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> Windows and MacOS enforce signature checking on all binaries. This is not a meaningful security feature. If the signature has to be from the manufacturer the
by AnthonyMouse 6y ago
> Windows and MacOS enforce signature checking on all binaries.
This is not a meaningful security feature. If the signature has to be from the manufacturer then you can't so much as write your own shell script, which is useless. That is a cage, not a security measure. But if the user can sign their own binaries then the signature is the equivalent of the execute bit -- you have to tell the system something is executable before it will execute it. Linux has had that forever.
- bitbang 6y agoI'd rather shit Legos than have to deal with binary signature checking.
- craftinator 6y agoOn Linux, just automate it.
- imtringued 6y agoThe signature could be tied to a sandbox. Signed apps each have their own sandbox. User signed apps all get thrown into the same sandbox. Otherwise I agree. A signature can't actually meaningfully exist as a security feature in an open source operating system where you are able to compile every piece of software yourself.
- AnthonyMouse 6y agoSignatures and sandboxing are independent. You can have either one without the other.
- noobermin 6y agoYou're going to make ipsec heads explode comparing signing a binary to setting a file's execute bit.
- infokiller 6y agoSignatures are meaningful when the keys are more secure than the servers hosting the data. If you download software from a hacked server that serves you malware, the signature check will fail. In contrast, the execute bit can be changed by anyone. The problem is that you need to get the authentic public key of the software distributor to verify the signature. If an attacker is able to forge the public key, they can easily forge the signature and the signature check will succeed.
- AnthonyMouse 6y ago> The problem is that you need to get the authentic public key of the software distributor to verify the signature. Right. If you already have a secure channel to receive the signing key over, you can just use it to receive the software to begin with. Meanwhile we do have a CA system that lets you download the software via TLS. It's not perfect, but breaking TLS or compromising a CA are not even close to common methods of delivering malware.
- infokiller 6y ago> Right. If you already have a secure channel to receive the signing key over, you can just use it to receive the software to begin with. Note that the secure channel sometimes has more limited bandwidth. An example would be reading part of your public key over the phone, which is not practical for the actual software. There are other considerations that make using the secure channel for the software itself impractical. For example, you can have many people publish known public keys on their website, so that other people could verify them with some majority voting. > Meanwhile we do have a CA system that lets you download the software via TLS. It's not perfect, but breaking TLS or compromising a CA are not even close to common methods of delivering malware. The main risk is not breaking TLS or CAs, but rather compromising the server that you download the software from, and serving malware instead. Indeed, if the same server is used for serving the public key, you don't gain much, because the attacker can just generate their own key pair, sign the malware, and publish their key. But ideally, the public key would not be published from the same server, making an attack more difficult.