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Yeah, but if you're blindly installing a third party's binary blob, it's hard to call that "zero trust". Edit: It seems like a serious extension of the zero tr

Yeah, but if you're blindly installing a third party's binary blob, it's hard to call that "zero trust". Edit: It seems like a serious extension of the zero trust concept would involve something like "only allow in source code into the system from sources we trust and then we compile it ourselves". Limit trust to trusted identities and don't allow binaries in any more than people.

xvector 6y ago
Of course, SDLC security and binary verification is also part of zero-trust systems. But you have to keep in mind - the whole point of zero-trust systems is that even if a malicious third-party blob is present on some nodes, it's blast radius is limited by the whitelist of clients that it can communicate with, which makes exfiltrating information particularly difficult unless you have additional exploits that let you move laterally.
- joe_the_user 6y ago
  I am suggesting you could limit "binary verification" and just allow "sources you compile yourself", 'cause how much can a binary be verified? (enough to know your blob was hacked at the source and not along the way, yeah but as we see, that's not enough). What describing just involves "we make sure our vendors are sort of trying to be secure" and that's about it 'cause that's all you can be when someone hands you a binary. And sure, there exist things like Linux drivers that are binary blobs in source code form but at least directs one's eyes to such things. Edit: Also, even in these environments, some people and some software has to run the network itself, like a sys admin tool. Which makes sys admin tools something everyone should look at. And brings us to the present hack.
  - bargle0 6y ago
    How much do you trust your compiler?
    - pabs3 6y ago
      https://bootstrappable.org/ https://bootstrappable.org/ https://bootstrapping.miraheze.org/wiki/Main_Page https://bootstrapping.miraheze.org/wiki/Main_Page
nl 6y ago
> Yeah, but if you're blindly installing a third party's binary blob, it's hard to call that "zero trust". No, "zero trust" means you install it (or anything) but assume that is is malicious so take proactive steps to limit its access within your network. "Zero Trust" means assuming everything (including your compiler) might be compromised, so try to limit the damage any one incident can cause.

xvector 6y ago

Of course, SDLC security and binary verification is also part of zero-trust systems. But you have to keep in mind - the whole point of zero-trust systems is that even if a malicious third-party blob is present on some nodes, it's blast radius is limited by the whitelist of clients that it can communicate with, which makes exfiltrating information particularly difficult unless you have additional exploits that let you move laterally.

joe_the_user 6y ago
I am suggesting you could limit "binary verification" and just allow "sources you compile yourself", 'cause how much can a binary be verified? (enough to know your blob was hacked at the source and not along the way, yeah but as we see, that's not enough). What describing just involves "we make sure our vendors are sort of trying to be secure" and that's about it 'cause that's all you can be when someone hands you a binary. And sure, there exist things like Linux drivers that are binary blobs in source code form but at least directs one's eyes to such things. Edit: Also, even in these environments, some people and some software has to run the network itself, like a sys admin tool. Which makes sys admin tools something everyone should look at. And brings us to the present hack.
- bargle0 6y ago
  How much do you trust your compiler?
  - pabs3 6y ago
    https://bootstrappable.org/ https://bootstrappable.org/ https://bootstrapping.miraheze.org/wiki/Main_Page https://bootstrapping.miraheze.org/wiki/Main_Page

nl 6y ago

> Yeah, but if you're blindly installing a third party's binary blob, it's hard to call that "zero trust". No, "zero trust" means you install it (or anything) but assume that is is malicious so take proactive steps to limit its access within your network. "Zero Trust" means assuming everything (including your compiler) might be compromised, so try to limit the damage any one incident can cause.