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In reality these bitbanks would probably have time delayed "safes" that only unlock the actual bitcoins after a waiting period. Transferring money between the b
by 3pt14159 15y ago
In reality these bitbanks would probably have time delayed "safes" that only unlock the actual bitcoins after a waiting period. Transferring money between the banks, and even to prepaid visas would probably be done with reversible bank credit from one account to another. So the rouge employee is a minor issue whose cost could be absorbed into the profits of the bank. True, this isn't "real" bitcoins, but the system's pillars would be built upon something stable and (sort of) anonymous.
As for the massive hack scenario, the same fears of large scale loss hold true if someone hacks Dropbox or Facebook/Gmail and everyones files or personal messages get leaked. I would rather lose $1000 or even $10k than have my
Dropbox & Gmail hacked. Even in the extraordinarily unlikely case where cracker hackers get into the bitcoin equivalent of Citibank three thinks should happen: 1. Automated systems that detect higher than normal activity and begin immediate shutdown until the cause is resolved. 2. (Barring 1, somehow) Free market deposit insurance. 3. (Barring 2, somehow) A reversal of the block chain to some stable point.
Yes 3. would require a massive amount of consensus and the relative value of bitcoin would go down against USD, but I don't even think that is likely.
The mafia & gangs exist due to a lack of freedom and they have very little trouble moving money today. You can carry out millions of dollars fairly easily in jewelry already.
As for bribing politicians, that is an angle I haven't thought of before. I'll think about it, but I'll grant that it is a very valid concern, although synonymous with bribing politicians with expensive jewelry or art or transfer of anonymous investment corporations (Nevada iirc) or Bearer Share Corporations.
The biggest weakness of bitcoin in my opinion are some implementation details. For one, the way the difficulty rate for the miners is determined I can construct a scenario where a clandestine intelligence agency or a medium wealthy individual could take over the transaction history. By flooding a time window with gpus they could force the difficulty rate for the next time window way, way above the cost of electricity. Then they would have almost no competition in the next round because anyone with a utility bill would stop mining, so they would be left free to corrupt the block chain. The difficulty rate should have been a continuous function of the current hashing power.
Anyways, good debate. I have code to write, though. I hear you on a number of points (specifically the c compiler one, wow that is nuts), but they aren't enough to stop my libertarian nerd glee :)
- Dylan16807 15y agoUtility costs going above the block-finding reward doesn't just happen in the flooding scenario, it also happens naturally as we approach 21M. It's already (supposed to be) handled by transaction fees. I don't think you're ever going to see most of the network shut down mining.
- 3pt14159 15y ago"Utility costs going above the block-finding reward doesn't just happen in the flooding scenario" Why not? If I throw in 4x the computational power for 2 weeks or less why wouldn't the next wave be that much harder?
- Dylan16807 15y agoI think you misunderstood me. I'll reword. There is more than one scenario where the reward from finding a block is less than the utility cost. This is in fact already guaranteed to happen as block-finding rewards decrease. It's nothing new to bitcoin, and is already expected to be dealt with.