5 ms·
> Otherwise, your options are a separate yubikey-like token that you buy and "personalize" These "burner phone"-keys are perhaps preferable to many people. >
by raxxorrax 6y ago
> Otherwise, your options are a separate yubikey-like token that you buy and "personalize"
These "burner phone"-keys are perhaps preferable to many people.
> you can't have an endogenous hardware root of trust on each device
You mean practically transferable? Sadly, a lot of security applications currently link their functionality to specific phone hardware. I think the whole approach to declare your device compromised just doesn't really fit practical applications but has become a pretty common axiom, although I understand the pessimism if we look at OS for mobile devices. Why would I believe trusted computing hardware and not the software in times we change both frequently? Doesn't really ring a bell for me. And beyond that I don't like to be treated as a terrorist by my own machine.
I fully agree that an identity should be at least disposable and certainly as anonymous as it can be. This are the core requirements I would level at a solution.