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The GNU Name System IETF Draft
- eqvinox 6y agoWhy would this be an IETF document when the GNUnet protocol itself isn't? "This document does not specifiy the properties of the underlying distributed hash table (DHT) which is required by any GNS implementation." Okay... so...
- jaekash 6y ago> Why would this be an IETF document when the GNUnet protocol itself isn't? Nothing in the spec suggests it must run on GNUnet. This is almost like asking why should IETF standardize JSON-schema when gRPC is not standardized. One thing does not require the other or depend on the other. > "This document does not specifiy the properties of the underlying distributed hash table (DHT) which is required by any GNS implementation." Well they do specify the interfaces, why should they care about the impliementation? > GNS resource records are published in a distributed hash table (DHT). We assume that a DHT provides two functions: GET(key) and PUT(key,value). > Okay... so... So what?
- espadrine 6y ago>> "This document does not specifiy the properties of the underlying distributed hash table (DHT) which is required by any GNS implementation." > Well they do specify the interfaces, why should they care about the impliementation? The choice of DHT typically has protocolar implications, such as the use of XOR metric in Kademlia, or the bootstrap algorithm. All nodes must use the same DHT. As a result, this cannot be implemented without knowing the particular DHT in use. Furthermore, different DHTs have distinct properties, including provisions for fault tolerance, resource recovery, latency bounds, and byzantine tolerance, which here seems like a concern.
- some-username 6y agoYes, sure. But that's fine - everyone who wants to have their GNS can design their own DHT. It's still outside of the spec. (Which makes a lot of sense to me.)
- jaekash 6y ago> The choice of DHT typically has protocolar implications, such as the use of XOR metric in Kademlia, or the bootstrap algorithm. > Furthermore, different DHTs have distinct properties, including provisions for fault tolerance, resource recovery, latency bounds, and byzantine tolerance, which here seems like a concern. What in the RFC is dependent or contingent on those? from what I read in it none of those properties affect what is specified in the draft. > All nodes must use the same DHT. As a result, this cannot be implemented without knowing the particular DHT in use. Not according to the draft. Sure, if a zone uses a specific DHT and then other nodes not using the same DHT they won't be able to resolve addresses from that zones, but everything in this draft would still be valid.
- eqvinox 6y ago> So what? So, it's currently a disconnected lego brick hanging in the air. It serves no purpose until other documents accompany it that specify how to use it either for GNUnet, for IP, or something else. If there is more than one application document coming, at least one should (IMHO) be submitted at the same time¹ in order to aid review and understanding. If only one such application is expected, they should probably be merged into the same document. Particularly, if it's to be applied for non-GNUnet (e.g. IP), it does need to say what underlying DHT is to be used. Otherwise it's not actually a naming system but 10 naming systems – which is, er, rather useless. ¹: it doesn't need to progress or be finalized at the same time, but the document should at least be published.
- antsoul 6y ago"lego brick" ? No, it's actually the most important pillars of the digital future (GNS, reclaim:id, Taler, Secushare... all based on gnunet)
- schanzen 6y agoThis is not true. Please study, for example, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6537 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6537.
- eqvinox 6y agoRFC6537 specifies an "upwards" (application direction) interface to HIP (RFC5201). Through that it is fully wired into IPsec / Mobile IP use. The GNS draft makes references to DNS but doesn't actually say how it would be used in that relationship. RFC6537 references OpenDHT as a "downwards" (wire direction) interface and points to XML-RPC calls and expected behavior on that. The GNS draft simply presumes the existence of a "DHT". Maybe you could tell me which part of my comment is not true? I don't see what your example is intended to illustrate... [Edited to add:] P.S.: please read the guidelines at https://www.ietf.org/standards/process/informational-vs-experimental/ https://www.ietf.org/standards/process/informational-vs-expe... (section 3.) GNS is very much something that can be "practiced" — or rather, it should be possible to practice. I don't think it can with your draft. I suppose that might be why you went for Informational rather than Experimental, but that kinda misses the point: you should be going for Experimental. To walk through the guideline bulletpoints: 1. GNS can be practiced. Or rather: should be. It's a protocol. 2. If you want to push it through the IETF, you should probably open it to changes. What's the point otherwise? The IETF is not a rubber-stamping organization. 3. I'm pretty sure you're not publishing this as "dropped, just for the record"? 4. "If the IETF may publish something based on this on the standards track once we know how well this one works, it's Experimental." I feel that's exactly your intent? 5. Doesn't seem to apply. Maybe it should too? All I'm saying is that your draft should be practice-able, but isn't, and I think it should be.
- mhandley 6y agoIt's not an IETF document - it's an independently submitted Internet draft that hasn't been adopted by any IETF working group at this stage. Anyone can write an internet draft. Getting concensus on it is the hard part.
- oefrha 6y ago> Anyone can write an internet draft. Getting concensus on it is the hard part. Not really. RFCs in the Informational category don't need consensus:[1] > An "Informational" specification is published for the general information of the Internet community, and does not represent an Internet community consensus or recommendation. The Informational designation is intended to provide for the timely publication of a very broad range of responsible informational documents from many sources, subject only to editorial considerations and to verification that there has been adequate coordination with the standards process (see section 4.2.3). Example: RFC 2448 AT&T's Error Resilient Video Transmission Technique.[2] This particular ID is informational rather than on the standards track. [1] https://www.ietf.org/standards/process/informational-vs-experimental/ https://www.ietf.org/standards/process/informational-vs-expe... [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2448 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2448
- sokoloff 6y agoNothing you wrote contradicts what GP wrote. (Your text, other than the first two words, also appears correct but doesn’t address GP’s argument.) GP claims getting consensus is hard. You argue that it’s not needed. Correct, but tangential.
- oefrha 6y agoGp clearly implies getting consensus would be the hard part for this ID to become an “IETF document”. You can strip all context and argue that every single statement is correct in isolation, but that’s not how communication works. This pointless bickering also adds zero new info, so I’ll stop here.
- eqvinox 6y ago
- als0 6y ago> GNS is based on the principle of a petname system and builds on ideas from the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI), addressing a central issue with the decentralized mapping of secure identifiers to memorable names: namely the impossibility of providing a global, secure and memorable mapping without a trusted authority. Great to see people learning from SDSI and SPKI, which have largely been forgotten despite their achievements.
- ryukafalz 6y agoAgreed. I've only recently been learning about capability and capability-like systems like SPKI, and there are lots of great ideas there that haven't gotten much attention since. It's refreshing to see them pop up in things like this!
- joosters 6y agoThe draft spec mentions DHT in several places long before it defines what exactly it is (in section 4) Perhaps the spec would be better if it added a table of definitions at the top, just like it has a table of names for the cryptographic primitives.
- jaekash 6y agoThe draft has it's issues, but the draft mentions ECDSA also without ever defining it and I'm sure I can find similar things in other accepted RFCs. I think there is some domain knowledge that can be reasonably assumed when writing documents.
- maverick74 6y agoFINALLY
- Ericson2314 6y agoThis is very much a draft, as it seems many important things (like the label plaintext) is missing from grammars / packet diagrams.
- upofadown 6y agoThey are baking the type of public key system (ECDSA) and a specific curve (Curve25519) right into the standard? So what happens if some sort of weakness is discovered in one of both of them? The internet falls apart? You need to define what is supposed to happen if your cryptography breaks.
- schanzen 6y agoSee 9.1. If ECDSA or Curve25519 are broken (e.g. because of quantum crypto), we can simply introduce a PKEY replacement (such as PKEY2) and migrate. EDIT: However, point well taken. This needs more space in the draft and is definitely a point to address.
- upofadown 6y agoOne perhaps obvious contingency is what to do if the key length has to get longer.
- goalieca 6y agoA weakness will not come in the form of "it's suddenly broken". It will be a slow decline of worsening performance. Even quantum computing will be moving forward with a gradual rate of growth in Qubits. At some point during this transition, it will break and they will have to transition. It will not be hard to create an new RFC for that task. It will be hard to replace all of the implementations in the field. We are getting better at this with our experiences in TLS but it is still somewhat painful. Crypto agility can be really nice but it can also be messy. Sometimes it's best to be opinionated and sometimes it's easier to just be flexible.
- brohee 6y agoLots of people don't like the crypto construction used at all https://soatok.blog/2020/07/08/gnu-a-heuristic-for-bad-cryptography/ https://soatok.blog/2020/07/08/gnu-a-heuristic-for-bad-crypt... The non AEAD symmetric cipher is IMHO completely unjustifiable in 2020.