5 ms·

Why do these articles say so little about how Boeing fixed the problem? People are more likely to fly on these if they know what's different from the ones that

by p1mrx 6y ago

Why do these articles say so little about how Boeing fixed the problem? People are more likely to fly on these if they know what's different from the ones that crashed.

dhritzkiv 6y ago
Patch notes: - bug fixes and general improvements
- hehetrthrthrjn 6y ago
  - reduced changes of uncontrollably flying into the ground at users' request
- scoopertrooper 6y ago
  - Corrected stability issues experienced by a small number of users.
- jahlove 6y ago
  I Lol'd
- oehtXRwMkIs 6y ago
  - updated locales
deleted 6y ago
[deleted]
gsnedders 6y ago
At least insofar as the US is concerned (and note many other regulating bodies are writing their own ADs, certifying the aircraft themselves), the FAA AD is https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/fb91abc41ef06432862586260051e5df/$FILE/2020-24-02.pdf https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf..., where the actual changes operators are required to make start on page 45.
- p1mrx 6y ago
  Quoting without context: "If on ground, do not takeoff. End of procedure."
- benhurmarcel 6y ago
  Thanks for the link. The interesting part [with some comments]: > As proposed in the NPRM [FAA's notice of proposed rulemaking], the corrective actions mandated by this AD [airworthiness directive] include a revision of the airplane's flight control laws (software). The new flight control laws now require inputs from both AOA [angle of attack] sensors in order to activate MCAS [Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System; the system causing the crashes]. They also compare the inputs from the two sensors, and if those inputs differ significantly (greater than 5.5 degrees for a specified period of time), will disable the Speed Trim System (STS), which includes MCAS, for the remainder of the flight and provide a corresponding indication of that deactivation on the flight deck. The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flight crew's ability to control the airplane's pitch by using only the control column. This means the pilot will have sufficient control authority without the need to make electric or manual stabilizer trim inputs. The new flight control laws also include FCC [flight control computer] integrity monitoring of each FCC's performance and cross-FCC monitoring, which detects and stops erroneous FCC-generated stabilizer trim commands (including MCAS). > This AD further mandates changes to the airplane's AFM [airplane flight manual] to add and revise flight crew procedures to facilitate the crew's ability to recognize and respond to undesired horizontal stabilizer movement and the effects of a potential AOA sensor failure. > This AD also mandates an AOA DISAGREE alert, which indicates certain AOA sensor failures or a significant calibration issue. The alert is implemented by revision of MDS software [MAX display system]; as a result, certain stickers (known as INOP [inoperative] markers) will be removed. > Additionally, this AD mandates adequately separating certain airplane wiring, and conducting an AOA sensor system test and an operational readiness flight on each airplane before the airplane is reintroduced to service. > Finally, this AD requires that operators that wish to dispatch airplanes with certain inoperative systems must first have incorporated specific provisions that are more restrictive into their existing FAA-approved MEL [minimum equipment list; defining what can be broken and you can still take-off]. Looks pretty convincing from my point of view.
WalterBright 6y ago
> Why do these articles say so little about how Boeing fixed the problem? Because they are journalists and have no idea how airplanes work or how engineering is done.
- voodootrucker 6y ago
  I think Journalists would. Not sure what to call the people we have writing stories now.
  - fastball 6y ago
    I mostly have started calling them "creative writers that haven't managed to write their first novel yet and so are just biding their time and making ends meet by practicing their creative writing in the 'news'".
- alkonaut 6y ago
  This is Reuters. It's for consumption by the general public. Even if the journalist did know, whould they really go into any detail in a short reuters piece? I'm sure there are better sources for details, and in the end FAA.
  - WalterBright 6y ago
    Aviation Week tends to have much more accurate aviation articles. I haven't seen much to gripe about with their coverage of the 737MAX issue, but the mainstream media articles have all been pretty much trash.
altrunox 6y ago
Well, I think it's just Boeing getting good PR, they even called journalists to the flight ... reminds me of this classic YC article. http://www.paulgraham.com/submarine.html http://www.paulgraham.com/submarine.html
kevin_thibedeau 6y ago
Because they didn't fix the problem. Shit can still hit the fan with one AoA indicator down and MCAS disabled. Think about how flawed these sensors have to be to fail mere months after coming off the assembly line. 737 MAX is only safe if there is triple redundancy on the sensors to confirm which of the two remaining sensors are in agreement.
- kayfox 6y ago
  The Lion Air sensor was defective when installed on the aircraft (The day prior to the accident), it was a part that was repaired by a company in Florida that was not authorized to repair it, and the airline's maintenance department failed to verify its correct operation and just forged the verification in their records. The Ethiopian Airlines sensor was speculated to have been hit by a bird on takeoff.
vzaliva 6y ago
commit message was: "bugfixes"

by p1mrx 6y ago

Why do these articles say so little about how Boeing fixed the problem? People are more likely to fly on these if they know what's different from the ones that crashed.

dhritzkiv 6y ago

Patch notes: - bug fixes and general improvements

hehetrthrthrjn 6y ago
- reduced changes of uncontrollably flying into the ground at users' request
scoopertrooper 6y ago
- Corrected stability issues experienced by a small number of users.
jahlove 6y ago
I Lol'd
oehtXRwMkIs 6y ago
- updated locales

deleted 6y ago

[deleted]

gsnedders 6y ago

At least insofar as the US is concerned (and note many other regulating bodies are writing their own ADs, certifying the aircraft themselves), the FAA AD is https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/fb91abc41ef06432862586260051e5df/$FILE/2020-24-02.pdf https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf..., where the actual changes operators are required to make start on page 45.

p1mrx 6y ago
Quoting without context: "If on ground, do not takeoff. End of procedure."
benhurmarcel 6y ago
Thanks for the link. The interesting part [with some comments]: > As proposed in the NPRM [FAA's notice of proposed rulemaking], the corrective actions mandated by this AD [airworthiness directive] include a revision of the airplane's flight control laws (software). The new flight control laws now require inputs from both AOA [angle of attack] sensors in order to activate MCAS [Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System; the system causing the crashes]. They also compare the inputs from the two sensors, and if those inputs differ significantly (greater than 5.5 degrees for a specified period of time), will disable the Speed Trim System (STS), which includes MCAS, for the remainder of the flight and provide a corresponding indication of that deactivation on the flight deck. The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flight crew's ability to control the airplane's pitch by using only the control column. This means the pilot will have sufficient control authority without the need to make electric or manual stabilizer trim inputs. The new flight control laws also include FCC [flight control computer] integrity monitoring of each FCC's performance and cross-FCC monitoring, which detects and stops erroneous FCC-generated stabilizer trim commands (including MCAS). > This AD further mandates changes to the airplane's AFM [airplane flight manual] to add and revise flight crew procedures to facilitate the crew's ability to recognize and respond to undesired horizontal stabilizer movement and the effects of a potential AOA sensor failure. > This AD also mandates an AOA DISAGREE alert, which indicates certain AOA sensor failures or a significant calibration issue. The alert is implemented by revision of MDS software [MAX display system]; as a result, certain stickers (known as INOP [inoperative] markers) will be removed. > Additionally, this AD mandates adequately separating certain airplane wiring, and conducting an AOA sensor system test and an operational readiness flight on each airplane before the airplane is reintroduced to service. > Finally, this AD requires that operators that wish to dispatch airplanes with certain inoperative systems must first have incorporated specific provisions that are more restrictive into their existing FAA-approved MEL [minimum equipment list; defining what can be broken and you can still take-off]. Looks pretty convincing from my point of view.

WalterBright 6y ago

> Why do these articles say so little about how Boeing fixed the problem? Because they are journalists and have no idea how airplanes work or how engineering is done.

voodootrucker 6y ago
I think Journalists would. Not sure what to call the people we have writing stories now.
- fastball 6y ago
  I mostly have started calling them "creative writers that haven't managed to write their first novel yet and so are just biding their time and making ends meet by practicing their creative writing in the 'news'".
alkonaut 6y ago
This is Reuters. It's for consumption by the general public. Even if the journalist did know, whould they really go into any detail in a short reuters piece? I'm sure there are better sources for details, and in the end FAA.
- WalterBright 6y ago
  Aviation Week tends to have much more accurate aviation articles. I haven't seen much to gripe about with their coverage of the 737MAX issue, but the mainstream media articles have all been pretty much trash.

altrunox 6y ago

Well, I think it's just Boeing getting good PR, they even called journalists to the flight ... reminds me of this classic YC article. http://www.paulgraham.com/submarine.html http://www.paulgraham.com/submarine.html

kevin_thibedeau 6y ago

Because they didn't fix the problem. Shit can still hit the fan with one AoA indicator down and MCAS disabled. Think about how flawed these sensors have to be to fail mere months after coming off the assembly line. 737 MAX is only safe if there is triple redundancy on the sensors to confirm which of the two remaining sensors are in agreement.

kayfox 6y ago
The Lion Air sensor was defective when installed on the aircraft (The day prior to the accident), it was a part that was repaired by a company in Florida that was not authorized to repair it, and the airline's maintenance department failed to verify its correct operation and just forged the verification in their records. The Ethiopian Airlines sensor was speculated to have been hit by a bird on takeoff.

vzaliva 6y ago

commit message was: "bugfixes"