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Because renting in SF trades off in part against buying in SF at the margins (and against renting nearby to SF and against moving out of SF entirely). If buying
by sokoloff 6y ago
Because renting in SF trades off in part against buying in SF at the margins (and against renting nearby to SF and against moving out of SF entirely). If buying in SF becomes more expensive due to an LVT, then renting becomes more competitive on the margin.
I find it to be strangely magical thinking that land-value-taxes will precisely and surgically extract 100% of their value from landlords with no players in the game altering their behavior in any way that would result in the effects being shared across many participants in the real estate markets in a city.
- imtringued 6y agoThe idea behind the LVT is not about making rent cheaper. It's to reward landlords for using land more efficiently. If the land costs a fixed amount you want to build as many units as possible and make each unit as attractive as possible. Compare that to a conventional property tax where you have to pay more tax for each unit of housing you build. You also have to pay property taxes for home improvement meaning old properties won't be renovated ahead of time and therefore won't be rented them out. Instead the house will only be available for sale with the hope that the buyer will renovate the property.
- Apocryphon 6y agoHave LVT proponents ever considered augmenting it with tax credits on the LVT for property improvements? To really hammer home incentives towards development in especially supply-strained markets such as S.F.
- nostrademons 6y agoLVT is a tax only on the unimproved value of the land. Property improvements are not covered: the land owner gets to keep (or pass onto the renter) 100% of the value of such improvements. No tax credit is necessary; it's a natural consequence of how the tax is structured.
- Apocryphon 6y agoRight, I understand that property improvements aren’t considered in LVT, and are naturally incentivized through the application of the tax. I’m just speculating if specific development-adverse markets could use both LVT, and credits against LVT to really get the pro-development ball rolling. Based on the one prior attempt at LVT in the U.S., landowners don’t seem to understand its intent: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-short-life-of-pennsylvanias-radical-tax-reform/article/2614398 https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-short-life-of-pennsyl...
- nostrademons 6y agoThere's a pretty big risk of market distortions then. I could easily see landowners adding whatever "improvements" the tax credit incentivizes, regardless of whether it benefits the tenant or increases the potential rent charged, and then passing the cost along to the tenant. Also see a booming cottage industry of contractors & paper-pushers to get the tax credit. I do agree that an LVT has psychological issues when proposed to voters. It's a massive change to how we currently do things (that's the point!), and it preferences groups who don't currently have political power (future developers, tenants, future residents) over those who do (land speculators, retirees, existing homeowners). I think the most likely scenario for its adoption is in the aftermath of a cataclysmic war that destroys all the existing infrastructure and redraws political boundaries. Likely one successor polity might try it out (since everything's dead & destroyed anyway), and then their pro-development advantages would draw lots of displaced immigrants to them, and eventually they'd amass more power than their neighbors through that economic dynamism. Much like how the U.S. became the pre-eminent global power through an innovative politico-economic system + immigration friendly policies + near complete genocide of the native population.
- randompwd 6y ago> Much like how the U.S. became the pre-eminent global power through an innovative politico-economic system + immigration friendly policies + near complete genocide of the native population It's also invaded a crap-load of countries and defacto taken their natural resources And slavery.
- renewiltord 6y agoUsually, the LVT on its own will be sufficient to provide an incentive to develop in an economically efficient manner. The real problem isn't that. The real problem is that people do not desire their neighbours to operate in an economically efficient manner. It is just risk aversion in a different sense except the asset is being paid for by someone else. Imagine that the US government would buy you a bicycle, any bicycle, at any price, reallocating from things that you don't care about, so long as you tell it how important a bicycle is to you. You are likely to describe it as being a matter of life and death. The amount any human would pay for a view is different from the amount they require someone else to pay to obscure the view. Economic efficiency is not a goal in any sense. And any incentives such as the ones you provide would be struck down in the court of popular opinion because it is the outcome that is not desired, not the process.
- nostrademons 6y agoThe point of LVTs is precisely to alter participants' behavior in the market. The value of LVTs is in aligning incentives so that landlords have an incentive to build more housing and use it more efficiently. It makes vacancy & speculation a money-losing endeavor (the same way that inflation makes holding cash a money-losing endeavor), and creates political pressure to repeal zoning laws and create smart public improvements, ones that will increase the value of the land more than their cost. Its value as a revenue source is secondary, and many proponents (of the geolibertarian sort) actually support lower tax receipts and smaller government.
- SllX 6y ago> The point of LVTs is precisely to alter participants' behavior in the market. Maybe this is the point to its proponents. However: > Its value as a revenue source is secondary, and many proponents (of the geolibertarian sort) actually support lower tax receipts and smaller government. Statements like this muddy tax discussions. The primary reason for any tax at all, regardless of type or preference is to raise revenue for government. That fact shouldn’t be lost when discussing which kinds of taxes and what percent to raise them at is discussed, even when optimizing for political outcomes. If the government were raising more tax than it needs for example, tax revenue is too high. If the government is spending more than it is collecting, then tax revenue is too low. Effects on market behavior are always secondary considerations.
- nostrademons 6y agoThat depends whether you're a politician or an economist. ;-) Through a politician's lens the goal of a tax is to raise revenue for government and tax policy exists to do that efficiently. Through an economist's lens efficient trade and alignment of incentives are fundamental and governments exist only incidentally to ensure those. There are various schools of economics that suggest limiting government's role only to the enforcement of private property rights and kneecapping its ability to do anything else. It's much like how to a physicist, vectors are real objects that live in the abstract concept of a vector space, while to a mathematician vector spaces are fundamental axioms and the existence of vectors is just a consequence that falls out of these axioms.
- fragmede 6y agoIf you think anyone believes LVT will be perfectly 100% efficient, you don't understand how to move markets.