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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normalization_of_deviance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normalization_of_deviance "Normalization of deviance is a term used by th

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normalization_of_deviance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normalization_of_deviance "Normalization of deviance is a term used by the American sociologist Diane Vaughan to describe the process in which deviance from the right as in the correct or proper behavior becomes normalized in a corporate culture. Vaughan defines this as a process where a clearly unsafe practice comes to be considered normal if it does not immediately cause a catastrophe: "a long incubation period [before a final disaster] with early warning signs that were either misinterpreted, ignored or missed completely". The original example cited by Vaughn was the events leading to the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, but the concept has also been applied to clinical practice in medicine and aviation safety."

liability 6y ago
Is this sort of process similar to what occurred in Europe during the decline of the Roman Empire when aqueducts and similar public infrastructure fell into disrepair? Did the people who witnessed that occurring notice the intergenerational trend, or did they think everything was business as normal? Is there any hope for reversing this decline in infrastructure if everybody close to the matter considers it normal?
- inamberclad 6y ago
  I'm not sure the term has ever been extended to multi-generational problems, though it very well could be. The traditional, aerospace human factors explanation occurs over timescales from weeks to years. It normally starts with something incorrect (the deviation) that doesn't cause an immediate problem. Examples would be O-ring burnthrough on Space Transportation System Solid Rocket Booster segments, or maybe a pilot who is always a few knots too fast over the threshold on his approaches. Both are problems - everyone knows it - but since it hasn't cause a problem yet its allowed to slide until it just becomes common practice. The key point here is that the system (machine, human, organization) has acquired a deviation that means it no longer operates like it was designed and is not fixed because everyone becomes accustomed to the deviation. This degraded state is now the new normal. One day the weather is too cold, and another assumption about how the system operates is violated. The O-rings don't seat properly when the boosters are fired. The runway has ice on it. Hot gasses escape through the booster joint and impinge on the LH2 tank, and the aircraft finds its braking authority is insufficient, and a runway overrun occurs.
- the_pwner224 6y ago
  The Overton Window is somewhat similar to this. Especially applicable to the erosion of privacy & software ownership over time. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window
andi999 6y ago
I think this normalisation also applies to the other factors of this disaster. I dont think it is enough to focus on the immediate cause of the fire (it could have started through other causes, if the tower werent faulty), but how can people build so close to a forest which is mantained in a way which allows for such big fires?
- rsync 6y ago
  This is a very good point. I love to malign PG&E, an organization that I despise, but these forests are loaded guns waiting to go off. If we had zero PG&E towers, they would still catch fire and explosively burn, given the levels of built up fuel. My source for this is very current and immediate: my volunteer fire department in Marin County just did a post-op debrief, last night, on the (relatively small, 5000 acre) Point Reyes National Seashore fire (the "Woodward" fire) and the photos and descriptions we were shown were very clearly indicative of dense, overgrown, heavy fuel loads.
  - deleted 6y ago
    [deleted]
joe_the_user 6y ago
The thing is, the concept seems to imply a decaying awareness of what's necessary. I don't think the concept is applicable here - PG&E, the utility, had reports describing the level of repairs their lines needed and chose to instead not to perform those repairs and return money to their stockholders - so there's a consciousness here.

liability 6y ago

Is this sort of process similar to what occurred in Europe during the decline of the Roman Empire when aqueducts and similar public infrastructure fell into disrepair? Did the people who witnessed that occurring notice the intergenerational trend, or did they think everything was business as normal? Is there any hope for reversing this decline in infrastructure if everybody close to the matter considers it normal?

inamberclad 6y ago
I'm not sure the term has ever been extended to multi-generational problems, though it very well could be. The traditional, aerospace human factors explanation occurs over timescales from weeks to years. It normally starts with something incorrect (the deviation) that doesn't cause an immediate problem. Examples would be O-ring burnthrough on Space Transportation System Solid Rocket Booster segments, or maybe a pilot who is always a few knots too fast over the threshold on his approaches. Both are problems - everyone knows it - but since it hasn't cause a problem yet its allowed to slide until it just becomes common practice. The key point here is that the system (machine, human, organization) has acquired a deviation that means it no longer operates like it was designed and is not fixed because everyone becomes accustomed to the deviation. This degraded state is now the new normal. One day the weather is too cold, and another assumption about how the system operates is violated. The O-rings don't seat properly when the boosters are fired. The runway has ice on it. Hot gasses escape through the booster joint and impinge on the LH2 tank, and the aircraft finds its braking authority is insufficient, and a runway overrun occurs.
the_pwner224 6y ago
The Overton Window is somewhat similar to this. Especially applicable to the erosion of privacy & software ownership over time. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window

andi999 6y ago

I think this normalisation also applies to the other factors of this disaster. I dont think it is enough to focus on the immediate cause of the fire (it could have started through other causes, if the tower werent faulty), but how can people build so close to a forest which is mantained in a way which allows for such big fires?

rsync 6y ago
This is a very good point. I love to malign PG&E, an organization that I despise, but these forests are loaded guns waiting to go off. If we had zero PG&E towers, they would still catch fire and explosively burn, given the levels of built up fuel. My source for this is very current and immediate: my volunteer fire department in Marin County just did a post-op debrief, last night, on the (relatively small, 5000 acre) Point Reyes National Seashore fire (the "Woodward" fire) and the photos and descriptions we were shown were very clearly indicative of dense, overgrown, heavy fuel loads.
- deleted 6y ago
  [deleted]

joe_the_user 6y ago

The thing is, the concept seems to imply a decaying awareness of what's necessary. I don't think the concept is applicable here - PG&E, the utility, had reports describing the level of repairs their lines needed and chose to instead not to perform those repairs and return money to their stockholders - so there's a consciousness here.