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I thought that the purpose of perfect forward secrecy was to protect against eavesdroppers who had recorded your encrypted traffic in the case of your secret ke
by tzs 6y ago
I thought that the purpose of perfect forward secrecy was to protect against eavesdroppers who had recorded your encrypted traffic in the case of your secret keys somehow leaking.
Protecting messages at rest at the source or destination is out of scope for perfect forward secrecy.
- schoen 6y agoYes, for example your key could be stolen through electromagnetic eavesdropping (Cryptography Research had an amazing demo of a practical side-channel attack at the RSA conference one time), but that doesn't mean that all of your message contents are exposed that way. Or, malware on your phone could exfiltrate your key but not all of your messages because that would somehow be more suspicious/noticeable, like if you were on a metered mobile data connection. But if the attacker is a government or has otherwise compromised telco infrastructure, the attacker might already have copies of your old encrypted traffic -- which, without forward secrecy, it could use. I think the context of the claim in the article is pretty much only for the "government physically seizes your phone and examines its contents" scenario: but even for that scenario, a user might choose to selectively delete specific messages without deleting all of them (e.g. Signal allows you to delete an entire "conversation" with a specific person). So in this threat model, either way, we also need to look into whether Signal successfully overwrites the content and metadata of the messages it deletes on the mobile device storage, because the government attacker would use forensic tools to try to undelete that data. I don't know the answer to that.
- ghthor 6y agoSSD storage makes it pretty much impossible to overwrite data on the disk from the OS. Because writing is all handled internally and is copy on write you cant just write to disk sectors. The internal firmware will route the write to different parts of the disk.
- schoen 6y agoI've been aware of that in the past, but it slipped my mind when I was asking this question. (So thanks.) Has anyone investigated the wear leveling of mobile device storage to see how bad/tractable this situation is at the moment?
- simcop2387 6y agoThis is one of the reasons that FDE on an SSD is so important, even if you still have it send discard through to the device to mark blocks as unused it'll still make things much more difficult to reconstruct and decrypt deleted data later. Probably not perfect but it's one more layer of defense that will be more difficult to break.
- h_anna_h 6y agoThe keys don't just "somehow" leak. They leak because someone has access to your device, where the messages are stored unencrypted anyway.
- zrm 6y agoThat is not the only mechanism for keys to leak. Timing side channels may reveal the key and not any of the old messages. The key could be guessed if it was inadvertently generated with a weak random number generator. The attacker could have an older backup of your device, which contains the long-term key and the older messages, but without forward secrecy they could then use the long-term key and traffic captures to decrypt the newer messages that weren't in the older backup.
- upofadown 6y agoThese are all very difficult attacks that require the attacker to have recorded your traffic off the network. In general, end device security is much easier to attack. >...they could then use the long-term key and traffic captures to decrypt the newer messages that weren't in the older backup. I don't see how forward secrecy would change things for this situation.
- zrm 6y ago> These are all very difficult attacks that require the attacker to have recorded your traffic off the network. The entire premise of encrypting the traffic passing over the network is that an attacker may have access to your traffic off the network. > I don't see how forward secrecy would change things for this situation. Suppose there is an attacker capturing all your network traffic, waiting for an opportunity to decrypt it. You backed up your phone in 2015. Then, today, the machine containing the 2015 backup of your phone is compromised, e.g. because you discarded it without sanitizing it. The attacker now has all of your messages from before 2015, because they're in the backup. But without forward secrecy, they also get all of your messages after 2015, because they could use the long-term key from the backup to decrypt all your captured network traffic. They would also get any messages from before 2015 that you had deleted prior to backing up your phone.