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The paper is 2y old - which is a bit of time in blockchain space - and yet, no one has performed this attack successfully in the wild. So, either everyone is ju
by iSnow 6y ago
The paper is 2y old - which is a bit of time in blockchain space - and yet, no one has performed this attack successfully in the wild. So, either everyone is just loving Bitcoin and wouldn't harm it for profit, or it's not so easy (hint: you cannot short Bitcoin for hundreds of millions, it's not liquid enough).
Also, this is strictly about PoW, the ETH roadmap (and this is where we are coming from in this submission) is moving to PoS where attacks are potentially way more expensive.
- schoen 6y ago> you cannot short Bitcoin for hundreds of millions, it's not liquid enough That seems like a great explanation, but the paper's argument is definitely not that cryptocurrencies can't exist or can't work, just that they have a limited range of levels of adoption where the incentives will continue to point in the right direction. In the paper's model it seems that Bitcoin has just not reached that level, right? If you could double-spend or short enough value in it, the incentives would reverse. > PoS where attacks are potentially way more expensive I don't think Eric Budish agrees that PoS verification is categorically immune to this. The very last sentence of the paper mentions that it "will be interesting to watch [PoS] research develop, and see whether or not it constitutes a valid response to the critique in this paper".
- e12e 6y agoJust a thought - is negative proof of stake a thing? Could you incentivice everyone else to sabotage the system by "shorting" it?