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Claims of said encrochat: * Each message session with each contact is encrypted with a different set of keys. If any given key is ever compromised, it will nev

Claims of said encrochat: * Each message session with each contact is encrypted with a different set of keys. If any given key is ever compromised, it will never result in the compromise of previously transmitted messages – or even passive observation of future messages. * Anyone can forge messages after a conversation is complete to make them look like they came from you. However, during a conversation the recipient is assured all messages received are authentic and unmodified. This assures non-reputability of messages. * The algorithms employed are many times stronger than that of PGP (RSA+AES). We employ algorithms from different families of mathematics, which protects message content in the event that one encryption algorithm is ever solved. * Messages do not employ digital signatures that provide third party proofs. However, you are still assured you are messaging with whom you think you are. source: https://encrochat.us/ https://encrochat.us/

fredley 6y ago
> We employ algorithms from different families of mathematics Did they roll their own?
- 0xFluegel 6y ago
  Could also simply mean that they are chaining different encryption algos from libraries (à la TrueCrypt) which would indeed add to the security level or even at worst not harm it. (This assumes that each step is not broken...)
- alias_neo 6y ago
  It's unclear, but that statement alone makes me shudder. Anyone doing secure comms at this level, and is talking about families of mathematics always gives me the impression they don't really know what they're doing.
  - 0xFluegel 6y ago
    > Anyone doing secure comms at this level, and is talking about families of mathematics always gives me the impression they don't really know what they're doing. Why is that? Do you assume that making competent choices for encryption algorithms (for which you try to understand the math problems involved) and trying to market the systems security means that they also try to implement it themselves? Or is the "family of mathematics" a sign for incompetence that I just don't recognize?
    - red_admiral 6y ago
      As someone who's worked in the sector (the crypto sector, not the crime one): "Families of Mathematics" is a marketing statement, or "hot air" as I prefer to call it. The information content of that statement is zero, what it's doing is trying to project warm "you can trust us" feelings. A statement aimed at technical people would read more like "we use AES-256-OFB with Axolotl on Curve25519 and scrypt(2^14, 8, 1)" or something like that. To a crypto professional, I'd say any "trust us" statement that's not backed up by technical information actually lowers their trust in the system - it makes you wonder why they're not making their algorithm choice public.
      - 0xFluegel 6y ago
        Thanks for clarifying. You convinced me.
      - charwalker 6y ago
        The US created a fake bank to catch drug runners and cartel bosses. What's to say this isn't an state intelligence backed company created not to sell a product but to be sold to criminals then listened to until warrants were signed? I haven't looked into the service at all so could be totally off.
        pas 6y ago
        Wow. Do you happen to have more details about that fake bank honeypot?
        taylorfinley 6y ago
        There's an excellent episode of the npr podcast Planet Money that covers this story: https://www.npr.org/transcripts/694548245 https://www.npr.org/transcripts/694548245
        charwalker 6y ago
        That's where I heard it, yeah.
Faaak 6y ago
I have to agree that point 2 is very clever. "It was not me, your Honour, as anyone can send a message by my (old) name)
- Thorrez 6y ago
  It (deniable authentication) has been provided previously by OTR. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_authentication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_authentication TLS provides a weaker version (instead of everyone in the world being able to forge a message, just your peer is able to forge the message).
dkarp 6y ago
> Each message session with each contact is encrypted with a different set of keys" Is this not a bad thing? Since transferring key-pairs is the weakest link on these apps. To be really secure, wouldn't you want to do this as infrequently as possible and ideally outside in person outside the app?
- robmccoll 6y ago
  Sounds like they are trying to achieve perfect forward secrecy per message. Typically you might do this with Diffie-Hellman using ephemeral derivation pairs per session. This is good practice as if any one session key is broken, that has no effect on the privacy of past or future messages encrypted under different session keys. They seem to be claiming to use their own crypto based on the parent comment (red flag) and no signature scheme over the top of it to prove a consistent identity, so I'm not sure what they would be doing. Establishing encrypted pipes over an observable medium is very doable, but providing a way to trust that the party on the other end of the pipe is who you think it is is the hard part as you pointed out.
  - deleted 6y ago
    [deleted]
- red_admiral 6y ago
  It would be fine if they meant "forward-secure ratchet construction", like Signal does. You can rotate message/session keys easily enough if you have a shared long(er) term key.
- deleted 6y ago
  [deleted]
- alias_neo 6y ago
  Session keys are fine, and they're usually not the top level identity or key. So long as this is what they're doing, i.e. using an asymmetric KEx (e.g. Diffie-Hellman) to exchange public keys, from which a shared secret would be derived, and then from that a KDF would be used to generate a key using a salt, you can keep generating new keys for each session from that shared secret (shared in the sense that it's symmetric, not that you send it over the wire). You can still be more secure, but that's a decent start.
Thorrez 6y ago
>This assures non-reputability of messages. No, they're assuring reputability, not non-reputability.
- nickcox 6y ago
  Perhaps they were going for non-repudiation?
- oconnor663 6y ago
  I've never heard "reputability" used in crypto, but confusingly, it might be the opposite of "repudiability"?
- kibibu 6y ago
  I read it as saying you could deny writing any specific message as it could have been forged after the session ended. Non-reputability.
- alias_neo 6y ago
  I disagree, I believe, they're trying to say they provide "non-reputability" (the opposite to non-repudiation) so you can deny messages actually came from you because they could have been "forged". it's hard to tell though, the statements are a bit of a mess in general.
  - Thorrez 6y ago
    Hmm, you're right that non-reputability likely means something different than non-repudiation. The problem is I can't find anyone actually using non-reputability in that other meaning. What I do find is various places using non-reputability erroneously as a synonym for non-repudiation.[1][2][3] So in fact I now think that EncroChat actually made 2 errors: said non-reputability instead of non-repudiation, and also misunderstood non-repudiation as meaning repudiation. [1] https://books.google.com/books?id=qk_hDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT682&lpg=PT682&dq=%22reputability%22+crypto&source=bl&ots=rNy0g5x6sN&sig=ACfU3U39G8jU9-0zFxLIkP-nZoy5ysI6fA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiP35T8vK_qAhVFip4KHWI1BZcQ6AEwDnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22reputability%22%20crypto&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=qk_hDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT682&lpg=... [2] https://books.google.com/books?id=_d7RUNF-2tcC&pg=PR21&lpg=PR21&dq=%22reputability%22+crypto&source=bl&ots=eAOarG8b3D&sig=ACfU3U1vOALyOL63rwHll5jzZhdnu5kGUw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiP35T8vK_qAhVFip4KHWI1BZcQ6AEwDHoECA0QAQ#v=onepage&q=%22reputability%22%20crypto&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=_d7RUNF-2tcC&pg=PR21&lpg=P... [3] https://books.google.com/books?id=PHBTDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA61&lpg=PA61&dq=%22reputability%22+crypto&source=bl&ots=_5ow00ZlU9&sig=ACfU3U1otQu_phi4LZwzBq-sHu8vFTZDKQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiP35T8vK_qAhVFip4KHWI1BZcQ6AEwC3oECAsQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22reputability%22%20crypto&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=PHBTDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA61&lpg=P...
red_admiral 6y ago
Saying "many times stronger than RSA/AES" but not providing details on the algorithms is a huge red flag. If they have built some home-grown algorithm, then it's possible the NCA actually cracked the encryption (with a bit of help from GCHQ) rather than using the baseband processor to snoop on the keys or something like that.
- GekkePrutser 6y ago
  It could also be implementation-based. A few years ago they rounded up a ring of crime phones in the Netherlands.. They were using PGP encryption, however instead of each phone generating its own private key, they generated them centrally and kept them in a database. Obviously this introduced a huge vulnerability. The police compromised the server and was listening in (through cooperation with Canadian police as they were using Blackberries) for quite a while before they started kicking doors down :D They basically got all the evidence on a silver platter. I'm surprised someone with the skill to develop such an app and service platform doesn't have the skill for avoiding such common mistakes. Or maybe they weren't able to explain to their users that the fact that they couldn't retrieve their messages after forgetting their pincode is a feature, not a bug. Either way, the police was really happy. https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-judge-releases-encrypted-blackberry-messages-from-20000-users-to-dutch-crime-probe/ https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-judge-releases... Not saying the same would have happened here, but crypto is hard to implement correctly and the algorithms are only part of the problem. And this kind of network is a massive target for law enforcement because the ratio of criminal users is huge.
  - speleding 6y ago
    Actually, according to Dutch press (nrc.nl), it was the same detectives who performed that hack who were flown into France to do this hack as well. Good for them, but I hope for their sake their names do not leak.
  - hackermailman 6y ago
    Another famous case was a crime lord who's blackberry pin was written on a sticky note so police got everything. https://www.chch.com/niagara-drug-kingpin-goes-trial-murder/ https://www.chch.com/niagara-drug-kingpin-goes-trial-murder/
test7777 6y ago
algorithms don't matter for shit to the person that controls the (mandatory) updates. its the same issue with all modern e2e apps like whatsapp or signal, if there is a single client implementation its not secure at all to these kind of attacks.
- anonymousiam 6y ago
  Exactly! All it takes is a "demand letter" from any government with jurisdiction. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit
- traverseda 6y ago
  > signal [...] > if there is a single client implementation its not secure at all to these kind of attacks. There are (where?) actually multiple "distributions" of signal, like textSecure on f-droid. Last I checked it worked with signal, but that was a few years ago.
  - alexandrerond 6y ago
    No, Moxy killed the alternatives with really shitty arguments and banning from using Signal official servers.
upofadown 6y ago
>Anyone can forge messages after a conversation is complete to make them look like they came from you. "I didn't send those messages your honour. Someone forged them. I am a victim of a conspiracy!" "Do you have any evidence that this actually happened?" "No." "...moving right along..." It will be fun if someone from this actually tries a cryptogeek argument in real life...
- hcs 6y ago
  Ross Ulbricht tried essentially that defense.
  - SAI_Peregrinus 6y ago
    Exactly. The tricky part of plausible deniability is that it needs to actually be plausible. People very often screw this part up. EG they'll make a TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt hidden volume, but then won't modify the outer volume with the same access patterns to hide their usage of the hidden volume.
- woah 6y ago
  Doesn't this put the burden of proof on the accused?
  - upofadown 6y ago
    People have been claiming they have been framed since forever. If claiming you were framed with zero proof actually helped in any way then every one would do it and much time would be wasted. In the case of a crypto forgeablity argument there will never be any proof. It will always be a false claim. It is a silly idea.
    - kazinator 6y ago
      > People have been claiming they have been framed since forever. Yes they have, but they have been doing so in the face of circumstantial evidence: DNA, fingerprints, blood, whatever. Or eyewitness evidence: someone saw you go in the building at such and such time (perhaps there is a surveillence video). If someone has nothing of the sort on you and their entire claim is that you wrote some digital message, I'd think the onus would be on them to prove their extraordinary claim somehow.
zelly 6y ago
Damn why didn't they use a messenger not made by idiots > The algorithms employed are many times stronger than that of PGP (RSA+AES). If they just used PGP over email, they wouldn't have gotten caught. From what I have heard most criminals since the 90s use PGP over email (middle management and higher criminals not street thugs who probably just use WhatsApp or worse). They should go back to that.
- mszcz 6y ago
  Well, it tells you a lot about the ease of use of PGP when people prefer to go to jail rather than use PGP ;P
- sbarre 6y ago
  If you read the Vice article, it explains that they were compromised by on-device "malware" that was pushed in an update via the company provider (whose software update process had been taken over by the authorities). So it doesn't matter what software they would have used since the device itself was capturing data before encryption and after decryption.
  - zelly 6y ago
    They could have been using regular iPhones/Galaxies/Pixels etc. Then it wouldn't rely on this bespoke operating system and its updates. It seems unlikely Play Store or Apple Store would get compromised. But you could always compile the PGP app yourself.
    - berkes 6y ago
      Could law enforcement require access to play and appstores? Has this happened? Law enforcement could replace an app, with their own, even for one specific user, if they have access to the system, granted by Google or Apple. I presume the signing can can be compromised, this way, but am unfamiliar to know this for sure.
    - sbarre 6y ago
      Using those stores means using those centralized services by Apple and Google, which includes device updates, carrier updates and more than just app store downloads. And those companies would absolutely comply with a legal request to push intercept updates to phones.

fredley 6y ago

> We employ algorithms from different families of mathematics Did they roll their own?

0xFluegel 6y ago
Could also simply mean that they are chaining different encryption algos from libraries (à la TrueCrypt) which would indeed add to the security level or even at worst not harm it. (This assumes that each step is not broken...)
alias_neo 6y ago
It's unclear, but that statement alone makes me shudder. Anyone doing secure comms at this level, and is talking about families of mathematics always gives me the impression they don't really know what they're doing.
- 0xFluegel 6y ago
  > Anyone doing secure comms at this level, and is talking about families of mathematics always gives me the impression they don't really know what they're doing. Why is that? Do you assume that making competent choices for encryption algorithms (for which you try to understand the math problems involved) and trying to market the systems security means that they also try to implement it themselves? Or is the "family of mathematics" a sign for incompetence that I just don't recognize?
  - red_admiral 6y ago
    As someone who's worked in the sector (the crypto sector, not the crime one): "Families of Mathematics" is a marketing statement, or "hot air" as I prefer to call it. The information content of that statement is zero, what it's doing is trying to project warm "you can trust us" feelings. A statement aimed at technical people would read more like "we use AES-256-OFB with Axolotl on Curve25519 and scrypt(2^14, 8, 1)" or something like that. To a crypto professional, I'd say any "trust us" statement that's not backed up by technical information actually lowers their trust in the system - it makes you wonder why they're not making their algorithm choice public.
    - 0xFluegel 6y ago
      Thanks for clarifying. You convinced me.
    - charwalker 6y ago
      The US created a fake bank to catch drug runners and cartel bosses. What's to say this isn't an state intelligence backed company created not to sell a product but to be sold to criminals then listened to until warrants were signed? I haven't looked into the service at all so could be totally off.
      - pas 6y ago
        Wow. Do you happen to have more details about that fake bank honeypot?
        taylorfinley 6y ago
        There's an excellent episode of the npr podcast Planet Money that covers this story: https://www.npr.org/transcripts/694548245 https://www.npr.org/transcripts/694548245
        charwalker 6y ago
        That's where I heard it, yeah.

Faaak 6y ago

I have to agree that point 2 is very clever. "It was not me, your Honour, as anyone can send a message by my (old) name)

Thorrez 6y ago
It (deniable authentication) has been provided previously by OTR. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_authentication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_authentication TLS provides a weaker version (instead of everyone in the world being able to forge a message, just your peer is able to forge the message).

dkarp 6y ago

> Each message session with each contact is encrypted with a different set of keys" Is this not a bad thing? Since transferring key-pairs is the weakest link on these apps. To be really secure, wouldn't you want to do this as infrequently as possible and ideally outside in person outside the app?

robmccoll 6y ago
Sounds like they are trying to achieve perfect forward secrecy per message. Typically you might do this with Diffie-Hellman using ephemeral derivation pairs per session. This is good practice as if any one session key is broken, that has no effect on the privacy of past or future messages encrypted under different session keys. They seem to be claiming to use their own crypto based on the parent comment (red flag) and no signature scheme over the top of it to prove a consistent identity, so I'm not sure what they would be doing. Establishing encrypted pipes over an observable medium is very doable, but providing a way to trust that the party on the other end of the pipe is who you think it is is the hard part as you pointed out.
- deleted 6y ago
  [deleted]
red_admiral 6y ago
It would be fine if they meant "forward-secure ratchet construction", like Signal does. You can rotate message/session keys easily enough if you have a shared long(er) term key.
deleted 6y ago
[deleted]
alias_neo 6y ago
Session keys are fine, and they're usually not the top level identity or key. So long as this is what they're doing, i.e. using an asymmetric KEx (e.g. Diffie-Hellman) to exchange public keys, from which a shared secret would be derived, and then from that a KDF would be used to generate a key using a salt, you can keep generating new keys for each session from that shared secret (shared in the sense that it's symmetric, not that you send it over the wire). You can still be more secure, but that's a decent start.

Thorrez 6y ago

>This assures non-reputability of messages. No, they're assuring reputability, not non-reputability.

nickcox 6y ago
Perhaps they were going for non-repudiation?
oconnor663 6y ago
I've never heard "reputability" used in crypto, but confusingly, it might be the opposite of "repudiability"?
kibibu 6y ago
I read it as saying you could deny writing any specific message as it could have been forged after the session ended. Non-reputability.
alias_neo 6y ago
I disagree, I believe, they're trying to say they provide "non-reputability" (the opposite to non-repudiation) so you can deny messages actually came from you because they could have been "forged". it's hard to tell though, the statements are a bit of a mess in general.
- Thorrez 6y ago
  Hmm, you're right that non-reputability likely means something different than non-repudiation. The problem is I can't find anyone actually using non-reputability in that other meaning. What I do find is various places using non-reputability erroneously as a synonym for non-repudiation.[1][2][3] So in fact I now think that EncroChat actually made 2 errors: said non-reputability instead of non-repudiation, and also misunderstood non-repudiation as meaning repudiation. [1] https://books.google.com/books?id=qk_hDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT682&lpg=PT682&dq=%22reputability%22+crypto&source=bl&ots=rNy0g5x6sN&sig=ACfU3U39G8jU9-0zFxLIkP-nZoy5ysI6fA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiP35T8vK_qAhVFip4KHWI1BZcQ6AEwDnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22reputability%22%20crypto&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=qk_hDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT682&lpg=... [2] https://books.google.com/books?id=_d7RUNF-2tcC&pg=PR21&lpg=PR21&dq=%22reputability%22+crypto&source=bl&ots=eAOarG8b3D&sig=ACfU3U1vOALyOL63rwHll5jzZhdnu5kGUw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiP35T8vK_qAhVFip4KHWI1BZcQ6AEwDHoECA0QAQ#v=onepage&q=%22reputability%22%20crypto&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=_d7RUNF-2tcC&pg=PR21&lpg=P... [3] https://books.google.com/books?id=PHBTDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA61&lpg=PA61&dq=%22reputability%22+crypto&source=bl&ots=_5ow00ZlU9&sig=ACfU3U1otQu_phi4LZwzBq-sHu8vFTZDKQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiP35T8vK_qAhVFip4KHWI1BZcQ6AEwC3oECAsQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22reputability%22%20crypto&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=PHBTDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA61&lpg=P...

red_admiral 6y ago

Saying "many times stronger than RSA/AES" but not providing details on the algorithms is a huge red flag. If they have built some home-grown algorithm, then it's possible the NCA actually cracked the encryption (with a bit of help from GCHQ) rather than using the baseband processor to snoop on the keys or something like that.

GekkePrutser 6y ago
It could also be implementation-based. A few years ago they rounded up a ring of crime phones in the Netherlands.. They were using PGP encryption, however instead of each phone generating its own private key, they generated them centrally and kept them in a database. Obviously this introduced a huge vulnerability. The police compromised the server and was listening in (through cooperation with Canadian police as they were using Blackberries) for quite a while before they started kicking doors down :D They basically got all the evidence on a silver platter. I'm surprised someone with the skill to develop such an app and service platform doesn't have the skill for avoiding such common mistakes. Or maybe they weren't able to explain to their users that the fact that they couldn't retrieve their messages after forgetting their pincode is a feature, not a bug. Either way, the police was really happy. https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-judge-releases-encrypted-blackberry-messages-from-20000-users-to-dutch-crime-probe/ https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-judge-releases... Not saying the same would have happened here, but crypto is hard to implement correctly and the algorithms are only part of the problem. And this kind of network is a massive target for law enforcement because the ratio of criminal users is huge.
- speleding 6y ago
  Actually, according to Dutch press (nrc.nl), it was the same detectives who performed that hack who were flown into France to do this hack as well. Good for them, but I hope for their sake their names do not leak.
- hackermailman 6y ago
  Another famous case was a crime lord who's blackberry pin was written on a sticky note so police got everything. https://www.chch.com/niagara-drug-kingpin-goes-trial-murder/ https://www.chch.com/niagara-drug-kingpin-goes-trial-murder/

test7777 6y ago

algorithms don't matter for shit to the person that controls the (mandatory) updates. its the same issue with all modern e2e apps like whatsapp or signal, if there is a single client implementation its not secure at all to these kind of attacks.

anonymousiam 6y ago
Exactly! All it takes is a "demand letter" from any government with jurisdiction. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit
traverseda 6y ago
> signal [...] > if there is a single client implementation its not secure at all to these kind of attacks. There are (where?) actually multiple "distributions" of signal, like textSecure on f-droid. Last I checked it worked with signal, but that was a few years ago.
- alexandrerond 6y ago
  No, Moxy killed the alternatives with really shitty arguments and banning from using Signal official servers.

upofadown 6y ago

>Anyone can forge messages after a conversation is complete to make them look like they came from you. "I didn't send those messages your honour. Someone forged them. I am a victim of a conspiracy!" "Do you have any evidence that this actually happened?" "No." "...moving right along..." It will be fun if someone from this actually tries a cryptogeek argument in real life...

hcs 6y ago
Ross Ulbricht tried essentially that defense.
- SAI_Peregrinus 6y ago
  Exactly. The tricky part of plausible deniability is that it needs to actually be plausible. People very often screw this part up. EG they'll make a TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt hidden volume, but then won't modify the outer volume with the same access patterns to hide their usage of the hidden volume.
woah 6y ago
Doesn't this put the burden of proof on the accused?
- upofadown 6y ago
  People have been claiming they have been framed since forever. If claiming you were framed with zero proof actually helped in any way then every one would do it and much time would be wasted. In the case of a crypto forgeablity argument there will never be any proof. It will always be a false claim. It is a silly idea.
  - kazinator 6y ago
    > People have been claiming they have been framed since forever. Yes they have, but they have been doing so in the face of circumstantial evidence: DNA, fingerprints, blood, whatever. Or eyewitness evidence: someone saw you go in the building at such and such time (perhaps there is a surveillence video). If someone has nothing of the sort on you and their entire claim is that you wrote some digital message, I'd think the onus would be on them to prove their extraordinary claim somehow.

zelly 6y ago

Damn why didn't they use a messenger not made by idiots > The algorithms employed are many times stronger than that of PGP (RSA+AES). If they just used PGP over email, they wouldn't have gotten caught. From what I have heard most criminals since the 90s use PGP over email (middle management and higher criminals not street thugs who probably just use WhatsApp or worse). They should go back to that.

mszcz 6y ago
Well, it tells you a lot about the ease of use of PGP when people prefer to go to jail rather than use PGP ;P
sbarre 6y ago
If you read the Vice article, it explains that they were compromised by on-device "malware" that was pushed in an update via the company provider (whose software update process had been taken over by the authorities). So it doesn't matter what software they would have used since the device itself was capturing data before encryption and after decryption.
- zelly 6y ago
  They could have been using regular iPhones/Galaxies/Pixels etc. Then it wouldn't rely on this bespoke operating system and its updates. It seems unlikely Play Store or Apple Store would get compromised. But you could always compile the PGP app yourself.
  - berkes 6y ago
    Could law enforcement require access to play and appstores? Has this happened? Law enforcement could replace an app, with their own, even for one specific user, if they have access to the system, granted by Google or Apple. I presume the signing can can be compromised, this way, but am unfamiliar to know this for sure.
  - sbarre 6y ago
    Using those stores means using those centralized services by Apple and Google, which includes device updates, carrier updates and more than just app store downloads. And those companies would absolutely comply with a legal request to push intercept updates to phones.