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At $work, udp/443 is blocked to the internet specifically because our corporate proxy can't deal with QUIC and Chrome tries using it a lot. Companies have a le
by unethical_ban 6y ago
At $work, udp/443 is blocked to the internet specifically because our corporate proxy can't deal with QUIC and Chrome tries using it a lot.
Companies have a legal and moral imperative to see what content is leaving their network, and until some combination of host/network governance is developed to only allow pre-authorized traffic to egress, MITM boxes will need to be supported.
- JoshTriplett 6y ago> Companies have a legal and moral imperative to see what content is leaving their network, and until some combination of host/network governance is developed to only allow pre-authorized traffic to egress, MITM boxes will need to be supported. "a legal and moral imperative"? No. Such networks are security threats and should be repeatedly broken until they give up. It will become increasingly expensive to even try. And an increasing number of security researchers will find ways to make maintaining MITM technologies more difficult and less transparent. You can block spam and outbound attacks without MITMing traffic. MITMing traffic is not about protecting the outside world in any way. It's technology sold to companies out of fear (or misguided regulatory requirements). One day it will go the way of the virus scanner: dead, worse than useless, and only existing to satisfy a decreasing number of corporate checkboxes.
- unethical_ban 6y agoYou completely ignore the concept of data breaches and preventing them. You complain about the alleged problem, "man in the middle" technologies, without any proposed solution. Let me be clear: If you do not think private companies and businesses have a right, and sometimes an obligation, to secure and monitor the traffic on their networks, then you are flat out incorrect, and this conversation can end. If you agree they need to monitor data, but that MITM technologies are a societal risk more than a benefit, I am all ears. Host-based data scanning at an OS level; signed traffic that the network can trust has been scanned by authorized hosts (so rogue hosts don't send traffic out); and so on. edit: I don't think your message is consistent, but I think that is not a sign of malice. You say "Companies have no legal or moral need to see what content is leaving their network" then say "You can block spam and outbound attacks without MITMing traffic." You seem to be equating "See the content leaving their network" with "MITM", but then say later that companies can "prevent outbound attacks" without MITM. The #1 threat for many companies is data loss. How do you propose DLP gets accomplished with zero access to the network?
- kstrauser 6y agoYour employer provides you with a medical insurance plan. On your break at work, you use your company laptop to access the insurer's website and use their find-a-doctor tool to search for a cancer doctor. This is a legitimate use of your work computer, after all. Does your employer have a right and obligation to see that you're searching for a cancer doctor? Go to a large company's IT department and find the person there you dislike the most. Do you want that person monitoring the traffic and seeing that you searched for a cancer doctor? Now you know why so very many of us believe you are completely wrong about this.
- unethical_ban 6y agoDo you want your bank to be hacked and have a 50GB database backup with all your accounts and transaction history slow-leaked out via DNS queries? Now you see why so many of us believe you are completely wrong about this. To your point: If it is their network, it's their network and their computer. Access the website from home, or from your phone, which isn't MITM'ed on the corporate network. If it is a resource only available on the corporate network, but it is not a "company resource" such as find-a-doctor, then you can (a) accept that the company may see it, (b) contact information security and ask if they can, or (c) find another way to get the information/complain to HR/ombudsman/whatever. It is up to the company to do the right thing when possible, which means (in our case) we don't intercept websites categorized banking, health, and a handful of others. Information security obfuscates/blocks the showing of personally identifiable logs to the rest of IT, as well. Again, banks (in my example) have an obligation to their millions of customers to protect their data, more than you have a right to browse a doctor tool or upload sensitive spreadsheets to your personal Google Drive to work on over the weekend.
- droitbutch 6y ago> Does your employer have a right and obligation to see that you're searching for a cancer doctor? Do you have the right to prioritize your personal activities over your employers protection of its' data? Creating blindspots on enterprise networks won't get far - especially not given today's realities of breaches.
- Spivak 6y agoYou don't have a right to know what network traffic is leaving your network from machines you own? Such an odd stance from a techie since this also applies to your Chromecast, Roku, Alexa, Laptop, Phone. Exactly zero companies care about "protecting the outside world", MITM Boxes are required to have a record and scan all traffic going through your network. If PHI is exfiltrated we can't just tell the auditor "sorry ma'am we have no visibility into our network by design. Could have been from anywhere. shrug"
- jessaustin 6y agoI'm sure there are auditors who would sign off on it, but you can't really claim that shitboxes prevent PHI exfil. This is like putting up a ten-foot-long fence a mile from the barn with the open door. You lost the battle the moment that data was viewed on any device that wasn't currently operated by a health professional with a reason to see it.
- fulafel 6y agoWhen those computers are used by people who you don't own, this reasoning doesn't hold.
- Spivak 6y agoKiosks?
- droitbutch 6y ago> Such networks are security threats and should be repeatedly broken until they give up. Why the hostility towards entities that have determined their best course of action to protect THEIR networks is by focusing on the network egress pipe? Simple and efficient to focus on one chokepoint vs patching a myriad of devices + client software + client versions + OS versions + future versions etc. > It will become increasingly expensive to even try. Go ahead, but you're increasingly unlikely to win that battle. There's bound to be some software or version that the enterprise cannot control (e.g. prevent data exfiltration) at which point, enterprises will have no solution but turn to SSL MITM again. Remember, it's the enterprises' network and data - not yours.
- JoshTriplett 6y ago> Why the hostility towards entities Among many other reasons, because such entities repeatedly try to weaken Internet security standards and software to accommodate their expectations. That's an attack, and deserves an appropriate response. Also, because today, everyone doesn't always have enough choices of potential employers that they can avoid such policies. Also, because nobody should ever get used to the idea that their network is MITMing their traffic, not least of which because that normalizes such technologies on other networks and in other contexts. Also, surveillance technologies like this will be abused by people with power over others; there's a long history of such abuse. And those are just the reasons off the top of my head. > Go ahead, you're increasingly unlikely to win that battle. What happens when libraries and software starts dropping support for old, insecure protocols, and the new protocols are designed to treat MITM as an attack? What happens when, even before that, companies that MITM have to replace cheap MITM infrastructure with incredibly expensive MITM infrastructure? What happens when software and services start treating the resulting decreasing percentage of companies that try to MITM the way they treat companies still running IE6, and tell them "you'll have to upgrade your network"? What happens when people trying to MITM find they can't run modern software stacks, and their auditors complain that they're not upgrading? What happens when they're spending huge amounts of money maintaining forks and patches? What happens when the engineers who would have to maintain those patches don't want to work on a hostile network, and the ones that remain are more expensive? There are many things people can do to make life difficult for anyone trying to MITM.
- api 6y agoControlling exfiltration by blocking ports. That's cute. There are SO many ways to exfiltrate data. The only way to control exfiltration with a chance of success greater than zero is to lock down all work devices (at the OS level, centrally managed) and prohibit outside devices including USB keys. Anything less is a joke.