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You’d think that sending the world’s foremost security researchers malware would be a stupid idea, but they’re people too. They run Windows and Chrome just like
by saagarjha 6y ago
You’d think that sending the world’s foremost security researchers malware would be a stupid idea, but they’re people too. They run Windows and Chrome just like everyone else, and (for the most part) nobody can really live with “I’m going to be targeted by a nation state” as their threat model, not even those who are aware of what the capabilities of an advanced zero day are. It’s kind of depressing if you think about it: nobody has really solved “what do I do if I have a government against me” yet…
- troyjfarrell 6y agoI agree that everyone, even security researchers, will make mistakes. But there are people who survive with state-level actors in their threat model. These people probably 1) do not post their threat model and mitigations in easy-to-Google places and 2) have the help of one or more other state-level actors.
- saagarjha 6y agoWell it’s twofold: one is that security researchers will use bad passwords and click in shady links just like anyone else, and the second part is that even people with state-level adversaries that are actively trying to avoid getting hacked (journalists, whistleblowers, the like) get hacked anyways because they…carry an up-to-date flagship. There really doesn’t seem to be actual protections against a determined state actor short of not using computers…
- i_am_proteus 6y ago"Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good pass-word and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https:// https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFI-NITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them."[0] [0]https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mickens/files/thisworldofours.pdf https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mickens/files/thisworldofo...
- tialaramex 6y agoI feel like James had the deadline wrong in his calendar and this article is what "Right, sorry, I'll get it over to you by the end of the day" looks like when there is not in fact already a pretty much complete piece that just needs some polish but instead an empty Word document and half an idea in your head. Like so many people, James is pretty confident that anything he doesn't understand (including apparently elliptic curve cryptography) is probably unimportant, and that the solution to his pressing problems is just to make something he knows isn't possible easy (remembering a separate strong random password for every site) so the people who are working on stuff James doesn't understand ought to work on that instead. This piece was written, I think, slightly before BCP 188 ("Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack") but to me it feels as though that's the answer to it. Yes, the NSA (or Mossad, but realistically the NSA) could definitely win if that's what it came down to, you or them. But that's very rarely the situation. Their budget, though large, is finite, and your value, even if large, is also finite. If snooping every word said on the telephone by an American costs 5¢ per citizen, why wouldn't the NSA do it? Worth a shot. But if it costs $5000 per citizen that's gonna blow their budget, and for what? So that's what BCP 188 is about, the question isn't whether you're dealing with "Mossad or not-Mossad" it's whether you are the Protagonist or just another extra. We can't make it impossible for a sophisticated and resourceful adversary to succeed, but we can make it very expensive so that they are obliged to choose their shots.
- buran77 6y ago> But if it costs $5000 per citizen that's gonna blow their budget The end result is that they split the type of surveillance between "cheap" blanket surveillance, and targeted surveillance for the targets that are deemed valuable enough, while also striving to drive the "per target" price down. Mass surveillance offers a good opportunity for economy of scales, and gives you a very granular estimate of how valuable a particular target is.
- saagarjha 6y agoI mean, it is pretty clear the piece is supposed to be burlesque, right? Do you actually think James is trying to write about how cryptography is totally useless and we should just give up?
- michaelt 6y agoY'all are getting help from your governments?
- eeZah7Ux 6y ago> They run Windows and Chrome just like everyone else Citation needed.
- numlock86 6y agogoogle.com/?q=windows%2010%20market%20share google.com/?q=chrome%20market%20share
- da_big_ghey 6y agoSure, but you must admit that there's probably a difference in the software used by security researchers and that used by average people. I know some who use linux for their day-to-day operations, and a few more who use OpenBSD. Though I'd say you're right that the majority (especially those who work in more "corporate" jobs) use either windows or mac.
- high_byte 6y agoThat's not the point. the cover was a Windows exploit, "please run it", for whatever reasons, presumably collaboration followed by monetary rewards, respect, etc. Why would anyone run that code outside a sandbox? it is unclear. even more so a security researcher. Come on, it is a single click to launch a Windows sandbox... was the source extremely trustworthy? fine, that would be the same as giving your password to your spouse.
- numlock86 6y agoI wouldn't bet on every security researcher also being a security enthusiast and vice versa. Also it depends on your scope. Plus the attacks originated from conversations mainly via Twitter and other social media and email. I am probably wrong, but even a security researcher wouldn't boot up a readonly OpenBSD live system with a cli-based browser just to access Twitter, as you are trying to imply. Also the article mentions compromising people with forged VS Studio projects relying on Powershell. To me this is pretty much "average people" software.
- segfaultbuserr 6y ago
- anovikov 6y agoWhat's so special about a state-level actor? What can a North Korean government do to a security researcher that a medium-sized Russian company cannot (not necessarily state-affiliated, just a company from any country which do not cooperate with the West)? North Koreans don't have more money and certainly they don't have more brainpower.
- da_big_ghey 6y agoThey operate with impunity because even if caught, they will not be punished. They also usually have large budgets and significant amounts of manpower.
- anovikov 6y agoSame with Russian company. Carders who only steal from Western banks, are walking in the open in Russia.
- saagarjha 6y agoIncentives, I would think. There are already smaller, private groups that have nation-state level zero days (after all, they sell these to governments…) but they would also need someone to use it on and the ability to ignore the consequences, neither of which seem to really be the case for a private company.
- segfaultbuserr 6y agoI guess many software developers and security researchers tend to have worse system security due to what they do - they are likely to have an experimental environment with code signing disabled, system libraries modified, no root password, and routinely download and run random PoCs and binaries for analysis. Fortunately, most use virtualization for that, and it should protect them from most threats (unless it's a VM escape 0day), even better is to use another machine in the room (use a VM if you must access it remotely, file transfers can be compromised). But one must have the discipline to keep personal, production, and experimental works compartmentalized - never access your home network, personal accounts, or production server from the experimental environment. As time goes by, many usually unintentionally violated the trust boundary for convenience and create a serious security problem. But this attack is nasty - even one follows all of these security measures I mentioned - it provides no protection. The attackers are not targeting security researchers personally but only their exploits. If you only have a single "untrusted" experimental system for reverse-engineering and testing all your exploits, once it's compromised, everything can be stolen. A better compartmentalized environment is possible (e.g. one for all untrusted files from the web, one for personal development, and disallow the exchange of any non-text files between them), but it's an order-of-magnitude more difficult to use.