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The insistence on the stupidly long passwords and 30-60 day expiration times created so many weaknesses. People choose obvious patterns for their passwords to g
by Jtsummers 6y ago
The insistence on the stupidly long passwords and 30-60 day expiration times created so many weaknesses. People choose obvious patterns for their passwords to get around it. Like `1q2w3e4r!Q@W#E$R`. Then they shift by one each time they have to update, by the time they get across the keyboard they can restart (or twice, in which case you swap the shift to the first half instead of second half). Or, this was fun, my first gov't job the guy had stored passwords on a sticky underneath the keyboard (I changed them all). They also used a shared account for admin stuffs, even though we were all given an admin token (like the smart card or CAC for regular login, but with admin credentials and issued separately).
In theory, the DOD CAC system (they've gotten better over the years) eliminates the need for passwords entirely, but somehow most teams never tie their system to it properly.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- Covzire 6y agoIndeed. Sports Team + Year, Season + Year, Company + Year or some other such combination should get you a good 10% or more of your users with only a few dozen permutations. They wrote 60 days into FEDRAMP I believe, something I jaw-droppingly realized last year sometime. Whoever is writing these policy frames don't know what they're doing. NIST did away with those periodic password change recommendations for a very good reason but IMO they need to now recommend the opposite, directly, because the constant password changes are doing real harm.
- throwaway894345 6y agoAccording to another comment, they do: > It's right there in section 5.1.1.2: "Verifiers SHOULD NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types or prohibiting consecutively repeated characters) for memorized secrets. Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically)." https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25421584 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25421584
- markus_zhang 6y agoYeah I always use something + year + month + day, otherwise how am I supposed to get it around...
- vngzs 6y agoNIST no longer suggests such a rotation policy. They have accepted that it weakens security. Anecdotally, colleagues have successfully lobbied to drop (or not enforce) password expiration policies from other government bodies on the strength of this recommendation from NIST.
- Jtsummers 6y agoYeah, I know it's not actually recommended anymore, but the policy makers don't care. They're doing CYA policy. They do whatever seems to be the strongest possible thing, users and reality be damned. I was in a team whose security group eliminated the use of DVD drives for reading (not writing) data except for a few permitted individuals. Creating a massive chokepoint in every process where data had to come from off-network. Security didn't care, it took the realization of the cost (delays, people too busy moving data to do their actual jobs) for management to step in and end the nonsense. The same will be required for things like password policies. Until the issue becomes realized (weak/written passwords lead to a compromise), these policies will stay in place within organizations and teams. It doesn't help that the majority of the policy setters are not IT professionals (or only in the loosest sense, they can install software but have no real understanding of IT systems). In DoD, most come from a physical security background (retired/separated security forces).
- mumblemumble 6y ago> They do whatever seems to be the strongest possible thing It's not that, it's inertia and poor incentive structures. In a large organization, if a policy was set in place by someone else, then, even when you know it's a sub-par policy, it's still in your interest to leave it alone. Doing so gives you a way to deflect blame in the event of a breach related to that decision. You can just blame the policy itself. If, on the other hand, you change the policy, you're more likely to be held personally accountable. That said, you're also absolutely right about the expertise problem. I don't know much about government, but, in private industry, I've observed that the best way to get put in charge of cybersecurity is to start from somewhere completely outside of IT, and become good friends with the CEO.
- toomuchtodo 6y agoWhat’s preventing more rapid uptake of integrating with the CAC system? I can use my CAC when going through TSA for ID (and verification is sub 10 seconds) but other agencies keep dragging their feet.
- Jtsummers 6y agoIt seems to be laziness on the part of the IT system makers. There are (mostly) standardized ways to authenticate a CAC and associate it with a user for an information system. But people seem to prefer to roll their own. Either using traditional username/password combos, or a worse solution. The worse one is this (seen a few times): Username/password and then you register your CAC with it. They only check the CAC itself for the cert expiration date. When it does finally expire (or gets revoked, say you need a new one early like happened to me a couple times, not to loss just became unreliable in the CAC reader), then you have to use the username/password combo (the password has been getting updated every 60-90 days during all this time) and register your new CAC. But, since they aren't checking revocation data a stolen CAC + PIN (say it's weak, beaten out of you, or they observe you using it) even revoked would still be able to authenticate against that system until the cert expires or the admin (usually) manually removes the revoked CAC.
- toomuchtodo 6y agoAs an IAM/trust systems enthusiast with a passing interest in the CAC system (and tangentially, Login.gov), this is disappointing to hear. Thanks for the context. I’ll keep my eye out for opportunities to contribute to improving the situation (USDS or 18F).
- herewulf 6y agoHappy CAC user here. I would love to see them as common as driver's licenses. Maybe then we could do away with SSNs as a secret identifier.
- toomuchtodo 6y ago
- triangleman 6y ago>Or, this was fun, my first gov't job the guy had stored passwords on a sticky underneath the keyboard (I changed them all). Nothing wrong with writing passwords down. Or at least it's the least wrong thing you could do among all things mentioned here.
- vorpalhex 6y agoIt depends entirely on your security and threat model. Me, working from home? I'll write down the password for my netflix account and wifi - sure. In an office? Absolutely not, never, not once. Offices are not private and not secure and in any kind of even vaguely sensitive setting allowing a colleague to have access to your password and impersonate you is a massive risk.
- m4rtink 6y agoYeah, it really depends - in many cases an attacker gaining local access is game over anyway & less technical users will at least have harder to guess passwords. In other cases it's indeed a bad idea.
- Jtsummers 6y agoI would partially agree with this. It's not wrong to write down passwords. It is wrong to write them down and not secure them. Securing them is the same step that happens (or is intended to happen) with password managers. The passwords are, themselves, encrypted in some fashion so that they're not (easily) accessible to others. If these passwords were at least put in a locked cabinet, I'd have felt better about it. A safe would've been even better (and this is assuming that they needed to be shared, we had security tokens that, if used properly, meant we didn't need the passwords at all and each person would have a unique access token for better accountability). It is moronic to write passwords down and stick them underneath the keyboard.
- nine_k 6y agoI wonder if they use password managers. All the household-name corporations and small startups alike where I worked for the last decade used a password manager. Selling a subscription to a government org should look like a tasty enough piece of revenue pie to attract multiple bidders, I assume.
- mikevm 6y agohow do you manage passwords at such a scale though? where do you keep the password DB?