If the deadlines aren't meant, there's a hierarchical escalation. In the case of the Equifax breach, such a mechanism might have helped. If the developers knew they had to update, but didn't, maybe the ticket from compliance would have given them the right nudge to actually do it.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- silly-silly 6y agoAt my employer we do the same thing for pretty much all software shipped to customers. (X thousand packages, across 5 arches, across 5 releases) There is an ongoing effort and it becomes more complex with vendored packages, embedded jars and 'containers'. I'm assuming that the indexing is done at compile time, how far back into your dep tree do you go ?
- perlgeek 6y agoIt's currently only at the top-level package level, and so the data is simply taken from the package manager. I want it to go one level deeper (we use dh-virtualenv to put several Python packages into one Debian package, but that's only done in a very small part of the company). Of course then there could be C libraries packaged with the Python libraries packaged in a Debian repository, so we'd need another level eventually...
- netflixandkill 6y agoWe're already living with dedicated software companies having serious issues with their internal lifecycles and secure build processes. The concept of a SBOM isn't bad but any nontrivial end product is going to be pulling in orders of magnitude more component software than even large nested BOMs do, and no one is willing to pay to maintain what they have internally, much less read and act on that. In principle, sure, but in immediate practice it would be like california forcing the labeling of basically everything as carcinogenic -- a step sort of in the right direction but mostly useless in practice. The one thing that absolutely needs to be considered is not constructing it in a way that encourages private and unmaintained forks or requiring business contractual liability. Most of software only works as well as it does because there is so much really good open source to draw on.
- jmull 6y agoI’m a bit skeptical too. (It didn’t seem to me that a SBOM would have helped with solarwinds either.) But I’ll play the devil’s advocate: * Perhaps end-user systems could automatically monitor the SBOMs of all software installed, cross-reference it with a live vulnerabilities database, and produce vulnerability reports and notifications. This increases the visibility of vulnerabilities and the chance they will be resolved quicker. * Software companies will feel the increased exposure of the SBOM they need to publish causing them to think more carefully about when and how to take on dependencies. Some do this well already, but this would likely cause more companies to do so.
- wpietri 6y agoIt's certainly possible. But I think it's equally likely that applied naively, we'd see more breaches as public SBOMs make it clearer what attacks will work where. There's also a real question of net value for effort. Security is one consideration people balance, but it's far from the only one. Starting with SBOMs as the focus assumes too much about what people care about and how much work they'll do. I'd much rather people start with some user-focused approach and then making use of particular technologies (like SBOMs) as needed to advance people's actual goals.
- TeMPOraL 6y agoI wonder how many companies already have SBOM internally for legal reasons? I know I recently participated in building a partial one, to help the company ensure we comply with exports regulations of multiple countries. After a casual inspection, we thought we had it all covered, but I felt a bit uneasy, so I dug deeper. Only after I actually read the build scripts of the transitive dependencies, one by one, cover to cover, I discovered we are actually pulling some extra libraries and features we weren't aware of. I've spent several days manually digging through build scripts of our dependencies, and manually[0] inspecting all the dynamic libraries we ship, to provide a complete list of artifacts that include components subject to legal requirements of interest. And the only reason I could complete this work to my satisfaction, is because there was a select set of things we were looking for. Even after this, I don't know what all the stuff our project depends on do - I only know the stuff the legal team cared about is accounted for. What this experience made me wish for is better tooling for figuring out what exactly goes into a software product. I'd love to have a tool I could attach to our build system, that would be able to track every single library and library feature that's actually being used. It's a tough job, given how many ways there are for some seemingly innocent piece of code to pull in some other innocent piece of code. Such tool would probably have to be launched on a freshly configured VM and intercept all network traffic, just to be sure. -- [0] - Well, I quickly scripted that part away. Thank God for people who provide CLI interfaces for GUI tools they write. And yes, inspecting the build output was very useful too - that's how we learned a binary-only commercial dependency we ship is also subject to legal requirements. This wasn't at all visible in the build system - the only way to know was to read the vendor's documentation thoroughly, or audit the symbols in the export tables.
- jacques_chester 6y agoI had a similar experience several years ago. It got worse when I began to consider dependencies in the supply chain itself. What version of our CI system are we using? What OS base image? What version are our worker VMs on? What packages are installed on them? And on and on and on. When I began writing these sources of upstream variability down I began to find dozens of them, for what was, in dependency terms, a fairly unremarkable application.
- 6y ago
- pycal 6y agoI think on balance it actually hurts more than it helps. The author lists Equifax as a case where an organization “failed to update a web server in timely fashion (a few months)” but a software bill of materials would not have made it any more or less obvious that they were running vulnerable web software an attacker could get a foothold in, and could have made it easier for an attacker to exploit that foothold, pivot, and exfiltrate, knowing what other software is available for them to exploit. Equifax didn’t “fail” to manage that particular vulnerability, as the author describes, and protect customer data. They neglected to manage the vulnerability and protect customer data. It’s my opinion that what would actually be valuable (and have been valuable) in the case of Equifax is compliance legislation that places liability on the custodian of PII. This compliance should require companies which are custodians of PII or financial data, or which operate critical infrastructure to have a vulnerability management practice.
- Jgrubb 6y agoPII?
- vlovich123 6y agoPersonally identifiable information. It’s a term of art that is extremely common, at least in any large software company, that deals with customer data in any way. I’m not sure if it’s usage in the broader industry/common speech (although I swear I’ve occasionally seen it in news reports)
- arrosenberg 6y agoFYI - Compliance regulation in the US government almost never works, our government sucks at it. If you want to regulate a company like EquiFax, you have to stick to investigations and prosecutions, which the US government is quite good at. Companies can take the risk, but if they violate the law it should be big fines and jail time for the executives.
- wpietri 6y agoThe US government has a high success rate in the cases it takes on, but it doesn't take on many cases. I think this works out pretty well for high-stakes things like securities. Most public-company CFOs are very careful because they want to have a long career that in no way involves even a risk of going to jail. But if the crime is smaller or has less obvious impact, I wouldn't hold my breath. And a giant barrier to regulatory enforcement in tech is that the average state of practice is so very low. I'd bet that Equifax's practices were no worse than average; we just hear about it because it was such a large breach. From a regulatory perspective it's hard to hold them accountable for doing what everybody else is doing.
- Ericson2314 6y agoThis government-adjacent people rediscovery Nix / Guix. So yes the current phrasing is bit vague in that they are just grasping at the concept via draft requirements. But you can't fault their intuition, as those tools do exact and are absolutely revolutionary. The one thing I wish they mentioned is https://docs.softwareheritage.org/devel/swh-model/persistent-identifiers.html https://docs.softwareheritage.org/devel/swh-model/persistent..., which are the right idea and actually used in practice.