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Intel to Build Silicon for Fully Homomorphic Encryption
- coolspot 6y agoInterestingly they measure anticipated speedup compared to a CPU, not a GPU: > Intel’s Data Platforms Group will come together to create a dedicated ASIC to reduce the computational overhead of FHE over existing CPU-based methods. The press release states that the target is to reduce processing time by five orders of magnitude from current methods, reducing compute times from days to minutes. AFAIK, a modern GPU already provides up to 3 orders of magnitude speedup compared to a CPU [1]. [1] - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9185077 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9185077
- osaariki 6y agoCPU is currently a rather natural baseline as the various GPU implementations are still somewhat preliminary. I'm not quite an expert on the implementation challenges around FHE (I work on compilers targeting FHE), but my understanding is that the access patterns of the core operation, the number theoretic transform (NTT, a DFT in a finite field), are not particularly GPU friendly. Dedicated hardware is expected to comparatively very well here.
- xsamgreen 6y agoDefinitely agreed that CPU is a natural baseline. But there are promising results for implementing NTT on GPUs. Here is something recent https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/124 https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/124 Nothing will beat an ASIC for NTT though.
- atlgator 6y agoIs it quantum safe?
- mnaei 6y agoThey are quantum resistant; as far as we know. https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/27589 https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/27589
- entee 6y agoCan someone better versed in this area give a decent sense of how this works and whether this is feasible? Also, as the article mentions, given an unencrypted dataset similar to the original, couldn’t you figure out important elements of the underlying data by brute force reverse engineering of the resulting algorithm?
- Taek 6y agoFHE is pretty well established at this point. It can guarantee that someone observing the computation has no ability to tell what data they are acting on or what result they are outputting. But, this is notably assuming that the program is not itself outputting leaky information. For example, if I use FHE to encrypt a program that takes my name and date of birth as input and then output "Taek is over the age of 21", the program itself has revealed data about me. You can't reverse engineer the FHE itself. But if the encrypted program is outputting information that could be used in reverse engineering, FHE is not going to protect you. Similar to how Tor isn't going to protect you if you go and log into Facebook using your real account information.
- tooltower 6y agoWhat output are you talking about? In FHE, you need the private key to decrypt any output. The "program" cannot output anything without access to some decryption oracle.
- waynesonfire 6y agoI think the point is that the program is useless unless it outputs _something_. And when it does, it can leak. This isn't a mind blowing concept.
- dodobirdlord 6y agoThe inputs are encrypted, the processing is encrypted, the outputs are encrypted. Once the execution service has produced an encrypted result it is sent back to the requester, who decrypts the returned result with their decryption key, which has never left their control.
- seaourfreed 6y agoHave you seen Intel's underground facility for national security issues. Why do people trust on-chip cryptography? https://cryptome.org/2013-info/11/intel-ug-lab/intel-ug-lab.htm https://cryptome.org/2013-info/11/intel-ug-lab/intel-ug-lab....
- osaariki 6y agoHomomorphic encryption (HE) is NOT what people would understand as "on-chip cryptography", i.e., secure enclaves. HE is a form of encryption that allows arithmetic operations on encrypted numbers without any access to the decryption key. Secure enclaves on the other hand do decrypt data on-chip and are thus vulnerable to side channel attacks. You can use HE to implement things like encrypted database lookups that don't reveal what is being queried (even to the database server) and the security of the encrypted query does not depend on any hardware properties of the server providing the service.
- Dylan16807 6y agoWhile noting that "database lookup" is a painful scenario for HE because you have to read through the entire thing just to find a single row.
- Misdicorl 6y agoWouldn't a normal db btree index work just fine? Scans certainly seem problematic though
- Dylan16807 6y agoA tree would require the ability to have control flow based on data, or using data as an index. You can't do that while keeping the data secret. Just to select a single row you have to do something like sum(row_meets_criteria() * row). With row_meets_criteria returning 0 or 1.
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- Klwohu 6y agoThis is a form of technology which is designed to harm computer users.
- bawolff 6y ago> The press release states that the target is to reduce processing time by five orders of magnitude Not sure if that's 2^5 or 10^5. A 100,000x speed up just might make FHE into the realm of feasible for some applications (not the silly big-data, AI buzzword soup BS the article is pushing though). Pretty exciting. I've always felt that crypto is magic,FHE especially so. Would be cool to see it remotely in the realm of practicality.
- osaariki 6y agoMore than 2^5 has already been demonstrated with GPU implementations, so they definitely do mean 10^5.
- mvanaltvorst 6y agoWhat would the implications of FHE be for the average consumer?
- neltnerb 6y agoWhat is an average consumer? It lets you do operations on encrypted data. By volume are data centers the average consumer? It seems fairly clear what the benefit would be to them, they can process all kinds of sensitive data that would otherwise be off limits for various reasons.
- bawolff 6y agoEven with a 100000x speed up, that probably puts it more in the territory of cool demo than actual production use, except for very specialized usecases (the overhead for current FHE methods is utterly insane). In principle, the main use case is cloud based algorithm as a service. If google has some service it wants to sell to users but it doesn't want to reveal how it works and the users dont trust google with their private data they can use FHE. The user data is encrypted so google can't extract anything from it to do evil with. The proprietary software stays on google servers so nobody can steal the algorithm. Everyone wins (except of course the progress that would be made if the algorithm was open). FHE is a really unique primitive, i expect when demos become practical people will come up with new interesting use cases. There's also some applications to identity-based/attribute-based encryption and multi-party computation, although i doubt that's coming to average consumer any time soon
- KETpXDDzR 6y agoOne of the main drawbacks of FHE is that it usually leaks some details of your data. E.g., if you do a multiplication of two (encrypted) values, an attacker can memorize the input and output. Since for most useful applications (eg ML) your computations must be deterministic, an attacker can build up a table of calculations. Once this is filled a bit, he can use that with some heuristics to estimate the data. The problem here is that it can be very difficult to prove that an application using FHE is really secure against leaking information. I guess Intel will just do some marketing a la "it's encrypted, thus is safe" BS that semi- or non-technical managers will buy to put a checkmark on their security checklists.
- bawolff 6y agoI'm confused who is the attacker in this scenario? The entity doing the computation? If the party doing the computation can only see the encrypted inputs and outputs, and the ciphertexts are not deterministic, how would they create a table out of that?
- klyrs 6y agoThe threat model for FHE is that the attacker is the entity doing the computation
- monstersinF 6y agoDoesn’t that threat model defeat the purpose of the algorithm leaks?
- bawolff 6y agoPrincipally yes, but it also aims to protect against evesdroppers for example. Many usecases want to keep the algorithm being invoked secret (by having it run on a computer the requester does not have access to) Anyways, the reason i asked is because the grandparent said "attacker can memorize the input and output", which is not something the entity doing the computation can do, as they only see the encrypted text, and encrypted values never repeat (or only with negligible probability) even if the plaintext they are encrypting are the same. The end user entity on the other hand, could try (in theory, not practically) every single value, memorize it, and recreate the secret function. So if the attacker in this scenario is the entity encrypting/decrypting the data, some of the grandparent's post makes more sense.
- dwheeler 6y agoThis might be important. Practical FHE would be a big deal. But this is to TRY to make it practical, and that is not the same thing. I wish them luck.
- airhead969 6y agoThis needs to happen in order to have secure, distributed/p2p computational shared overlay networks.
- bawolff 6y agoI'm not sure i see the relavance. I would consider Zk-Snark's much more relavant to that domain. And well, doing something about targeted DoS attacks somehow.
- Zenst 6y agoInteresting, I was aware of IBM's work in this field and certainly an area they have been a bit more focused upon: https://www.ibm.com/security/services/homomorphic-encryption https://www.ibm.com/security/services/homomorphic-encryption https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2020/06/ibm-releases-fully-homomorphic-encryption-toolkit-for-macos-and-ios-linux-and-android-coming-soon/ https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2020/06/ibm-releases-full... https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2020/12/fhe-progress-milestones/ https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2020/12/fhe-progress-mile... So the whole aspect of IBM not being involved does seem (too me at least, curious.
- erk__ 6y agoI would imagine that IBM have their own private hardware for it, or at the very least wants to make it themselves. IBM still have their own chip designers and still make quite a large selection of rather custom kinds of chips and processors.
- Zenst 6y agoVery true, but they also do not own any chip Fab nowadays, having shifted that to Global Foundaries iirc. Which is one area that Intel still have in house. But given how much research IBM has done, I do wonder how many patents they hold in the FME feild.
- liquidify 6y agoWhy would anyone trust Intel with encrypted data? They have basically proven they are working with the U.S. government who clearly doesn't care about your privacy.
- xsamgreen 6y agoRemote clients are the only ones with the encryption/decryption keys. The compute provider (Intel in this case) only has public keys. If the remote client is using trusted open source software, I wish the compute provider the best of luck in extracting any information from what they are processing.
- jonny383 6y agoI see we have all caught on to Apple's "Silicon" buzzword.
- stadia42 6y agoI didn't fully understand the implications. Why is there so much focus on privacy protection? Isn't by far the biggest application of this technology in security? (Presumably, ensuring that no one steals money out of my bank account is much more important than hiding my porn preferences from the advertisers.)
- littlestymaar 6y agoAFAIK FHE offers little security benefits compared to more standard cryptography when it comes to securing bank accounts. It can hide things (which is the first application of cryptography, hence the crypto prefix − ancient greek for hidden), but it doesn't give you certification like asymmetric cryptography, quite the opposite actually, because by definition FHE schemes are perfectly malleable.
- stadia42 6y agoAh thanks! I incorrectly assumed that if so much effort is spent on this, it must be because it helps protect something valuable (directly by preventing bank or credit hacking, or indirectly by helping secure trade secrets behind encryption, etc.).