3 ms·
The fact you can take faster guesses at them to try and recover the secret doesn't change the fact that they are, in themselves, not secrets. The whole purpose
by pvg 6y ago
The fact you can take faster guesses at them to try and recover the secret doesn't change the fact that they are, in themselves, not secrets. The whole purpose of the hashing is to make them not-secrets. They may be more sensitive in some way but they are not meaningfully 'secrets'.
- tialaramex 6y ago> The whole purpose of the hashing is to make them not-secrets. I put that thought experiment there for a reason. The choice to use password hashing is in effect an admission that they'll still be secrets. We are only using a specialist password hash because we know at least some fraction of our users will be using poor quality human memorable passwords. Less fUTz2uIHExKCHbLxMgNHWhnU and more Sup3rman. If we believed users were choosing random alphanumerics like fUTz2uIHExKCHbLxMgNHWhnU then we don't need a password hash, you can just use a plain cryptohash like SHA256. It's safe, it's faster, nothing not to like about it. You can publish that hash, ain't no way anybody is going to reverse it to get the password back because there are too many possibilities to try. Try it: cbc08cf5e1039d686879535794dc3616b020aed6ff92c52bdfe0f33360eb167b But, we can't do that because we know real users aren't using such passwords. The users are picking human memorable passwords and so even after they've been stretched as much as we can stomach too many of them are still weak and so they are still secret.
- pvg 6y agoThe thought experiment is bad for the same reason, which you appear to agree with. The hashes are not secrets, it's just that passwords are pretty bad secrets. If I gave you an RSA modulus in which you know one factor is chosen from a range of a few trillion primes, the public key could be broken if public. The fact that typical user-chosen passwords are iffy secrets doesn't make the hashes secrets as well. The choice to use password hashing is in effect an admission that they'll still be secrets. We are only using a specialist password hash No, as you say yourself, we'd still hash if the passwords were random strings. Which turns them into non-secrets. The specialized hashing is an admission that many passwords are guessable. It sorts of sounds like you want to forklift your own terminology into this using the fact that user-selected passwords can be guessed.
- tialaramex 6y ago> If I gave you an RSA modulus in which you know one factor is chosen from a range of a few trillion primes, the public key could be broken if public. And so public CAs are obliged to forbid such practices to the extent they're able to detect them. As a result on the whole users who try to use crap moduli get denied. Go try it, mint yourself an RSA pair such that the public modulus is 11 x n or something easy, and ask Let's Encrypt to issue for that key in a name you own, they'll refuse explaining that your proposed key is crap. Here's a nickel kid go buy yourself a better semi-prime. In contrast the vast majority of password protected user accounts don't even check Pwned passwords. I can sign up for a lot of stuff literally using Sup3rman as my password. > The fact that typical user-chosen passwords are iffy secrets doesn't make the hashes secrets as well. Yes, in practice it does. > as you say yourself, we'd still hash if the passwords were random strings. Which turns them into non-secrets. That works on random strings, but it doesn't work on non-random strings. No amount of processing can magically make the non-random strings be random and so Argon2id("Sup3rman") is going to need to be treated as a secret or else any fool can just try the most popular passwords and reverse it.
- e12e 6y agoYes, it does. If I have a properly salted/hashed password dump, I can easily check common passwords against all users. Assume 5m users. The odds of finding any user with password: "Password2020" is pretty high. But you'd need 5m requests against the service to do the same thing. There's no rate limit on local, offline attacks. Are salted hashes better than, hashed, or plain text passwords? Yes! But there's still more attacks possible with access to the data. This gets much worse, if the password/secret is limited, say a 4 digit pin - or a social scurity/government id number with error correcting code (eg the Norwegian government ID is 11 digits, but 2 are error correcting, and 6 are a date - so it's pretty much impossible to store them hashed in a secure fashion. You only need to try 365.25 * ~60 years * 1000 numbers to find/recover all - a far cry from 10^11 - which is pretty low anyway). If the passwords are all truly random, well over 64 bits of entropy, and never re-used and/or leaked... then properly hashed, a dump would not leak much information. But there'll always be re-use, and at that point, exposing the salted hash along with a linked login name will expose information (of course, sometimes the login will be the same as well - but it's still valuable to know login is possible before trying to login to a service).
- pvg 6y agoYou should perhaps read the rest of this thread if you haven't had a chance since you seem to be rehashing (whee!) an argument that was just had.