3 ms·

I was describing alternative ways to get water rather than draining the aquifer, as well as long term effects of flooding the market with opium. I do not think

by hosh 6y ago

I was describing alternative ways to get water rather than draining the aquifer, as well as long term effects of flooding the market with opium. I do not think the Nash equilibrium describes that.

samatman 6y ago
Unfortunately, it does. A farmer can convert now, and pay the extra price of doing so, while missing out on the easier aquifer water. Or, they can do what everyone else does: pump now, then convert when their hand is forced. Absent some group collaboration, this bad deal is the correct choice: anything else would be worse for an individual farmer. That's a Nash equilibrium. Not addressing the short vs long term thinking about opium, since it's unrelated, but I don't think your analysis is correct; the Pashtuns have been growing this crop for literally thousands of years.
- hosh 6y ago
  That is a lot to think about. I did not know what a Nash equilibrium is. I don’t have an immediate answer to this. I only have some vague notions that the alternatives I am thinking of does not cost as much as it is perceived, and conversion strategies may not require a large investment with an immediate opportunity cost. In other words, not all viable strategies are known by the actors. I tried looking up information on the Pashtuns and pre-modern cultivation of opium. So far, I have only found articles and papers talking about significant cultivation since the 1950s. I have found articles describing this as a fairly complex issue. I am interested in understanding the traditional farming practices of the Pashtuns, and how and why it changed. Is there anything written about that you know off the top of your head?
  - raincom 6y ago
    You don't need to worry about the Nash equilibrium. What happens in many cases is that short-term rationality trumps the long-term rationality. When neighbors are making more money; when neighbors are sending their kids to good schools; when neighbors are doing better; it is irrational of one to harvest rain water to recharge groundwater.
    - hosh 6y ago
      Thank you for your view. I am trying to practice keeping an open mind, or at least, think through things from different perspectives. It also helps me to communicate better. I think another point that the Nash equilibrium brings up is that all actors are non-cooperative. I thought I was making a point that self-interest would make rainwater harvesting rational. I think rainwater harvesting is rational, having seen good designs, and what it can do. It may even cost less than the solar panels, pump, digging out a reservoir, and the drilling... but I don’t think I know the exact numbers to make that kind of comparison. There is also an assumption that you choose between one or the other, rather than a succession, where one method is employed in the small scale and gradually replaces the other. Another issue is whether it would scale. I had not even brought up how specific soil amendments and practices can greatly increase the water retention ability of the water —- which is also a part of rainwater harvesting. I don’t know how well rainwater harvesting scale to industrial agriculture. I _think_ it can be scalable. Looking at the harvesting practices, you are scarring the head and collecting the sap. So it probably does not require planting in a way to optimize for using a combine to harvest. Finally, I also recall the farmer’s mindset. I was watching this show about American farmers. One thing they say a lot is how they make gambles. Sometimes it pays off and sometimes it does not. (Which I can say a lot about with regenerative agriculture that is also resilient against a single point of failure). So introducing new practices is risky for the farmer, and they would probably rather build on what they know works. As such, they would narrow their perceived viable choices, and it gets to the conditions for the Nash equilibrium.
      - raincom 6y ago
        Yes, it is non-cooperative. Cooperation works when there is cooperation in every other area, not just rainwater harvesting. Will the neighbor's child, who has become a multi-millionaire, help another neighbor, whose kids are not as fortunate as that kid? I ask this question, not to bring in some silly contrast. There is a deeper issue, since Arrow's impossibility theorem is shown to be equivalent to a special case of the Nash Equilibrium. As a consequence, Arrovian dictator (in social choice framework) is equivalent to shared compromise in Nash cooperative game. Unless there is a dictator to force cooperation, it is just a talk. In an extreme, where everyone is poor and struggling for drinking water, you can see some cooperation. As long as the gravy train runs, one just milks it.

by hosh 6y ago

I was describing alternative ways to get water rather than draining the aquifer, as well as long term effects of flooding the market with opium. I do not think the Nash equilibrium describes that.

samatman 6y ago

Unfortunately, it does. A farmer can convert now, and pay the extra price of doing so, while missing out on the easier aquifer water. Or, they can do what everyone else does: pump now, then convert when their hand is forced. Absent some group collaboration, this bad deal is the correct choice: anything else would be worse for an individual farmer. That's a Nash equilibrium. Not addressing the short vs long term thinking about opium, since it's unrelated, but I don't think your analysis is correct; the Pashtuns have been growing this crop for literally thousands of years.

hosh 6y ago
That is a lot to think about. I did not know what a Nash equilibrium is. I don’t have an immediate answer to this. I only have some vague notions that the alternatives I am thinking of does not cost as much as it is perceived, and conversion strategies may not require a large investment with an immediate opportunity cost. In other words, not all viable strategies are known by the actors. I tried looking up information on the Pashtuns and pre-modern cultivation of opium. So far, I have only found articles and papers talking about significant cultivation since the 1950s. I have found articles describing this as a fairly complex issue. I am interested in understanding the traditional farming practices of the Pashtuns, and how and why it changed. Is there anything written about that you know off the top of your head?
- raincom 6y ago
  You don't need to worry about the Nash equilibrium. What happens in many cases is that short-term rationality trumps the long-term rationality. When neighbors are making more money; when neighbors are sending their kids to good schools; when neighbors are doing better; it is irrational of one to harvest rain water to recharge groundwater.
  - hosh 6y ago
    Thank you for your view. I am trying to practice keeping an open mind, or at least, think through things from different perspectives. It also helps me to communicate better. I think another point that the Nash equilibrium brings up is that all actors are non-cooperative. I thought I was making a point that self-interest would make rainwater harvesting rational. I think rainwater harvesting is rational, having seen good designs, and what it can do. It may even cost less than the solar panels, pump, digging out a reservoir, and the drilling... but I don’t think I know the exact numbers to make that kind of comparison. There is also an assumption that you choose between one or the other, rather than a succession, where one method is employed in the small scale and gradually replaces the other. Another issue is whether it would scale. I had not even brought up how specific soil amendments and practices can greatly increase the water retention ability of the water —- which is also a part of rainwater harvesting. I don’t know how well rainwater harvesting scale to industrial agriculture. I _think_ it can be scalable. Looking at the harvesting practices, you are scarring the head and collecting the sap. So it probably does not require planting in a way to optimize for using a combine to harvest. Finally, I also recall the farmer’s mindset. I was watching this show about American farmers. One thing they say a lot is how they make gambles. Sometimes it pays off and sometimes it does not. (Which I can say a lot about with regenerative agriculture that is also resilient against a single point of failure). So introducing new practices is risky for the farmer, and they would probably rather build on what they know works. As such, they would narrow their perceived viable choices, and it gets to the conditions for the Nash equilibrium.
    - raincom 6y ago
      Yes, it is non-cooperative. Cooperation works when there is cooperation in every other area, not just rainwater harvesting. Will the neighbor's child, who has become a multi-millionaire, help another neighbor, whose kids are not as fortunate as that kid? I ask this question, not to bring in some silly contrast. There is a deeper issue, since Arrow's impossibility theorem is shown to be equivalent to a special case of the Nash Equilibrium. As a consequence, Arrovian dictator (in social choice framework) is equivalent to shared compromise in Nash cooperative game. Unless there is a dictator to force cooperation, it is just a talk. In an extreme, where everyone is poor and struggling for drinking water, you can see some cooperation. As long as the gravy train runs, one just milks it.