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> Today, you can take that tiny webserver and put it in a VM, and voila, now it doesn't matter if anyone breaks in This is a dangerous viewpoint to hold. Cont
by jedberg 6y ago
> Today, you can take that tiny webserver and put it in a VM, and voila, now it doesn't matter if anyone breaks in
This is a dangerous viewpoint to hold. Containers do offer some slightly better security, but they are not a silver bullet or anything close. There are still lots of ways to cause problems whether the software is in a container or not.
- amarshall 6y ago>> a VM > Containers These are not the same thing, and have different security guarantees.
- falcolas 6y agoShort of CVEs, which are fixed after identification, can you point out other ways to "cause problems" with a tiny webserver serving static content in a container?
- jedberg 6y agoWell, there have been many container breakout CVEs, and I'm sure there will be more: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=container https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=container But let me ask the question another way. What security do you gain by being in a container instead of on a server without a container?
- cytzol 6y ago> What security do you gain by being in a container instead of on a server without a container? I'm not a container guru, but... this is obvious, right? You have to break out the container, which is an extra layer. In order to get root on the server, you need: • Without container: application vulnerability (to gain access to the OS) + kernel vulnerability (to gain access to root) • With container: application vulnerability (to gain access to the container) + container breakout vulnerability (to gain access to the OS) + kernel vulnerability (to gain access to root) You make it sound like I'm missing something — what am I missing here? Edit: are you talking about CVEs like this one (https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-3215 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-3215)? I guess I'm assuming that a container vulnerability will give an attacker less to play with than a kernel vulnerability.
- xorcist 6y agoAre you talking about VMs or containers? If you have an application RCE and a kernel vulnerability, what difference would a running container daemon make?
- inopinatus 6y agoContainers share a platform. They increase attack surface by supplying a vector to any neighbour, by being something that can be attacked at all, and by requiring another control plane that requires credentials, making it a social engineering opportunity as well as being another component that itself can be vulnerable. They are not an additional shell of defence, they do not reduce your blast radius.
- cytzol 6y ago> They increase attack surface by supplying a vector to any neighbour Could you explain what you mean by this? I'm still not getting it. Here's the example I have in mind: I have one application listening on a TCP port, and another one listening on a different port. I don't want the first application to talk to the second application. If they're just two processes on the same machine, they can both see each other, and an attacker who manages to exploit an RCE vulnerability gets access to the port "for free"; if they're both in containers, then they can only see the ports I specify, and it's really easy for me to specify them. This literally does seem like an additional shell of defence to me! What sort of attack would it make worse?