> thousands of engineers worked on the 737 Max. Not a single engineer raised issues with the engineering of the aircraft. It's entirely realistic that most eng

> thousands of engineers worked on the 737 Max. Not a single engineer raised issues with the engineering of the aircraft. It's entirely realistic that most engineers by far were not aware of it. I work (not at Boeing) on an aircraft system. On the aircraft I work on, I have no idea if the flight controls architecture is fully safe, I don't know nearly enough about it to judge. I don't know how many sensor they use and how. That's not the system I work on. > Boeing made an unstable plane which it then stablized with a dangerous MCAS to get it to market fast. They then topped it off by making the MCAS rely on a single sensor. They then made the dual-sensor an upgrade. An undergraduate engineering student with a basic course on probability can see that this is tailor-made for disaster. It's really not that straightforward. Again, without knowing a lot of details about the implementation of the MCAS you couldn't say it was so obviously dangerous. For instance, I understand that the use of a single sensor was justified by the fact that the MCAS was supposed to be possible to activate only once, which wouldn't give it enough authority to reach a catastrophic condition. This literally gives you the justification to use a single sensor. However the implementation of the MCAS software combined with the flight crew procedures ended up activating it several times. The point is, you need to know an awful lot about a system to judge whether it's dangerous or not. And there are lots of systems. It's not something that any engineer not working on that particular part could do, and it's certainly not in the reach of any external undergraduate student. > Strong regulation is necessary to ensure the safety of Boeing Products. Right, and the only thing any engineer on the program could have been concerned about is the apparent lack of oversight from the authorities, although I don't know enough about how it went in practice to say if it was really apparent to lower level engineers.