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You are getting down voted, but this is part of the problem. For people skeptical of this point, look at mask recommendations in the US. There are only two rea
by enchiridion 6y ago
You are getting down voted, but this is part of the problem.
For people skeptical of this point, look at mask recommendations in the US. There are only two reasons that masks were not recommended in February. Incompetence or deception to secure mask supply for health care workers. Neither options inspires confidence in the government.
- SpicyLemonZest 6y agoI just don't think the problem of misinformation has much to do with trusting the government. Even people who distrust the government can, should, and often do avoid falling victim to misinformation.
- enchiridion 6y agoThat is a fair point, but I'm not sure what causes it to go off the rails. It seems like a certain degree is of apathy is necessary. As in, yes there are problems with ~INSTITUTION~, but changing it would be hard and it is good enough for now. Could be that conspiracies are trending so hard now because people do not have other worthwhile personal pursuits to focus on, due to lock downs.
- ryandrake 6y agoOP is getting downvoted because this blanket, default distrust is not escapable once you adopt it. Yes, some institutions have a bad track record and can’t be trusted. Others can be trusted. But OP extends distrust to “every major institution of our society” and then proposes we address the corruption. If your default position is that nobody can be trusted, how do you know that you’ve addressed the corruption? Trust someone to tell you that the corruption has been addressed? You can’t because you default to distrust!
- carry_bit 6y agoI think it's a manifestation of epistemic learned helplessness: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/06/03/repost-epistemic-learned-helplessness/ https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/06/03/repost-epistemic-learn...
- enchiridion 6y agoThat was a good read. It's interesting that there are basically three groups that the author focuses on. 1. Smart people who have never been burned by a bad argument. 2. Smart people who have been fallen for a bad argument. 3. Average people who have been been tricked before. The first two groups as described defer to authority, but the first tends toward extreme ideas while the second relies on institutions as a filter. The third group is the most interesting in my opinion, tending toward ideas that "feel right". The important point here, that the author stops short of making, is that the second and third groups are very similar, just with different filtering criteria. The difference is that, with less education/training, the filtering of the third group is more easily undermined. Which brings me back to my original point. Given that the third group comprises the vast majority of the public, governmental institutions have an exceptional burden to not erode trust. If these institutions fail at that, it opens the door for epistemic learned helplessness.