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I think most of the PKI trust issue, at least with regard to financial transactions, could be solved with government involvement. Governments could sign, or iss

I think most of the PKI trust issue, at least with regard to financial transactions, could be solved with government involvement. Governments could sign, or issue, PKI keys when they issue identity documents and business licenses. There's much less room for impersonation fraud if the keys used by businesses and people to identify themselves electronically are tied to their foundational identity documents. Obviously, using government-controlled PKI for communications would be unwise, but there's very little risk to using government PKI for financial transactions as governments already have warrantless access to this data.

AmericanChopper 6y ago
I think a government controlled PKI authority, especially one that required real identity authentication, would possibly be the solution that would make the least number of people happy.
- dnautics 6y ago
  without even broaching conspiracy theories or secret organizations it's not like government has a stellar track record of dealing with data it promises will be kept secret and single-purpose (for example SSNs).
  - nradov 6y ago
    The government never promised to keep SSNs secret.
  - GoblinSlayer 6y ago
    Well, in PKI a CA doesn't keep much secret data. SSN is a symmetric shared secret, not PKI.
- bleepblorp 6y ago
  Why? Even if you don't have to show government ID for every financial transaction, you need to show government ID (and, often, a lot more government paperwork) to open a financial account that can be used to make transactions. Your ability to move money is entirely predicated on the banks knowing who you are by linking your accounts to a tombstone government identity document. Using PKI controlled by government to authenticate identity for transactions doesn't give government any more control over your affairs than it already has. All it does is add one more layer of authentication to the transaction process by allowing all parties involved to verify that their counterparty is the legal entity they claim to be.
  - GoblinSlayer 6y ago
    I'm afraid if the government ID becomes ubiquitous, there's a danger of abuse that all systems will require it for everything and I doubt government will certify pseudonymous IDs. I'd say have banks as independent CAs, one or several keys per bank.
nradov 6y ago
There would be huge room for impersonation fraud even with a government run PKI. Hackers would steal private keys from individuals and businesses using the same malware and phishing attacks that they use today for stealing credit card numbers.
- tialaramex 6y ago
  The important difference is that credit card details are a shared "secret". You can't use your credit card number and CVV with Amazon without giving those numbers to Amazon, which is the exact same thing a crook would try to trick you into doing. Whereas the whole point of a public key system is that nobody needs your private key. So we don't need to provide individuals and businesses with a way to give their private key to somebody else. The only reason you'd give your private key to somebody else is because you want them to seamlessly impersonate you forever, so there's no need to make it any easier than, for example, giving your kidney to somebody else. Concrete example: A WebAuthn/ U2F "Security Key" offers no way to get the Private Keys out. If you want to "steal" the credentials used to get into my GitHub your best bet is to somehow trick me into physically packaging up the USB authenticator itself and sending that to you by FedEx or something. Or maybe you could try putting a knife to my throat or something?
pteraspidomorph 6y ago
That system is already in place in several european countries. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_identity_cards_in_the_European_Economic_Area#Electronic_identity_cards https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_identity_cards_in_the...
- corty 6y ago
  With lots of BS like EIDAS remote "signatures". I wouldn't necessarily trust this for anything important.
  - tW4r 6y ago
    What are the downsides of EIDAS? They’re widely accepted and used in my home country and I personally have a great experience, although I wish there was a way I could generate my own private key and or at least acquire it so I could script my own solutions rather than depending on third party providers
    - corty 6y ago
      Most of EIDAS is quite fine, but there are really stupid ideas in there. Remote signatures are signatures where the key user is not the key owner. The key is located with some service provider who signs with the user's key on request. The security of this is as useless as it sounds, but for many situations here in Germany it is the only option because there are no officially accredited providers for signature card certificates anymore. Therefore it is all the bother of digital signatures with the insecurity of analogue signature stamps...
      - tW4r 6y ago
        Oh yes that is exactly what I meant by not having access to the keys, I use one of such services myself. I do however consider them a bit more secure than signature stamps as should the provider become compromised, their upstream certificate would be revoked, to my understanding this would invalidate all of the signatures. The same as any CA

AmericanChopper 6y ago

I think a government controlled PKI authority, especially one that required real identity authentication, would possibly be the solution that would make the least number of people happy.

dnautics 6y ago
without even broaching conspiracy theories or secret organizations it's not like government has a stellar track record of dealing with data it promises will be kept secret and single-purpose (for example SSNs).
- nradov 6y ago
  The government never promised to keep SSNs secret.
- GoblinSlayer 6y ago
  Well, in PKI a CA doesn't keep much secret data. SSN is a symmetric shared secret, not PKI.
bleepblorp 6y ago
Why? Even if you don't have to show government ID for every financial transaction, you need to show government ID (and, often, a lot more government paperwork) to open a financial account that can be used to make transactions. Your ability to move money is entirely predicated on the banks knowing who you are by linking your accounts to a tombstone government identity document. Using PKI controlled by government to authenticate identity for transactions doesn't give government any more control over your affairs than it already has. All it does is add one more layer of authentication to the transaction process by allowing all parties involved to verify that their counterparty is the legal entity they claim to be.
- GoblinSlayer 6y ago
  I'm afraid if the government ID becomes ubiquitous, there's a danger of abuse that all systems will require it for everything and I doubt government will certify pseudonymous IDs. I'd say have banks as independent CAs, one or several keys per bank.

nradov 6y ago

There would be huge room for impersonation fraud even with a government run PKI. Hackers would steal private keys from individuals and businesses using the same malware and phishing attacks that they use today for stealing credit card numbers.

tialaramex 6y ago
The important difference is that credit card details are a shared "secret". You can't use your credit card number and CVV with Amazon without giving those numbers to Amazon, which is the exact same thing a crook would try to trick you into doing. Whereas the whole point of a public key system is that nobody needs your private key. So we don't need to provide individuals and businesses with a way to give their private key to somebody else. The only reason you'd give your private key to somebody else is because you want them to seamlessly impersonate you forever, so there's no need to make it any easier than, for example, giving your kidney to somebody else. Concrete example: A WebAuthn/ U2F "Security Key" offers no way to get the Private Keys out. If you want to "steal" the credentials used to get into my GitHub your best bet is to somehow trick me into physically packaging up the USB authenticator itself and sending that to you by FedEx or something. Or maybe you could try putting a knife to my throat or something?

pteraspidomorph 6y ago

That system is already in place in several european countries. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_identity_cards_in_the_European_Economic_Area#Electronic_identity_cards https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_identity_cards_in_the...

corty 6y ago
With lots of BS like EIDAS remote "signatures". I wouldn't necessarily trust this for anything important.
- tW4r 6y ago
  What are the downsides of EIDAS? They’re widely accepted and used in my home country and I personally have a great experience, although I wish there was a way I could generate my own private key and or at least acquire it so I could script my own solutions rather than depending on third party providers
  - corty 6y ago
    Most of EIDAS is quite fine, but there are really stupid ideas in there. Remote signatures are signatures where the key user is not the key owner. The key is located with some service provider who signs with the user's key on request. The security of this is as useless as it sounds, but for many situations here in Germany it is the only option because there are no officially accredited providers for signature card certificates anymore. Therefore it is all the bother of digital signatures with the insecurity of analogue signature stamps...
    - tW4r 6y ago
      Oh yes that is exactly what I meant by not having access to the keys, I use one of such services myself. I do however consider them a bit more secure than signature stamps as should the provider become compromised, their upstream certificate would be revoked, to my understanding this would invalidate all of the signatures. The same as any CA