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The problem that I always have with this author’s material and most material in the “rationalist movement” is that after making very valid points about biases,
by tshaddox 6y ago
The problem that I always have with this author’s material and most material in the “rationalist movement” is that after making very valid points about biases, irrational behavior, etc., he seems to leave things at some sort of implicit epistemological nihilism. Since people on the left and the right in American politics both have biases, and both believe their beliefs just as strongly as the other side, apparently we can’t discern anything about their political views other than how their views make them feel? That’s the vibe I’m getting from stuff like this:
> I've had arguments with people who believe that no pro-life conservative really cares about fetuses, they just want to punish women for being sluts by denying them control over their bodies. And I've had arguments with people who believe that no pro-lockdown liberal really cares about COVID deaths, they just like the government being able to force people to wear masks as a sign of submission. Once you're at the point where all these things sound plausible, you are doomed.
Apparently you’re doomed if you believe one of those things describes reality more than the other? They’re both extreme generalizations, obviously, and are defined imprecisely (“no true Scotsman”), but couldn’t it be that one of those two groups of people have beliefs that correspond much more with reality? Or is the conclusion that, since this is politics, and political views is intensely personal and prone to bias, that both sides are equally correct?
Isn’t it possible that there actually are some powerful political groups who have honest and good intentions and others which do not? Isn’t that possible even if most people have a tendency to believe that their own groups are the good ones, and that belief is just as strong for each group? Is it impossible for me to believe my group’s intentions are honest and good, and you believe just as strongly that your group’s intentions are honest and good, but that only one of us is correct? Is knowledge nothing more than a feeling of certainty? Or is knowledge simply impossible?
- jbay808 6y agoI think the author only means you're "doomed" in the sense that "your fate is sealed": you'll find it very hard to change your mind in the face of contrary evidence, because your observations will start to feel like they always reinforce your conclusion.
- tshaddox 6y agoRight, but the implication is that your fate is sealed and that your belief doesn’t reflect reality or isn’t “rational.” I’m assuming the author wouldn’t use the same terminology to describe one’s unwillingness to change their views from something he considers “rational” to something he considers “irrational,” e.g. he probably wouldn’t say “if you believe the Earth is not flat, and you won’t change your beliefs unless presented with compelling evidence and explanations that the Earth is flat, then you are doomed.”
- emmett 6y agoThat's not perfectly parallel as a belief. The parallel statement would be "If you believe that flat-Earth advocates don't actually care about whether the Earth is flat or not, they just want to prevent space exploration to keep us trapped on Earth"...that would be equivalent. And I can't speak for Scott, but I think he'd say if you believed that, your ability to reason about the Earth being flat is basically dead. It happens to be that you have the right answer (the Earth is round), but only by chance...if you were wrong, you wouldn't be able to be convinced to change your mind.
- tshaddox 6y ago> The parallel statement would be "If you believe that flat-Earth advocates don't actually care about whether the Earth is flat or not, they just want to prevent space exploration to keep us trapped on Earth" But...isn’t that statement either true or false, just like the statement “the Earth is flat” is either true or false? What’s the difference between the two statements? Is knowledge about one statement possible, but not the other?
- drdeca 6y agoIt's the connection between the two statements. If you believe "flat-Earth advocates don't actually care about whether the Earth is flat or not, they just want to prevent space exploration to keep us trapped on Earth" , this would pose difficulty for changing the belief "the earth isn't flat". If someone believed "people who claim that 'flat-Earth advocates don't actually care about whether the Earth is flat or not, they just want to prevent space exploration to keep us trapped on Earth' don't actually care about whether flat-Earth advocates really [...], they just [idk, some absurd motivation for making the claim] ", that would pose difficulty for changing the belief "flat-Earth advocates really do believe that the Earth is flat".
- emmett 6y agoThat quote is NOT Scott saying that pro-life advocates are right about abortion or wrong about abortion. That quote is Scott saying that once you start to believe that "the enemy" is a cackling evil villain, who is lying about their true motivations and secretly is only advocating for their preferred policies because they want to do evil things...you are doomed, at least in terms of seeking truth. Because once you believe that, there is nothing that "the enemy" can ever say or do that will change your mind. It's always just a tactic to advance their evil plot. Of course, Scott could be wrong about this thesis. It's possible that maybe believing that pro-life conservatives don't care at all about fetuses doesn't actually indicate that you have a trapped prior that will prevent you from ever hearing new arguments on the abortion issue. But that is the argument that Scott is advancing, not that you can't form opinions about the truth or falsehood of someone's political views at all.
- tshaddox 6y agoI guess my question is whether the author believes that it’s possible to have knowledge about these sorts of things or not. Everything he says in this article sounds like he’s saying that obtaining such knowledge is impossible, or at least that neither side has obtained knowledge. He seems to only judge the validity of the opposing views by how strongly their proponents believe the views, and since the two views seem to be held equally strongly, he seems to conclude that there is no discernible difference in the validity of the views. But if it were possible to obtain such knowledge, then it would be possible to correctly say “both sides believe their views equally strongly, but side A is more correct and side B is less correct.”
- ilaksh 6y agoThere are outside groups with less of that type of bias that will often be able to see things in a more nuanced way that more closely reflects reality. For example, maybe someone from another country who is uninterested in politics. That doesn't mean there are some people who have no bias at all. Just different ones that apply to other things. In the examples you quoted, he was deliberately listing views extreme enough to be inaccurate. For example, both the liberal and conservative examples said the characterization applied to _everyone_ in those groups. The less-biased interpretations might be: _some_ conservatives really _do_ care about fetuses and lives, and _some_ liberals _do_ care about preventing COVID deaths.
- andrewflnr 6y agoAgnosticism about particular partisan issues is very appropriate when discussing general patterns of thinking and failure modes. And I think he would agree with your last paragraph to the extent of thinking it too obvious to say out loud. His own politics are clear enough from his other writing.
- drdeca 6y ago> Isn’t it possible that there actually are some powerful political groups who have honest and good intentions and others which do not? There are people who have bad values, and want things that are bad, yes. (Though generally they don't want them because they think they are bad.) > Isn’t that possible even if most people have a tendency to believe that their own groups are the good ones, and that belief is just as strong for each group? yes. > Is it impossible for me to believe my group’s intentions are honest and good, and you believe just as strongly that your group’s intentions are honest and good, but that only one of us is correct? I'm not sure what precisely you mean by intentions being "honest and good". If I believe that my intent is honest -- well, I suppose I could be fooling myself, thinking that some behavior of mine is "honest" by twisting the meaning of the word "honest" in my mind, while still intending to cause others to have a belief which I believe to be false. Also, by intentions being "good", do you mean that the things one intends are actually good things, or that the one intending them thinks them good for those they impact, and intends them for that reason? > Is knowledge nothing more than a feeling of certainty? Or is knowledge simply impossible? Knowledge is more than a feeling of certainty, yes. And, either knowledge, or something very similar to knowledge, is possible. For example, both of the beliefs quoted, are false. There may be related claims which are true, but neither of the claims, as stated, are. (I don't see the no true Scotsman aspect of either though?) The point isn't that different sides are equally correct. The point is demonstrating a kind of error that can be made, and giving an example on multiple sides makes it easier to understand. If one only gave examples of a type of error being made by the side the reader agrees with, there would be a danger of this being interpreted as simply an attack on the side the reader agrees with, and so the reader would be less likely to appreciate the point. On the other hand, if one only gave examples of the type of error being made by the side the reader disagrees with, while the reader may take a more positive view of what is being written, they are less likely to internalize the point as a kind of error that they, or others on their side, are prone to. For something to be a general type of error, the type of error should be one that can be made in multiple contexts/directions/ways. Then, to demonstrate that something is a general type of error, why not demonstrate that, by showing that it can be made in multiple contexts/directions/ways ? The point isn't nihilism or relativism. The point is vigilance.
- tshaddox 6y ago
- oconnor663 6y ago> Isn’t it possible that there actually are some powerful political groups who have honest and good intentions and others which do not? I think it's important to really carefully spell out what we mean by "not having good intentions". Because there are two different reasonable things that that can mean, and they're _really_ different, but the incentive to flip-flop between them can be strong. The first meaning sounds like "having bad ideas". For example, let's say I'm in favor of some new law to...promote the arts. (Trying to pick a bland example.) You might think my law is actually going to hurt the arts, and argue against it for that reason. Or maybe you agree that it'll help the arts, but you think its other downsides outweigh its upsides. At maximum generality, maybe you don't object to my idea per se, but you'd just rather spend the same money on something else. The second meaning sounds like "having bad values". For example, you could claim that I'm not actually interested in art, and just trying to divert money to my friends. Or maybe I could paint you as some sort of uncultured caveman, who can't understand why normal people like art. When we put it that way, I think it's clear that we usually say "good intentions" to talk about the second meaning. Like, the whole point of saying it is usually to _contrast_ someone's good values with some bad outcome they're associated with, right? On the other hand, it's much easier to take an argumentative position using the first meaning. The world is complicated, everything has downsides, etc. Plus object level arguments tend to be more sophisticated and interesting, with expertise and fancy math getting involved. So a tempting strategy can be to equivocate between "having bad ideas" and "having bad values", by making an argument about ideas or outcomes and yet drawing or implying a conclusion about values. This is the sort of fallacy that internet rationalists complain about constantly, calling it a "motte and bailey" or something like that. And I'm really sympathetic to that complaint: I think that it's very easy to make this sort of bad argument, that it's actually kind of hard _not_ to make it without some sort of shared community or commitment, and that the effect of this sort of argument on discourse is frustrating, unproductive, and ultimately dehumanizing. So all that said, do I think that some groups objectively have bad values? I...oof...I feel kind of forced to admit that it's true sometimes. I can't sustain a really extreme position here like "everyone's values are special and lovely in their own way", at least not without diluting the concept of values so much that it's not very interesting anymore. But at the same time, I just feel...super skeptical of most "bad values" arguments in practice.
- 6y ago