4 ms·

Saying "many times stronger than RSA/AES" but not providing details on the algorithms is a huge red flag. If they have built some home-grown algorithm, then it

Saying "many times stronger than RSA/AES" but not providing details on the algorithms is a huge red flag. If they have built some home-grown algorithm, then it's possible the NCA actually cracked the encryption (with a bit of help from GCHQ) rather than using the baseband processor to snoop on the keys or something like that.

GekkePrutser 6y ago
It could also be implementation-based. A few years ago they rounded up a ring of crime phones in the Netherlands.. They were using PGP encryption, however instead of each phone generating its own private key, they generated them centrally and kept them in a database. Obviously this introduced a huge vulnerability. The police compromised the server and was listening in (through cooperation with Canadian police as they were using Blackberries) for quite a while before they started kicking doors down :D They basically got all the evidence on a silver platter. I'm surprised someone with the skill to develop such an app and service platform doesn't have the skill for avoiding such common mistakes. Or maybe they weren't able to explain to their users that the fact that they couldn't retrieve their messages after forgetting their pincode is a feature, not a bug. Either way, the police was really happy. https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-judge-releases-encrypted-blackberry-messages-from-20000-users-to-dutch-crime-probe/ https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-judge-releases... Not saying the same would have happened here, but crypto is hard to implement correctly and the algorithms are only part of the problem. And this kind of network is a massive target for law enforcement because the ratio of criminal users is huge.
- speleding 6y ago
  Actually, according to Dutch press (nrc.nl), it was the same detectives who performed that hack who were flown into France to do this hack as well. Good for them, but I hope for their sake their names do not leak.
- hackermailman 6y ago
  Another famous case was a crime lord who's blackberry pin was written on a sticky note so police got everything. https://www.chch.com/niagara-drug-kingpin-goes-trial-murder/ https://www.chch.com/niagara-drug-kingpin-goes-trial-murder/
- joe_the_user 6y ago
  I'm surprised someone with the skill to develop such an app and service platform doesn't have the skill for avoiding such common mistakes My impression is that the way things go is: * Sure, a smart person can implement a "homebrew" security protocol that seems safe. * But smarter people never implement a "homebrew" security protocol and instead use existing protocols, 'cause they know how easy it is to fuck-up. * The smartest people implement real, secure protocols, working in academic or three letter agencies and have those protocols vetted and peer reviewed. And even these fail on a regular basis.
  - kstrauser 6y ago
    So much this! My learning curve on crypto took me through a few self-evaluations: - Crypto isn't that hard! I can do this! - Crypto is a lot harder than I though. I shouldn't do this. - I've read about a lot of crypto! I can do this! - People way more experienced than me are making the tiniest mistakes that end up crashing the entire house of cards. I definitely shouldn't do this.
  - loup-vaillant 6y ago
    Implementing a protocol correctly is easy. Implementing the primitives is harder (and tons of work), but you can easily grab them from a low-level crypto library like Libsodium or Monocypher. Designing a protocol correctly is not that hard, as long as you understand exactly what you are doing. By which I mean you are at least able to write an informal (yet rigorous) proof that it has the security properties you seek. Also, verification tools like Verifpal are a godsend. The tricky part here is avoiding the Dunning-Kruger effect. It's easy to have the illusion of perfect understanding while being unable to write the most basic mathematical proof. The hardest part is convincing others that your protocol is any good. People who don't understand what you are doing cannot (perhaps even must not) trust your work. They need the vetting of someone reputable, and getting those reputable people to take a look is pretty hard if you don't have the right connections (an uphill struggle without a relevant PhD).
multjoy 6y ago
It was the French. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3aza95/how-police-took-over-encrochat-hacked https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3aza95/how-police-took-ov...
- ralfn 6y ago
  No the exploit was by the Dutch supporting the French because the actual physical servers were located in France, under their jurisdiction. Just like the previous time they did this we aren't getting a lot of information of how. But it seems physical access is part of the exploit.
noobermin 6y ago
Sure but the "crack" that occurred here was essentially MITM, so regardless of their encryption scheme they would have been caught.
- tialaramex 6y ago
  It isn't necessary for a central server to be able to intercept messages. In an end-to-end encrypted system any boxes in the middle can infer stuff from traffic but they can't read message contents.
  - noobermin 6y ago
    The article says: "Europol said that French police had discovered some of EncroChat's servers were located in the country, and that it was possible to put a 'technical device' in place to access the messages." Even if it was end-to-end, they at least could intercept the initial key exchange perhaps.
    - tialaramex 6y ago
      Intercepting a DH key exchange doesn't help you. The whole point of DH is that an eavesdropper doesn't learn the secret even though both of the other participants do. They probably just didn't use end-to-end because it's easier to offer a nice customer experience without.
kazinator 6y ago
Closed source is a huge red flag. Ideally, nobody should use any form of closed-source crypto any more.

GekkePrutser 6y ago

It could also be implementation-based. A few years ago they rounded up a ring of crime phones in the Netherlands.. They were using PGP encryption, however instead of each phone generating its own private key, they generated them centrally and kept them in a database. Obviously this introduced a huge vulnerability. The police compromised the server and was listening in (through cooperation with Canadian police as they were using Blackberries) for quite a while before they started kicking doors down :D They basically got all the evidence on a silver platter. I'm surprised someone with the skill to develop such an app and service platform doesn't have the skill for avoiding such common mistakes. Or maybe they weren't able to explain to their users that the fact that they couldn't retrieve their messages after forgetting their pincode is a feature, not a bug. Either way, the police was really happy. https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-judge-releases-encrypted-blackberry-messages-from-20000-users-to-dutch-crime-probe/ https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-judge-releases... Not saying the same would have happened here, but crypto is hard to implement correctly and the algorithms are only part of the problem. And this kind of network is a massive target for law enforcement because the ratio of criminal users is huge.

speleding 6y ago
Actually, according to Dutch press (nrc.nl), it was the same detectives who performed that hack who were flown into France to do this hack as well. Good for them, but I hope for their sake their names do not leak.
hackermailman 6y ago
Another famous case was a crime lord who's blackberry pin was written on a sticky note so police got everything. https://www.chch.com/niagara-drug-kingpin-goes-trial-murder/ https://www.chch.com/niagara-drug-kingpin-goes-trial-murder/
joe_the_user 6y ago
I'm surprised someone with the skill to develop such an app and service platform doesn't have the skill for avoiding such common mistakes My impression is that the way things go is: * Sure, a smart person can implement a "homebrew" security protocol that seems safe. * But smarter people never implement a "homebrew" security protocol and instead use existing protocols, 'cause they know how easy it is to fuck-up. * The smartest people implement real, secure protocols, working in academic or three letter agencies and have those protocols vetted and peer reviewed. And even these fail on a regular basis.
- kstrauser 6y ago
  So much this! My learning curve on crypto took me through a few self-evaluations: - Crypto isn't that hard! I can do this! - Crypto is a lot harder than I though. I shouldn't do this. - I've read about a lot of crypto! I can do this! - People way more experienced than me are making the tiniest mistakes that end up crashing the entire house of cards. I definitely shouldn't do this.
- loup-vaillant 6y ago
  Implementing a protocol correctly is easy. Implementing the primitives is harder (and tons of work), but you can easily grab them from a low-level crypto library like Libsodium or Monocypher. Designing a protocol correctly is not that hard, as long as you understand exactly what you are doing. By which I mean you are at least able to write an informal (yet rigorous) proof that it has the security properties you seek. Also, verification tools like Verifpal are a godsend. The tricky part here is avoiding the Dunning-Kruger effect. It's easy to have the illusion of perfect understanding while being unable to write the most basic mathematical proof. The hardest part is convincing others that your protocol is any good. People who don't understand what you are doing cannot (perhaps even must not) trust your work. They need the vetting of someone reputable, and getting those reputable people to take a look is pretty hard if you don't have the right connections (an uphill struggle without a relevant PhD).

multjoy 6y ago

It was the French. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3aza95/how-police-took-over-encrochat-hacked https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3aza95/how-police-took-ov...

ralfn 6y ago
No the exploit was by the Dutch supporting the French because the actual physical servers were located in France, under their jurisdiction. Just like the previous time they did this we aren't getting a lot of information of how. But it seems physical access is part of the exploit.

noobermin 6y ago

Sure but the "crack" that occurred here was essentially MITM, so regardless of their encryption scheme they would have been caught.

tialaramex 6y ago
It isn't necessary for a central server to be able to intercept messages. In an end-to-end encrypted system any boxes in the middle can infer stuff from traffic but they can't read message contents.
- noobermin 6y ago
  The article says: "Europol said that French police had discovered some of EncroChat's servers were located in the country, and that it was possible to put a 'technical device' in place to access the messages." Even if it was end-to-end, they at least could intercept the initial key exchange perhaps.
  - tialaramex 6y ago
    Intercepting a DH key exchange doesn't help you. The whole point of DH is that an eavesdropper doesn't learn the secret even though both of the other participants do. They probably just didn't use end-to-end because it's easier to offer a nice customer experience without.

kazinator 6y ago

Closed source is a huge red flag. Ideally, nobody should use any form of closed-source crypto any more.