5 ms·

Interesting/educational read but I'm still not convinced that this unintended side effect is a bad thing - it seems like a desirable property to have authentica

Interesting/educational read but I'm still not convinced that this unintended side effect is a bad thing - it seems like a desirable property to have authenticated emails. Matt argues this might lead to regular folks (as opposed to politicians) getting blackmailed, but: 1) it seems unlikely this cryptographic proof is needed (he acknowledges this criticism in the post), and 2) what seems more likely to me is that politicians would intentionally _not_ opt in to any alternate solution and use that deniability for their own advantage. (Also as an alternate he proposes GPG, which I know Matt knows is laughable).

busterarm 6y ago
You might want to validate your emails more than a few months out. Regardless of if your emails are valid or not, blackmail is still a crime. Not being able to have your emails validated doesn't protect you from blackmail. The power of blackmail is often in the social cost of the accusation itself. The thing that protects you from blackmail is not getting involved in things you can be blackmailed for. This is like saying don't lock your doors so that nobody can break and enter into your house.
- vorpalhex 6y ago
  > The thing that protects you from blackmail is not getting involved in things you can be blackmailed for. This is incorrect, because the things that someone can be blackmailed for is not the same as the set of immoral or unethical acts. You can be blackmailed for being gay, or for having a serious medical condition that's undisclosed. Neither of those situations is a "well just don't do that" kind of thing. The defense against blackmail is to make blackmail difficult (eg release DKIM keys), severely punish people who engage in blackmail, and guard your secrets effectively. > This is like saying don't lock your doors so that nobody can break and enter into your house. This is like saying the latch on your fence is a security mechanism. Nobody intended that fence latch to keep your safe or secure and hiding behind it won't make you safer. Rip away the false pretense.
  - michaelmrose 6y ago
    Doesn't DKIM make it harder to blackmail or destroy someone with fake emails because they can show their lack of authenticity? Shouldn't we privilege protecting people from lies vs protecting people from the truth?
    - vorpalhex 6y ago
      No because it's not on us to make moral distinctions between someone who is gay and doesn't want to make that information public, and someone who isn't gay and is being falsly blackmailed. Publishing the DKIM keys makes both cases harder because you no longer have authenticity claims. Neither claim has authenticity value and instead is just a "their word versus yours" situation. Humans are terrible moral adjudicators, and acting off of universals leads to repugnant ends. The truth can absolutely do terrible damage and still be the truth, but being the truth doesn't remove value from privacy. Put another way - would it be moral to publish your full medical records in the public? After all, they are the truth...
      - baobabKoodaa 6y ago
        When an angry mob goes after suspected homosexuals, do you think they stop to authenticate DKIM signatures of emails? I'll give you a hint: no. In fact, it's hard to imagine any scenario where anybody goes through the trouble of authenticating e-mails of a "normal person" who is persecuted of something other than crimes.
        lxgr 6y ago
        Homosexuality is considered a crime in quite a few countries.
        busterarm 6y ago
        Well, then if you live in one of those countries or plan on traveling through them, you're probably at risk if you're an open homosexual. If you live in one of those countries and secretly a homosexual, do not send emails indicating that you're a homosexual. You wouldn't tape your key to your front door.
- mthoms 6y ago
  Sounds like the "If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear" argument. Not very compelling. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_hide_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_hide_argument
  - busterarm 6y ago
    See response here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25114692 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25114692
    - mthoms 6y ago
      Okay, but what about a topic that is legal and acceptable in today's society but not in the society 20, 30 or 40 years down the line? What if being gay becomes socially unacceptable again? Or supporting the second amendment? Or [literally anything]? The problem is that what is socially and legally acceptable changes over time. Just 30 years ago, the standard for social acceptable commentary was wildly different in the areas of gender identity, sexuality, and race for instance.
      - busterarm 6y ago
        Yes, you should absolutely think about everything that you commit to public record. Yes, you might be totally fine now. You might be hanging out and get photographed with this creepy billionaire named Jeffrey Epstein who is just another creepy billionaire at your creepy billionaire parties. Then 20 years from now we find out he's running pedophile island and people start looking into your associations. We are not teaching people to be cautious about their public data and in fact there's an entire industry out there encouraging everyone to detail their whole lives in public record. Get off of social media _today_. Yes, it's probably too late. The other option is to be such a big celebrity that your entire life is public and you have the defense of scrutiny. Side note: Somebody from my high school class is a famous criminal. I regularly receive requests for interviews on the basis of that association alone despite having nothing to do with the person for decades.
n0nc3 6y ago
Put the company you work for in your threat model, and this becomes relevant to you. The corporate world is mired in zero-sum competition, and some of your colleagues are willing to do things that will shock and appall you if it increases their chance of "winning". Try working in defense, finance, or security as a closet anarchist. Have a few Chomsky books in your Amazon purchase history? Good luck climbing the Amazon corporate ladder.
CodesInChaos 6y ago
You can authenticate messages in a way that only the recipient can verify (Diffie-Hellman plus MAC).
- arkadiyt 6y ago
  If you had access to a public key for every email address then why stop at authentication - you could encrypt all email on the web. But we don't, so we can't.
  - tomrod 6y ago
    Maybe we should.
  - CodesInChaos 6y ago
    Authentication in this context doesn't need to be end-to-end. Instead of a custom protocol, we could probably just use SSL client certificates authenticating the sending domain to achieve the same effect.

busterarm 6y ago

You might want to validate your emails more than a few months out. Regardless of if your emails are valid or not, blackmail is still a crime. Not being able to have your emails validated doesn't protect you from blackmail. The power of blackmail is often in the social cost of the accusation itself. The thing that protects you from blackmail is not getting involved in things you can be blackmailed for. This is like saying don't lock your doors so that nobody can break and enter into your house.

vorpalhex 6y ago
> The thing that protects you from blackmail is not getting involved in things you can be blackmailed for. This is incorrect, because the things that someone can be blackmailed for is not the same as the set of immoral or unethical acts. You can be blackmailed for being gay, or for having a serious medical condition that's undisclosed. Neither of those situations is a "well just don't do that" kind of thing. The defense against blackmail is to make blackmail difficult (eg release DKIM keys), severely punish people who engage in blackmail, and guard your secrets effectively. > This is like saying don't lock your doors so that nobody can break and enter into your house. This is like saying the latch on your fence is a security mechanism. Nobody intended that fence latch to keep your safe or secure and hiding behind it won't make you safer. Rip away the false pretense.
- michaelmrose 6y ago
  Doesn't DKIM make it harder to blackmail or destroy someone with fake emails because they can show their lack of authenticity? Shouldn't we privilege protecting people from lies vs protecting people from the truth?
  - vorpalhex 6y ago
    No because it's not on us to make moral distinctions between someone who is gay and doesn't want to make that information public, and someone who isn't gay and is being falsly blackmailed. Publishing the DKIM keys makes both cases harder because you no longer have authenticity claims. Neither claim has authenticity value and instead is just a "their word versus yours" situation. Humans are terrible moral adjudicators, and acting off of universals leads to repugnant ends. The truth can absolutely do terrible damage and still be the truth, but being the truth doesn't remove value from privacy. Put another way - would it be moral to publish your full medical records in the public? After all, they are the truth...
    - baobabKoodaa 6y ago
      When an angry mob goes after suspected homosexuals, do you think they stop to authenticate DKIM signatures of emails? I'll give you a hint: no. In fact, it's hard to imagine any scenario where anybody goes through the trouble of authenticating e-mails of a "normal person" who is persecuted of something other than crimes.
      - lxgr 6y ago
        Homosexuality is considered a crime in quite a few countries.
        busterarm 6y ago
        Well, then if you live in one of those countries or plan on traveling through them, you're probably at risk if you're an open homosexual. If you live in one of those countries and secretly a homosexual, do not send emails indicating that you're a homosexual. You wouldn't tape your key to your front door.
mthoms 6y ago
Sounds like the "If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear" argument. Not very compelling. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_hide_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_hide_argument
- busterarm 6y ago
  See response here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25114692 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25114692
  - mthoms 6y ago
    Okay, but what about a topic that is legal and acceptable in today's society but not in the society 20, 30 or 40 years down the line? What if being gay becomes socially unacceptable again? Or supporting the second amendment? Or [literally anything]? The problem is that what is socially and legally acceptable changes over time. Just 30 years ago, the standard for social acceptable commentary was wildly different in the areas of gender identity, sexuality, and race for instance.
    - busterarm 6y ago
      Yes, you should absolutely think about everything that you commit to public record. Yes, you might be totally fine now. You might be hanging out and get photographed with this creepy billionaire named Jeffrey Epstein who is just another creepy billionaire at your creepy billionaire parties. Then 20 years from now we find out he's running pedophile island and people start looking into your associations. We are not teaching people to be cautious about their public data and in fact there's an entire industry out there encouraging everyone to detail their whole lives in public record. Get off of social media _today_. Yes, it's probably too late. The other option is to be such a big celebrity that your entire life is public and you have the defense of scrutiny. Side note: Somebody from my high school class is a famous criminal. I regularly receive requests for interviews on the basis of that association alone despite having nothing to do with the person for decades.

n0nc3 6y ago

Put the company you work for in your threat model, and this becomes relevant to you. The corporate world is mired in zero-sum competition, and some of your colleagues are willing to do things that will shock and appall you if it increases their chance of "winning". Try working in defense, finance, or security as a closet anarchist. Have a few Chomsky books in your Amazon purchase history? Good luck climbing the Amazon corporate ladder.

CodesInChaos 6y ago

You can authenticate messages in a way that only the recipient can verify (Diffie-Hellman plus MAC).

arkadiyt 6y ago
If you had access to a public key for every email address then why stop at authentication - you could encrypt all email on the web. But we don't, so we can't.
- tomrod 6y ago
  Maybe we should.
- CodesInChaos 6y ago
  Authentication in this context doesn't need to be end-to-end. Instead of a custom protocol, we could probably just use SSL client certificates authenticating the sending domain to achieve the same effect.