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This is great news! CGP Grey has a great series on voting schemes for anybody who is interested in learning more - https://www.cgpgrey.com/politics-in-the-anim

This is great news! CGP Grey has a great series on voting schemes for anybody who is interested in learning more - https://www.cgpgrey.com/politics-in-the-animal-kingdom https://www.cgpgrey.com/politics-in-the-animal-kingdom Also, not to be too self-promotional, but I also made a simple site for running polls using Ranked-choice voting. I was surprised that it was tricky to find a nice SurveyMonkey-esque site that did Borda Counts and Instant Runoff voting so I made my own. Hope some other voting geeks can enjoy it - https://poller.io https://poller.io

deleted 6y ago
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oehpr 6y ago
Hey this is great! I've been looking for a decent poll site like this! Some things I would like: Could you randomize the initial order to avoid donkey votes? I'd like it if there was an option to allow invited participants to add their own choices. For communal voting like "where shall we have breakfast" letting people add things would be good. Also it would be nice to be able to drag some of the choices into a "I'm not voting for this" box or something. Or maybe just start all the options in the "I'm not voting for this" box and let people move them over? Not sure what would be easier. Anyway thanks for making this.
- glafayette 6y ago
  Hey, thanks for checking it out! Definitely planning to randomize the order. This is next on my todo list whenever I get back around to this site. Adding your own choices is tricky UX-wise, because if person A votes, then person B votes and adds a new choice, person A's vote never took the new choice into account. When using this personally with friends, I've just aggressively solicited ideas beforehand to get around this. Definitely not a perfect solution though. I really like the "I'm not voting for this" idea. Also, that would let you just click your votes in order, rather than having to sort a list. Will explore this idea!
godelski 6y ago
Unfortunately CGP Grey is wrong. RCV (IRV) has been used in Australia for 100+ years. Ireland uses it. We've already had it in America. We've done enough experimenting. The thing to get excited about is Approval and STAR. Let's interested try cardinal voting systems instead of ordinal. They are also substantially simpler.
- mjevans 6y ago
  What about "Path Vote" AKA the Schulze method? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method "The Schulze method (/ˈʃʊltsə/) is an electoral system developed in 1997 by Markus Schulze that selects a single winner using votes that express preferences. The method can also be used to create a sorted list of winners. The Schulze method is also known as Schwartz Sequential dropping (SSD), cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping (CSSD), the beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting, and path winner. The Schulze method is a Condorcet method, which means that if there is a candidate who is preferred by a majority over every other candidate in pairwise comparisons, then this candidate will be the winner when the Schulze method is applied."
  - godelski 6y ago
    Condorcet methods get discussed a lot but they are pretty complicated. I believe that they are discussed because they maximize VSE, such as Schulze. I'll reference my comment in this thread because the VSE link has what I'm talking about. The problem is they are less resistant to strategic voting (though much better than IRV and plurality). But let's just keep it dumb and simple with cardinal systems. Approval is dead simple and gets you pretty much all the way there on most of the criteria. If you want to add a little bit of complexity, STAR makes things even better because it gives you some more specificity (and slightly improves upon score/range). Every time we talk about electronic voting everyone always brings up the matter of simplicity, well, that matters here too. With approval and score you're literally just creating a matrix. STAR you have two rounds (top two from the previous round). Ordinal methods are pretty complex and much more prone to mistakes because of such. You don't need a PhD to understand approval (it is actually how I solve the "where should we eat" problem). [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24563236 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24563236
Jarwain 6y ago
When it comes to learning about voting schemes, I will always link to this: https://ncase.me/ballot/ https://ncase.me/ballot/. Interactive simulations comparing different voting methods really tickle the nerd in me.
ScottBurson 6y ago
I think it is unfortunate that Instant Runoff Voting (commonly called Ranked-Choice Voting, though it is not the only system for counting ranked ballots) is getting all the buzz these days. Someone posted this link to a very nice explanation, complete with spiffy simulations, then deleted their comment: https://ncase.me/ballot/ https://ncase.me/ballot/ Approval Voting is much simpler to implement and use than IRV, and much less prone to produce anomalous results. More discussion can be found here: https://electionscience.org/ https://electionscience.org/ I think the Marquis de Condorcet got the entire field off on the wrong foot with a conceptual framework in which voting is about expressing preferences between candidates. Voting theorists have tended ever since to think in terms of preferential voting. The result is an unconscious bias to the effect that a voter's evaluations of the candidates tend to be roughly evenly spaced: that the gap between their first choice and their second is roughly equal to that between their second and third, etc. You can hear that bias, for example, in this statement from FairVote.org: [A]pproval voting [has the] practical flaw of not allowing voters to support a second choice without potentially causing the defeat of their first choice. It's true in AV that if you vote for two candidates, your ballot contributes equally to the potential victory of either; you don't get to say which you prefer. But calling this a "flaw" assumes that you couldn't be somewhat indifferent between those two candidates, at least relative to the degree of your dislike for the other(s). That assumption is pervasive, albeit implicit, in the arguments I have seen made against AV, and it is indeed nothing but an assumption. A much better conceptual framework is to imagine an N-cube, where N is the number of candidates, and each voter's position as a point in that cube. Then the problem of designing a voting system becomes that of identifying which corner the mean of the positions of the voters is closest to. In principle a voting system could allow each voter to supply a real number in [0, 1] for each candidate, and we could simply add them up and see which is largest. In practice it makes more sense to quantize the space to some extent. Score Voting gives the voter a set of possible values, e.g., integers in [0, 10]. Approval Voting boils that down to the bare minimum of {0, 1}. (My opinion is that once the electorate is large enough, there is little benefit to allowing more than two choices; the greater quantization noise of AV gets averaged out.) Armed with that, we can now look back at the preferential systems. Is there a way to interpret a preferential ballot in the N-cube framework? Yes, there is. We cut the unit N-cube up along diagonal hyperplanes; for instance, in 3 dimensions (i.e. for a 3-candidate race), the X=Y plane, the Y=Z plane, and the X=Z plane. This gives us 6 prismatically shaped regions. We compute the barycenter of each — the center of mass, under the assumption of uniform density — and look at their coordinates. These turn out to be permutations of [1/4, 1/2, 3/4] — a linear sequence. In short, what falls out of this exercise is equivalent, modulo linear transformation, to the Borda Count. So the Borda Count optimizes for the case in which the voters' positions cluster near the barycenters of those regions: where their evaluation of the middle candidate, in a 3-candidate race, is about halfway between those of the other two. If you listen closely to the arguments presented by preferential-voting advocates, you can hear them assuming that this is likely to be the case. But there's no reason it should be, and in practice I haven't observed that it tends to be.
twblalock 6y ago
The conversation in this thread demonstrates why first-past-the-post voting is so hard to replace. There is no consensus on which alternative system to replace it with.
- dane-pgp 6y ago
  On the contrary, it shows that so many people with differing views share a common goal of replacing FPTP. I'm sure all the people here opposing FPTP would eagerly accept any of the alternatives being proposed, if it had a credible chance of being implemented in their jurisdiction. The real barrier is that a change to the voting system would have to be approved by a party that is winning under the current system. Convincing a party to agree to any change is much harder than picking one of the many good options. Also, I hope you don't mind if I mention that your point is eerily analogous to a dictator saying "We can't introduce democracy, because then people would disagree on who the leader should be."
  - Doxin 6y ago
    So what's the solution here? Pick a system at random? Hold a vote? Neither seems quite satisfactory.
    - dane-pgp 6y ago
      In practice, the decision-makers within a major party would look at which option would benefit them more than the other major party, and then a commitment to introduce that system would be added to their party platform, with it being implemented the next time they win an election. For example, if the Democrats were afraid that the Green party would split their vote, they might support RCV. Therefore, arguably, the best strategy for bringing about voting reform might be to vote for the Green party, even if you don't support any other Green party policies, or any Democrat policies.
- MilesTeg 6y ago
  Amusingly this can be interpreted as that the vote for which voting system to use uses first-past-the-post so first-past-the-post wins.

deleted 6y ago

[deleted]

oehpr 6y ago

Hey this is great! I've been looking for a decent poll site like this! Some things I would like: Could you randomize the initial order to avoid donkey votes? I'd like it if there was an option to allow invited participants to add their own choices. For communal voting like "where shall we have breakfast" letting people add things would be good. Also it would be nice to be able to drag some of the choices into a "I'm not voting for this" box or something. Or maybe just start all the options in the "I'm not voting for this" box and let people move them over? Not sure what would be easier. Anyway thanks for making this.

glafayette 6y ago
Hey, thanks for checking it out! Definitely planning to randomize the order. This is next on my todo list whenever I get back around to this site. Adding your own choices is tricky UX-wise, because if person A votes, then person B votes and adds a new choice, person A's vote never took the new choice into account. When using this personally with friends, I've just aggressively solicited ideas beforehand to get around this. Definitely not a perfect solution though. I really like the "I'm not voting for this" idea. Also, that would let you just click your votes in order, rather than having to sort a list. Will explore this idea!

godelski 6y ago

Unfortunately CGP Grey is wrong. RCV (IRV) has been used in Australia for 100+ years. Ireland uses it. We've already had it in America. We've done enough experimenting. The thing to get excited about is Approval and STAR. Let's interested try cardinal voting systems instead of ordinal. They are also substantially simpler.

mjevans 6y ago
What about "Path Vote" AKA the Schulze method? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method "The Schulze method (/ˈʃʊltsə/) is an electoral system developed in 1997 by Markus Schulze that selects a single winner using votes that express preferences. The method can also be used to create a sorted list of winners. The Schulze method is also known as Schwartz Sequential dropping (SSD), cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping (CSSD), the beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting, and path winner. The Schulze method is a Condorcet method, which means that if there is a candidate who is preferred by a majority over every other candidate in pairwise comparisons, then this candidate will be the winner when the Schulze method is applied."
- godelski 6y ago
  Condorcet methods get discussed a lot but they are pretty complicated. I believe that they are discussed because they maximize VSE, such as Schulze. I'll reference my comment in this thread because the VSE link has what I'm talking about. The problem is they are less resistant to strategic voting (though much better than IRV and plurality). But let's just keep it dumb and simple with cardinal systems. Approval is dead simple and gets you pretty much all the way there on most of the criteria. If you want to add a little bit of complexity, STAR makes things even better because it gives you some more specificity (and slightly improves upon score/range). Every time we talk about electronic voting everyone always brings up the matter of simplicity, well, that matters here too. With approval and score you're literally just creating a matrix. STAR you have two rounds (top two from the previous round). Ordinal methods are pretty complex and much more prone to mistakes because of such. You don't need a PhD to understand approval (it is actually how I solve the "where should we eat" problem). [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24563236 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24563236

Jarwain 6y ago

When it comes to learning about voting schemes, I will always link to this: https://ncase.me/ballot/ https://ncase.me/ballot/. Interactive simulations comparing different voting methods really tickle the nerd in me.

ScottBurson 6y ago

I think it is unfortunate that Instant Runoff Voting (commonly called Ranked-Choice Voting, though it is not the only system for counting ranked ballots) is getting all the buzz these days. Someone posted this link to a very nice explanation, complete with spiffy simulations, then deleted their comment: https://ncase.me/ballot/ https://ncase.me/ballot/ Approval Voting is much simpler to implement and use than IRV, and much less prone to produce anomalous results. More discussion can be found here: https://electionscience.org/ https://electionscience.org/ I think the Marquis de Condorcet got the entire field off on the wrong foot with a conceptual framework in which voting is about expressing preferences between candidates. Voting theorists have tended ever since to think in terms of preferential voting. The result is an unconscious bias to the effect that a voter's evaluations of the candidates tend to be roughly evenly spaced: that the gap between their first choice and their second is roughly equal to that between their second and third, etc. You can hear that bias, for example, in this statement from FairVote.org: [A]pproval voting [has the] practical flaw of not allowing voters to support a second choice without potentially causing the defeat of their first choice. It's true in AV that if you vote for two candidates, your ballot contributes equally to the potential victory of either; you don't get to say which you prefer. But calling this a "flaw" assumes that you couldn't be somewhat indifferent between those two candidates, at least relative to the degree of your dislike for the other(s). That assumption is pervasive, albeit implicit, in the arguments I have seen made against AV, and it is indeed nothing but an assumption. A much better conceptual framework is to imagine an N-cube, where N is the number of candidates, and each voter's position as a point in that cube. Then the problem of designing a voting system becomes that of identifying which corner the mean of the positions of the voters is closest to. In principle a voting system could allow each voter to supply a real number in [0, 1] for each candidate, and we could simply add them up and see which is largest. In practice it makes more sense to quantize the space to some extent. Score Voting gives the voter a set of possible values, e.g., integers in [0, 10]. Approval Voting boils that down to the bare minimum of {0, 1}. (My opinion is that once the electorate is large enough, there is little benefit to allowing more than two choices; the greater quantization noise of AV gets averaged out.) Armed with that, we can now look back at the preferential systems. Is there a way to interpret a preferential ballot in the N-cube framework? Yes, there is. We cut the unit N-cube up along diagonal hyperplanes; for instance, in 3 dimensions (i.e. for a 3-candidate race), the X=Y plane, the Y=Z plane, and the X=Z plane. This gives us 6 prismatically shaped regions. We compute the barycenter of each — the center of mass, under the assumption of uniform density — and look at their coordinates. These turn out to be permutations of [1/4, 1/2, 3/4] — a linear sequence. In short, what falls out of this exercise is equivalent, modulo linear transformation, to the Borda Count. So the Borda Count optimizes for the case in which the voters' positions cluster near the barycenters of those regions: where their evaluation of the middle candidate, in a 3-candidate race, is about halfway between those of the other two. If you listen closely to the arguments presented by preferential-voting advocates, you can hear them assuming that this is likely to be the case. But there's no reason it should be, and in practice I haven't observed that it tends to be.

twblalock 6y ago

The conversation in this thread demonstrates why first-past-the-post voting is so hard to replace. There is no consensus on which alternative system to replace it with.

dane-pgp 6y ago
On the contrary, it shows that so many people with differing views share a common goal of replacing FPTP. I'm sure all the people here opposing FPTP would eagerly accept any of the alternatives being proposed, if it had a credible chance of being implemented in their jurisdiction. The real barrier is that a change to the voting system would have to be approved by a party that is winning under the current system. Convincing a party to agree to any change is much harder than picking one of the many good options. Also, I hope you don't mind if I mention that your point is eerily analogous to a dictator saying "We can't introduce democracy, because then people would disagree on who the leader should be."
- Doxin 6y ago
  So what's the solution here? Pick a system at random? Hold a vote? Neither seems quite satisfactory.
  - dane-pgp 6y ago
    In practice, the decision-makers within a major party would look at which option would benefit them more than the other major party, and then a commitment to introduce that system would be added to their party platform, with it being implemented the next time they win an election. For example, if the Democrats were afraid that the Green party would split their vote, they might support RCV. Therefore, arguably, the best strategy for bringing about voting reform might be to vote for the Green party, even if you don't support any other Green party policies, or any Democrat policies.
MilesTeg 6y ago
Amusingly this can be interpreted as that the vote for which voting system to use uses first-past-the-post so first-past-the-post wins.