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The reason why the Intelligence Community freaked out is because this is exactly the kind of small-scale test they'd do to test a possible attack pattern. https
by areoform 6y ago
The reason why the Intelligence Community freaked out is because this is exactly the kind of small-scale test they'd do to test a possible attack pattern. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/27/military-style-raid-on-california-power-station-spooks-u-s/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/27/military-style-raid-on-...
The people spooked here are spooks. And that should be telling for those of us on the outside. It's an attack scenario no one had planned for.
I would highly recommend this article by Michael Lewis (and his book) that explores related systemic risk, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/07/department-of-energy-risks-michael-lewis https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/07/department-of-energy...
> The safety of the electrical grid sat at or near the top of the list of concerns of everyone I spoke with inside the D.O.E. Life in America has become, increasingly, reliant on it. “Food and water has become food and water and electricity,” as one D.O.E. career staffer put it. Back in 2013 there had been an incident in California that got everyone’s attention. Late one night, just southeast of San Jose, at Pacific Gas and Electric’s Metcalf substation, a well-informed sniper, using a .30-caliber rifle, had taken out 17 transformers. Someone had also cut the cables that enabled communication to and from the substation. “They knew exactly what lines to cut,” said Tarak Shah, who studied the incident for the D.O.E. “They knew exactly where to shoot. They knew exactly which manhole covers were relevant—where the communication lines were. These were feeder stations to Apple and Google.” There had been enough backup power in the area that no one noticed the outage, and the incident came and went quickly from the news. But, Shah said, “for us it was a wake-up call.” In 2016 the D.O.E. counted half a million cyber-intrusions into various parts of the U.S. electrical grid. “It’s one thing to put your head in the sand for climate change—it’s like mañana,” says Ali Zaidi, who served in the White House as Obama’s senior adviser on energy policy. “This is here and now. We actually don’t have a transformer reserve. They’re like these million-dollar things. Seventeen transformers getting shot up in California is not like, Oh, we’ll just fix the problem. Our electric-grid assets are growingly vulnerable.”
> In his briefings on the electrical grid MacWilliams made a specific point and a more general one. The specific point was that we don’t actually have a national grid. Our electricity is supplied by a patchwork of not terribly innovative or imaginatively managed regional utilities. The federal government offers the only hope of a coordinated, intelligent response to threats to the system: there is no private-sector mechanism. To that end the D.O.E. had begun to gather the executives of the utility companies, to educate them about the threats they face. “They all sort of said, ‘But is this really real?’ ” said MacWilliams. “You get them security clearance for a day and tell them about the attacks and all of a sudden you see their eyes go really wide.”
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Personal Interpretation: Someone hired highly trained mercenaries (?) to operate on US soil to test destroying critical infrastructure that led directly to Apple + Google. Large, stationary, expensive infrastructure that is lacking in redundancy.
They knew exactly what targets to hit. It follows that they knew that there was backup capacity in the system. This was a test run. And bullets are cheap.
What if instead of one team for one location, it had been three teams for three locations? Or, four? Five? Six? Could they have successfully crippled the nation? And plunged the stock market?
- thinkling 6y ago> They knew exactly what targets to hit. It follows that they knew that there was backup capacity in the system. This was a test run. And bullets are cheap. Sounds like perhaps this was a white hat actor intending to push others to get serious about these risks?
- baybal2 6y agoKind of useless act it was then. Fences, and cameras would not stop a well armed sabotage team.
- mhh__ 6y agoEntirely possible. It's sometimes useful to remember that even in today's "open" world (The fall of the Soviet Union made it a lot less like active warfare even in the spooks still roam free) there will still be huge amounts of material known only to those on the inside. In the 70s there was an unannounced (to the PM) "terrorism drill" on Heathrow Airport, that some have alleged was a practice run for a potential coup against Wilson (I don't think that holds much weight, but it's not impossible)
- nullc 6y agoSounds like a great promotion for someone selling substation security.
- bonchicbongenre 6y agoThe answer: yes, they could've. I had a professor who previously had been part of a US gov group that had been tasked with preparing for an attack on the electrical grid, all the way back in the tail end of the cold war. His impression of the security of the US grid was that it was completely unsecured. He told me that they had no chance of solving the problem then, and that he expects the same is still the case. His worst fear is a large EMP attack, not locally cutting powerlines, but the danger still stands
- g_p 6y agoPutting aside EMP attacks (a real risk, but harder to mitigate against), the big issue right now on a day to day level is that energy suppliers are under pressure from regulators to reduce prices to consumers (in most countries which run regulated private sector energy distribution). This means redundancy is written down by MBAs as excess capacity. It means assets are stretched to far nearer their safe limits than was ever envisaged previously. This ironically reduces their safe working life (in many cases), but this problem is cast along the road - in markets where providers re-tender regularly to continue to operate, that means it's a problem for the next franchise holder. The incentives just aren't there to encourage creation of new redundancy. Existing redundancy won't be removed (as that would cost more!), but the long term outcome of this kind of "regulated private provider" system seems to be systemic under-investment in capital assets, with a view to deferring the problem until another time. Another big challenge is that often the regulators for energy companies are "market" regulators, and therefore staffed by expert economists, rather than expert engineers. This further perpetuates the myth you can maintain and run critical national infrastructure with an economics degree and a calculator, and means the regulator tends to focus solely on economics, while assuming any issues with technology are fixed through economic incentives. Often they aren't, as the cost of a systemic black swan event is multiplied out by its likelihood, and the end result is to take no action while enjoying the profits today. At least the above is based on my experience in trying to get energy market regulators to understand security and the issues of their regulator approach.